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HARNESSING PRIVATE REGULATION 
Lesley K. McAllister* 
In private regulation, private actors make, implement, and enforce rules that 
serve traditional public goals. While private safety standards have a long history, 
private social and environmental regulation in the forms of self-regulation, sup-
ply chain contracting, and voluntary certification and labeling programs have 
proliferated in the past couple decades. This expansion of private regulation raises 
the question of how it might be harnessed by public actors to build better regula-
tory regimes. This Article tackles this question first by identifying three forms of 
strong harnessing: public incorporation of private standards, public endorsement 
of self-regulation, and third-party verification. It then analyzes eight third-party 
verification programs established by six federal regulatory agencies to derive les-
sons about what makes a program successful and to develop recommendations to 
federal agencies about when and how they should use third-party verification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Private regulation is a large and growing field of regulatory activity.1 
Industry associations set health and safety standards for their member 
companies. Companies with global supply chains establish codes of conduct 
for their foreign suppliers regarding treatment of workers and the environ-
ment. Companies join voluntary programs that certify and label their 
consumer products to indicate compliance with social and environmental 
criteria. Private auditors are hired to assess corporate compliance with rules 
and standards developed by both governments and private entities. In all 
these forms of private regulation, private actors engage in developing and 
implementing rules that serve the traditional social goals of public regula-
tion, particularly health, safety, and environmental protection.2 
Private regulation is often viewed as an alternative to public regula-
tion.3 It tends to develop where there are gaps in public regulation.4 Private 
environmental governance has thrived in the United States, for example, in 
the absence of significant new legislation.5 Gaps may also be present be-
cause existing governmental institutions cannot reach certain activity. 
Economic globalization has been an important driver of private regulation 
because governmental actors lack sufficient authority to regulate against 
many of the negative social externalities of international economic activity.6 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 129, 140–41 (2013) (discussing the “large number of private environmental governance 
initiatives that have emerged”); see also infra notes 37–40 and associated text.  
 2. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 147 (referring to private governance as the “devel-
opment and enforcement by private parties of requirements designed to achieve traditionally 
governmental ends”). On the distinction between social regulation and economic regulation, 
see Keith Hawkins, Rule and Discretion in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Social Regula-
tion, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1989) (distinguishing social regulation from other forms of 
regulatory control that seek to control markets or other aspects of economic life); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 609 (identifying health, safety, 
broadcasting, discrimination, and the environment as areas of social regulation and 
distinguishing social regulation from economic regulation). While much of its analysis may 
also apply to economic regulation, this Article limits its focus to social regulation.  
 3. As others have discussed, the lines between public and private blur upon examina-
tion. See especially Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative 
Law, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331 (David 
Dyzenhaus ed., 1999); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229 n.1 (2003). However, these terms continue to be 
useful as “shorthand for describing different kinds of regulatory actors.” Freeman, supra, at 
334 n.13. 
 4. Cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Con-
tracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 919 (2007). 
 5. See Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 133. 
 6. Cf. Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 20 (2011) (discussing drivers of transnational private regulation); Frederick Mayer & 
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Even when public actors have the power to regulate, companies or indus-
tries may develop private regulation in an attempt to address public  
concerns and preempt new governmental regulation.7 Commonly cited 
benefits of enabling private actors to exercise functions that would other-
wise be carried out by public actors include enhancing pluralism, better 
representing interests, increasing expertise, and reducing governmental 
bureaucracy and cost.8 
Less examined are the ways that private regulation may be coordinated 
and even integrated with public regulation.9 Public regulation suffers from 
many well-documented deficiencies. Rulemaking has been described as 
ossified.10 Regulatory implementation is subject to slippage.11 Enforcement 
is unreliable and agencies lack data to assess compliance.12 Regulatory agen-
cies endure budget constraints and downsizing.13 In this context, an apt 
                                                                                                                      
Gary Gereffi, Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Govern-
ance, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, art. 11, 2010 at 1, 3 (explaining that private governance responds 
to the public governance deficit in the face of economic globalization); David Vogel, The 
Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievement and Limitations, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 
68, 72–73 (2010). 
 7. Responsible Care, which was established in the wake of the Bhopal disaster, has 
been viewed as an example of this. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, “Voluntary” Ap-
proaches to Environmental Regulation: A Survey, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE 75, 79 (Maurizio Franzini & Anto-
nio Nicita eds., 2002); see also ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION 
IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 179–80 (1990) (discussing private regulatory action 
taken with the intention o� forestalling governmental regulation). 
 8. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 651–
57 (1986); see also Minow, supra note 3, at 1242–46 (citing potential increases in quality of 
public services, incentives for improvement, pluralism, and new knowledge).  
 9. An important body o� legal scholarship has recognized the many public functions 
that private actors fulfill, but there has been little work on how public and private regulation 
can be coordinated and integrated. Key works include Freeman, supra note 3; Jody Freeman, 
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2003); 
Minow, supra note 3; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, 
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Free-
man & Martha Minow eds., 2009).  
 10. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
 11. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance 
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999). 
 12. Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits: 
There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 86 
(2010).  
 13. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1756–59 (2008); Paul Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310, 311 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
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question is whether public and private regulation can be combined to create 
more robust regulatory regimes.14 More specifically, this Article addresses 
whether and how private regulation can be leveraged—or harnessed—by 
public regulators to achieve the objectives of public law.15 By relying on the 
mechanisms and institutions of private regulation, public regulators may be 
able to regulate more effectively.16  
Such harnessing has been recognized as a possibility by other scholars, 
but little analysis exists regarding how public regulators can design regula-
tory regimes that include significant roles for private actors.17 As one 
commentator has stated, “scholarship on new regulatory forms has produced 
far more empirical research on their rise and character than on their transla-
tion into practice.”18 To the extent that legal scholars have considered how 
private regulation can be leveraged to serve public goals, they have focused 
primarily on the constitutionality of private delegations and the incorpora-
tion of private standards.19 Much less has been written about designing 
                                                                                                                      
 14. On the concept of a regulatory regime, see DAVID LEVI-FAUR, Regulation & 
Regulatory Governance, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 13–14 (David 
Levi-Faur ed., 2011) (“The notion of a regulatory regime encompasses the norms, the 
mechanisms of decision making, and the network of actors that are involved in regulation.”); 
Colin Scott, Regulating Everything: From Mega- to Meta-Regulation, 60 ADMINISTRATION 61, 
67 (2012) (“A regulatory regime is the aggregation of the activities of those whose actions 
shape behaviour within a particular set sector or policy domain.”). 
 15. Harnessing is used herein in the sense o� leveraging or bringing into service or 
incorporating, cf. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence 
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1253 (pointing out that harnessing can be 
used in two senses: to mean either leveraging or constraining). 
 16. Cf. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
549 (2000) (stating that administrative law needs to reorient “toward facilitating the effec-
tiveness of public/private regulatory regimes”).  
 17. Id. (mentioning the “possibility o� harnessing private capacity to serve public 
goals”); see also Tim Büthe, Global Private Politics: A Research Agenda, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, 
art. 12, 2010 at 1, 19 (stating that it is possible that private regulation can “strengthen public 
regulation, for instance if the former addresses problems that are inherently transnational 
and hence cannot be effectively regulated by any one state unilaterally”); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (discussing contractual standard 
setting and contractual enforcement); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Govern-
ance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 
(2006) (suggesting that transformation in the law can be achieved by yoking private and 
public regulation together); see also infra notes 151–156 and associated text. 
 18. Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely 
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 365 (2010) (citing 
Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory 
Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
31, 50 (2008)). 
 19. On the constitutionality of private delegations, see especially Harold I. Abram-
son, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 168 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: 
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public regulation to incorporate the implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms that are commonly used in private regulation.20 By analyzing 
how major federal programs in the United States have been structured to 
enable third-party verifiers to assess the compliance of regulated entities, 
this Article helps fill that void. Moreover, the Article’s broad analytical 
framework combines the insights of scholarship on private and public regu-
lation in ways that suggest a set of criteria for designing public-private 
regulatory regimes and invite further theoretical and empirical research.  
In its first part, this Article explains the concept of private regulation 
and analyzes the public harnessing of private regulation. This part begins 
by defining private regulation and identifying how private actors engage in 
standard setting, implementation, and enforcement in the most common 
forms of private regulation. It then conceptualizes harnessing and distin-
guishes weak forms from strong forms, in which a private regulatory 
function substitutes for a public regulatory function. Private standard set-
ting, for example, is strongly harnessed when private standards are 
incorporated into public regulation. Private standard setting and private 
implementation are strongly harnessed when public law endorses self-
regulation in various forms. And private implementation is strongly har-
nessed in third-party verification programs that rely on private inspectors 
to monitor and assess compliance with public law.21  
The remaining three parts of the Article focus on third-party verifica-
tion programs established by federal regulatory agencies.22 In these 
programs, federal agencies rely on private third parties that they have ap-
proved to provide information about the regulated entity’s compliance with 
                                                                                                                      
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. 
L. REV. 62; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003). 
On the incorporation of private standards, see Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in 
an Open Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013); Robert W. Hamilton, The 
Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting 
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (1978); Nina Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to 
Public Law: The Puzzling Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737 
(2014); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013).  
 20. Cf. Colin Scott, Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in Transnational Regulation, 
13 GERMAN L. J. 1329, 1330 (2012) (noting the need to “consider also the central importance 
of mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement”). 
 21. See especially Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 1 (2012).  
 22. These parts are closely based on a report that the author prepared for the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States. See LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, THIRD PARTY 
PROGRAMS TO ASSESS REGULATORY COMPLIANCE (2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Third-Party-Programs-Report_Final.pdf. 
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applicable standards.23 While not an entirely new practice, third-party 
verification seems to be increasingly attractive to Congress and federal 
agencies in light of inadequate agency resources and other persistent barri-
ers to reliably monitoring regulatory compliance.24 The Article’s objective 
in these parts is to analyze the design and performance of existing federal 
third-party programs and make policy recommendations for future pro-
grams based on this analysis. To gather information about existing 
programs, the author reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, guidance 
documents, and reports. She also conducted twenty interviews of agency 
staff and other experts.  
Eight third-party verification programs developed by six different fed-
eral agencies are identified and described in the second part of the Article.25 
Congress directed agencies to use third-party verification in four of the 
programs. In the others, agencies chose third-party verification without 
specific Congressional authorization. In four of the programs, third parties 
are used by regulatory agencies to assess compliance with mandatory regu-
latory standards such as food and medical device safety standards. In the 
other four, third parties assess compliance with voluntary regulatory stand-
ards like those for U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) organic food 
label and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Energy Star label. 
In all but two of the eight programs, the regulated entity has no choice but 
to contract with a third party if it wants to show compliance with the man-
datory or voluntary standard. Four of the programs were established before 
2003 (with one dating to the late 1980s), and four others have been estab-
lished since 2008.  
                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. at 7–8 (“Several types of programs that share some similarities but do not meet 
this description are outside the scope of this Article. Examples include (1) where a federal 
agency places responsibility for inspecting and providing information about compliance 
directly on regulated entities; (2) where a federal agency relies on state agency personnel to 
inspect and provide information about compliance [as in the USDA’s Good Agricultural 
Practices/Good Handling Practices (GAP/GHP) Audit Program]; (3) where a federal 
agency takes into account whether a regulated entity is certified as meeting an [International 
Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC)] 
standard or other similar privately-established standard in determining its inspection priori-
ties; and (4) where an agency uses private third parties to assess compliance with its own 
procurement or federal assistance policies.”).  
 24. Congress has required the use of third-party verification in two recent major 
reforms of regulatory legislation: the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, see infra Part 
II.A.1; and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, see infra Part II.A.2.  
 25. The author’s research showed these eight programs to be the most significant and 
well-documented examples of third-party verification in federal environmental, health, and 
safety regulation. See supra note 23 and associated text for specification of types of programs 
that fell outside the scope of the research.  
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The third part develops a set of metrics of success for third-party pro-
grams. While a variety o� forces are leading public regulators to consider 
third-party programs, there has been little analysis and discussion of what a 
successful program looks like. The metrics of success identified and dis-
cussed include the reliability of the compliance assessments made by third-
party verifiers, the rates at which regulated entities comply with standards 
when third-party verification is used, the sufficiency of agency resources for 
establishing and maintaining a third-party program, and the acceptance of 
the program by the public and by industry. In the case of programs that 
allow but do not require regulated entities to use third-party verifiers, the 
rate at which regulated entities do so is another relevant metric of success.  
The fourth and final part consists of policy recommendations to federal 
agencies about whether and how to establish a third-party program. The 
first set of recommendations pertains to federal agencies that are consider-
ing whether to establish a third-party program. Agencies are advised, for 
example, to consult available public and private resources, consider the 
suitability of the regulatory problem for third-party verification, and com-
pare this approach with others. The second set of recommendations is 
directed toward those agencies that have already decided to establish such a 
program, whether required by law or on their own initiative. Here, agencies 
are advised to calibrate the program to the risks presented, rely on existing 
conformity assessments standards and activities, ensure agency and public 
access to appropriate program information, and undertake necessary over-
sight. The recommendations contained in this part were the basis for a 
formal Recommendation issued by the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (ACUS) in December 2012.26 The text of the ACUS Rec-
ommendations is included in an appendix. 
I. PRIVATE REGULATION AND ITS HARNESSING 
Regulation is typically understood by lawyers to refer to the rules that 
administrative agencies promulgate to implement statutes.27 In a slightly 
broader view, regulation encompasses not just rulemaking, but also the 
implementation and enforcement of rules.28 In current academic parlance, 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Agency Use o� Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 2939, 2941-45 (Jan. 15, 2013).  
 27. Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 134 (describing the “standard model” of envi-
ronmental law in which it is assumed that “the actor is the government and the action is 
some form of positive law”). For a broad survey of various meaning and uses of the term 
regulation, see LEVI-FAUR, supra note 14, at 3–11.  
 28. LEVI-FAUR, supra note 14, at 4 (“Some contend that regulation comprises mostly 
rule making while others extend it to include rule monitoring and rule enforcement.”).  
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however, a much broader understanding of regulation has prevailed that 
includes not just rules made by governmental actors but also those made by 
private actors: regulation is “the promulgation of prescriptive rules as well 
as the monitoring and enforcement of these rules by social, business, and 
political actors on other social, business, and political actors.”29 Regulation 
is “decentred”: government does not have a monopoly on it, and it can 
occur within and between other social actors without the government’s 
involvement.30  
Notably, in this broader understanding, regulation can still be said to 
have three aspects.31 First is rule creation, in which regulatory objectives—
often referred to as standards—are established.32 Second is rule implemen-
tation, wherein mechanisms are developed and deployed to monitor for 
compliance. And third is rule enforcement, through which deviations are 
corrected. Regulation accordingly refers to “any process or set of processes 
by which norms are established, the behavior of those subject to the norms 
monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms 
                                                                                                                      
 29. Id. at 9. 
 30. Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 103 (2001); see also 
Colin Scott, Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism, in THE 
REGULATORY STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 15, 21 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds., 
2010) (stating that regulation is fragmented, “within the state and beyond the state, substan-
tial involvement of supranational and non-state organizations at every stage, including the 
making, monitoring and enforcement of norms”).  
 31. Scott, supra note 20, at 1333 (stating that regulation comprises norm creation, 
detection of deviation, and correcting deviation). The regulatory process can be defined into 
more stages, but the terms rule making, implementation and enforcement are intended to 
encompass the whole. See, e.g., Tim Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A 
(P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, art. 2, 2010 at 1, 1 n.1 (specifying as regulations compo-
nents: “agenda-setting, rule-making, implementation, monitoring, adjudication, and 
enforcement”); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: 
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
REGULATION 44, 63 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (setting forth components 
of regulation as agenda, negotiation, implementation, monitoring, enforcement, with discus-
sion about overlap among them); Errol Meidinger, Private Import Safety Regulation and 
Transnational New Governance, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 233, 237 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) (“Regulatory programs can 
be broken down into several basic functions, including standard-setting and rule-making, 
adoption, implementation, inspection and monitoring, and sanctioning.”). 
 32. The term standard is broadly defined as “[c]ommon and repeated use of rules, 
conditions, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods, and related management systems practices.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-119, REVISED, MEMORANDUM FOR 
HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY 
ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES (1998). 
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for holding the behavior of regulated actors within the acceptable limits of 
the regime.”33  
With this broad definition, one can speak of public regulation, private 
regulation, or a combination of the two, which is sometimes referred to as 
co-regulation.34 As used in this Article, public regulation refers to the exer-
cise of public authority to make, implement, and enforce rules.35 Private 
regulation means that private actors play a major role in one or more of 
these elements of regulation.36 The first part of this section further explains 
the concept of private regulation and how private regulators perform stand-
ard setting, implementation, and enforcement functions in common forms 
of private regulation. The second part of this section analyzes the interac-
tion of public and private regulation, with a focus on how public regulation 
can harness private regulation.  
A. Elements of Private Regulation 
Private regulation is long-standing, widespread, and varied.37 Organiza-
tions like the American Society for Testing Materials (now ASTM 
International) and professional societies like the American Society of Civil 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional 
Design, PUB. L., Summer 2001, at 329, 331.  
 34. See, e.g., Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-
Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, in NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 129 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); NEIL 
GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 55 (1998) (stating that in co-regulation, “[g]overnment may directly engage in the 
self-regulatory process by jointly negotiating targets and strategies, and providing, if neces-
sary, external verification and/or ratification”); Lesley K. McAllister, Co-Regulation in 
Mexican Environmental Law, 32 UTAH ENVTL L. REV. 181 (2012). 
 35. Public regulation thus encompasses the “standard model” of regulatory law. Cf. 
Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 131. Notably, this standard model is “already co-regulatory” in 
the sense that it “relies significantly on private participation in implementation, even though 
this is largely hidden from public view.” Freeman, supra note 3, at 350–51. 
 36. Büthe, supra note 31, at 1 n.1 (“Private regulation in a broad sense entails private 
actors playing a major role—at one or more stages beyond implementation or compliance 
. . . .”).  
 37. A variety of terms have been used for private regulation. For example, Vogel 
defines global civil regulation as “voluntary, private, nonstate industry and cross-industry 
codes that specify the responsibilities of global firms for addressing labor practices, envi-
ronmental performance, and human rights policies.” Vogel, supra note 6, at 68. Transnational 
private regulation is an active area of scholarship among international law scholars. See 
especially Cafaggi, supra note 6. Private regulation can be understood as an aspect of private 
governance, namely that part of private governance that is about “steering the flow of events 
and behavior, as opposed to providing and distributing [public goods and services].” John 
Braithwaite et al., Can Regulation and Governance Make a Difference?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
1, 3 (2007).  
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Engineers have been writing safety standards for over a hundred years.38 By 
the early 1920s, Underwriters Laboratory (UL) had established itself as the 
primary regulator o� fire safety, with the largest fire-testing laboratory in 
the world and over 500 million products stamped with the UL label each 
year.39 The Orthodox Union established a rigorous certification system for 
Kosher food in the 1950s and 1960s, such that by 1970 it employed more 
than 750 supervisors to certify more than 2,500 products for 475 compa-
nies.40  
Private regulators have been called a fifth branch of government.41 Like 
their counterparts in public agencies, private regulators essentially “make 
laws and adjudicate disputes.”42 While some private regulators specialize in 
setting standards or assessing compliance, others perform functions that 
span the regulatory process. This section explains how private regulators of 
different types carry out the three elements of regulation: setting, imple-
menting, and enforcing standards.  
1. Standard Setting 
In line with the diversity of private regulation, private regulators of 
various types set private standards of various types. As described below, 
standards development organizations (SDOs) at the national and interna-
tional levels have set tens of thousands of private standards. Standards are 
also often set by firms, industry associations, and non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) in the form of voluntary codes to guide their own behavior 
and that of other organizations with which they conduct business.  
Just in the United States, there are hundreds of private SDOs with di-
verse institutional characteristics.43 Most are industry or trade associations 
like the American Petroleum Institute; scientific or professional societies 
like the Society of Automobile Engineers; or membership organizations 
                                                                                                                      
 38. Notable Milestones, ASTM INT’L, http://www.astm.org/HISTORY/milestones. 
html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013); History of ASCE, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 
http://content.asce.org/history/150/150years.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).  
 39. SCOTT GABRIEL KNOWLES, THE DISASTER EXPERTS: MASTERING RISK IN 
MODERN AMERICA 122 (2011) 
 40. Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification 
Can Overcome Constraints that Frustrate Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. (forthcoming 2014).  
 41. Abramson, supra note 19, at 168.  
 42. Id.; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Inter-
net, UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 250 (2001) (“Private regulatory regimes are a form of 
government . . . . Private legislators make the rules, private judges apply them to concrete 
situations, and private sheriffs enforce the rules against violators.”).  
 43. Standards Development in the United States, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
http://gsi.nist.gov/global/index.cfm/L1-5/L2-44/A-165 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
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specifically established to set standards, such as ASTM.44 Writing private 
standards is costly, so an important question regards why private standard 
setting occurs.45 Industry associations may set standards in the expectation 
of private gains, as their standards may lower their compliance costs or 
create barriers to entry in ways that enhance their profits.46 Professional 
societies and membership organizations may establish standards to position 
themselves as experts in a given regulatory field and derive revenues from 
selling their copyrighted standards.47 Not uncommonly, private actors com-
pete to establish the dominant standards.48  
Many SDOs seek to establish standards that will be considered “volun-
tary consensus standards” based on their adherence to certain procedures.49 
In the United States, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ac-
credits SDOs that meet its requirements for developing voluntary 
consensus standards.50 Accreditation requires, for example, that SDOs open 
standards development to all directly affected persons, notify the public in 
suitable media, ensure a balance of participation from diverse interests and 
a lack of domination by a single interest, promptly consider the written 
views and objections of all participants, and maintain an appeal process.51 In 
addition, accredited SDOs must use consensus voting. Instead of a unanim-
ity requirement, consensus voting refers to a process that seeks the greatest 
possible agreement by hearing and responding to negative votes that are 
                                                                                                                      
 44. TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 148 (2011) (stating that the 
U.S. private-sector standards consists of about 300 trade associations, 130 professional 
societies, 40 general membership organizations, and 150 consortia); Cheit, supra note 7, at 
23–24; see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-TCT-512, GLOBAL 
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 49–51 (1992). 
 45. Büthe, supra note 31, at 12. 
 46. Id. at 13. 
 47. Id.; see OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 50–51. 
 48. Büthe, supra note 31, at 14–15 (discussing competition among industry actors and 
between industry and civil society NGOs); BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 148 (de-
scribing how SDO’s in the United States have been spurred by competition to develop high 
quality standards). 
 49. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 32. 
 50. BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 150 (discussing ANSI and the American 
system of standardization); AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL 
REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS 4–
5 (2013), available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/ 
American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2013_ANSI 
_Essential_Requirements.pdf. 
 51. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., supra note 50, at 8–9 (setting forth requirements 
for “[e]vidence of consensus and consensus body vote”). 
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accompanied by related comments.52 In 2012, there were over 200 ANSI 
accredited SDOs, collectively responsible for approximately 10,000 volun-
tary consensus standards.53 ASTM, the largest developer of consensus 
standards in the United States, with over 12,000 standards promulgated by 
2013, has similar procedural requirements.54  
The International Organization of Standards (ISO) and the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) are major SDOs at the 
international level.55 ISO alone has developed more than 18,000 standards, 
and together ISO and IEC account for about 85 percent of all known inter-
national standards.56 Founded in 1946, the ISO’s membership consists of 
the one body from each country that is most responsible for coordinating 
private standard setting in that country.57 ISO members in developing 
countries are often governmental departments, whereas ISO members in devel-
oped countries tend to be “non-governmental organizations recognized by their 
government as the entity responsible for such voluntary standardization.”58 In 
the United States, the non-governmental ANSI is the ISO member body.59  
                                                                                                                      
 52. Id.; see also BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 145–46 (explaining that consen-
sus-based standard setting means that the process tries to incorporate negative opinions 
“striving for the greatest feasible agreement”); CHEIT, supra note 7, at 176 (noting the rule in 
consensus decisionmaking that there be no “unresolved negatives”).  
 53. Domestic Programs (American National Standards) Overview, AM. NAT’L 
STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview. 
aspx?menuid=3#.UcikGZxuuJs (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). No estimate of the number of 
standards set by all private SDOs is available, but twenty-five years ago, it was estimated 
that 400 SDOs had promulgated over 30,000 private standards. MAUREEN A. 
BREITENBERG, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 6014, THE ABC’S OF THE 
U.S. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 3 (1997). Also, a 1996 study by the National 
Institute of Science and Technology counted 49,000 private standards. OFFICE OF 
STANDARDS SERV., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 806, 
STANDARDS ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Robert B. Toth ed., 
1996), available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/SP%20806.pdf. 
 54. Robert W. Hamilton, Prospects for the Nongovernmental Development of Regulatory 
Standards, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 462–64 (1983) (discussing how standard setting by ASTM 
requires balance of participation, consensus adoption, special procedure for no votes, written 
procedures, and an appeal mechanism); Annual Book of ASTM Standards, ASTM INT’L, 
http://www.astm.org/BOOKSTORE/BOS/standard_track1.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) 
(stating that ASTM’s Annual Book of Standards contains over 12,000 ASTM standards).  
 55. BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 5.  
 56. Id. at 137. 
 57. Id. at 131, 138.  
 58. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND “PRIVATE 
STANDARDS” 4 (2010), available at www.iso.org/iso/private_standards.pdf; see also BÜTHE & 
MATTLI, supra note 44, at 138–39 (stating that such bodies are often private-sector organiza-
tions funded largely by industry). 
 59. David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Volun-
tary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009). 
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ISO standard setting is coordinated by a secretariat in Geneva and car-
ried out by tens of thousands of experts organized into hundreds of 
technical committees and subcommittees, and thousands of associated work-
ing groups.60 Seeking to establish international consensus standards, ISO 
purports to abide by principles of transparency, openness, impartiality, and 
consensus set out in World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.61 As 
explained by ISO, other SDOs at the international level such as private 
consortia in the fields of information and communications, agri-food indus-
try organizations, and retailers that develop private standards relating to 
social and environmental aspects often do not adhere to the WTO princi-
ples of international standardization.62  
Many standards developed by private bodies are technical standards de-
signed to ensure that parts or products made by one manufacturer function 
with those of others. They generally “regulate uniformity or interchangea-
bility,” with limited relevance for health, safety, and environmental 
protection.63 Economic actors generally have strong incentives to comply 
with such standards because they enhance the market for their products and 
services.64 Industry has a long history of establishing and promoting these 
uniformity and interchangeability standards. For example, the pharmaceuti-
cal, automotive parts, railroad, and aviation industries have adopted such 
standards.65 
Other private standards, however, can be considered to be regulatory 
standards that “have significant implications for the public interest.”66 They 
may, for example, regulate the maximum age of pilots, the level of pesticide 
residues in agricultural products, and the level of cadmium and other heavy 
                                                                                                                      
 60. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 58, at 5; BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra 
note 44, at 139. 
 61. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 58, at 2, 8 (particularly mention-
ing annex 3 of the WTO TBT Agreement Code of Good Practice for the preparation, 
adoption and application of standards). 
 62. Id. at 6–7. 
 63. See CHEIT, supra note 7, at 5; cf. Strauss, supra note 19, at 499 (stating that SDOs 
have “long existed to create voluntary private standards by which to declare or measure the 
characteristics of goods on the marketplace”). Even technical standards, however, may have 
negative public interest impacts if they, for example, create barriers to market entry, freeze 
technological innovation, or reduce consumer choices. Cf. OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE 
TRANSP., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 9 (1993), available at http://www.strategic 
standards.com/files/GovernmentStandards.pdf. 
 64. See Büthe, supra note 17, at 17. 
 65. OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., supra note 63, at 3–4 (describing the 
history of standard setting in various industries).  
 66. See CHEIT, supra note 7, at 23. 
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metals in the surface coating of toys.67 In contrast to technical standards 
that address network externalities, regulatory standards address social and 
environmental externalities.68 Economic actors are less likely to have mar-
ket incentives to privately create and enforce regulatory standards because 
such standards make them internalize the negative externalities of their 
activities.69 Of ANSI standards that had been developed by 1990, roughly 
10 percent related to the health and safety of industrial products and pro-
cesses.70 ISO has increasingly promulgated standards relevant to the 
environment and health and safety, including: standards for environmental 
management, environmental labeling, lifecycle assessment, greenhouse gas 
measurement, drinking water and wastewater services, and social responsi-
bility.71  
Aside from consensus standards, a wide variety of voluntary codes have 
been promulgated by industries, firms, and NGOs to regulate themselves or 
those with whom they establish business relationships.72 Voluntary codes 
setting forth responsible business practices “now exist for virtually every 
global industry and internationally traded commodity, including forestry, 
fisheries, chemicals, computers and electronic equipment, apparel, rugs, 
coffee, cocoa, palm oil, diamonds, gold, toys, minerals and mining, energy, 
tourism, financial service, and athletic equipment.”73 They primarily ad-
dress labor and environmental practices, often focusing on high-profile 
issues like sweatshops and sustainability.74  
                                                                                                                      
 67. Hamilton, supra note 54, at 455 (mentioning the rule that pilots be under a certain 
age). The test method ASTM F963-08, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Toy Safety, 
places limits on the amount of antimony, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercu-
ry, and selenium in toys. FAQs: Lead In Paint (And Other Surface Coatings), U.S. CONSUMER 
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Business--Manufacturing/ 
Business-Education/Lead/FAQs-Lead-In-Paint-And-Other-Surface-Coatings/ (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2014). 
 68. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 31, at 45; see also Hamilton, supra note 54, at 455 
(“Creating a regulatory standard requires an estimate of acceptable levels of risk . . . . Regu-
latory standards thus almost always involve social or political as well as technological 
issues.”). 
 69. Büthe, supra note 17, at 17. 
 70. Cf. CHEIT, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that 900 out of 8,500 ANSI standards in 
1990 were considered to relate to health and safety). 
 71. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 58, at 7. On ISO’s environmental 
management systems standard, see especially Wirth, supra note 59, at 82.  
 72. Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 230 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood 
eds., 2006) (using the term code “in its ordinary sense as ‘a set of rules on any subject’ ”). 
 73. Vogel, supra note 6, at 71–72. 
 74. David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 269 
(2008). 
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Voluntary codes are often developed by industry associations and 
NGOs.75 For example, the International Chamber of Commerce’s Business 
Charter for Sustainable Development, endorsed by more than 2,000 global 
firms, sets out sixteen principles for environmental management.76 The 
chemical industry’s Responsible Care requires chemical companies “to 
recognize and respond to community concerns,” “to develop and produce 
chemicals that can be manufactured, transported, used and disposed of 
safely,” and “to report promptly to officials, employees, customers and the 
public, information on chemical-related health or environmental hazards.”77 
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) established sustainable forestry 
goals for forest management operations that included, inter alia, complying 
with applicable laws, respecting the rights of indigenous peoples, and con-
serving biodiversity.78  
Other private standards are established by individual firms to regulate 
themselves. Standards for self-regulation often seek to accomplish objec-
tives that are not legally required, and they may be embodied in a corporate 
code of conduct.79 Examples discussed in the literature include ARCO’s 
voluntary development of standards for reformulated cleaner gasoline in the 
late 1980s and voluntary codes adopted by the Body Shop, the Shell Group, 
and Interface Flooring.80 Other self-regulatory standards involve the devel-
opment of a management system. For example, some companies have  
established environmental management systems, which include policies and 
programs that help reduce the company’s environmental impact.81 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Vogel, supra note 6, at 73–74 (citing examples of codes initiated by NGOs, trade 
associations, trade unions, and international standards bodies); see also Vandenbergh, supra 
note 4, at 922 (describing “collective standards”). 
 76. Vogel, supra note 6, at 72; see also ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development, 
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd.org/business/tools/principles_icc.asp 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014).  
 77. Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems and Community Participa-
tion: Rethinking Chemical Industry Regulation, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 338 (1998).  
 78. Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 218 (2002).  
 79. Short & Toffel, supra note 18, at 361 (stating that self-regulation is commonly 
undertaken either “to demonstrate a commitment to comply with legal mandates or bring 
corporate conduct into line with widely shared normative ideals like workplace fairness or 
environmental sustainability”). For an interesting discussion of the forms of self-regulation 
and their various problems, see Black, supra note 30. On corporate codes of conduct, see, 
e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor for 
Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367 (2008). 
 80. Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 7, at 93; Wood, supra note 72, at 238. 
 81. See McAllister, supra note 21, at 16 n.105; Stepan Wood, Environmental Manage-
ment Systems and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L.J. 129 (2002). Firms may also adopt international environmental management 
systems such as ISO 14001 or European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). See 
 
McAllister_to_PDF 9/26/2014  9:42 AM 
Spring 2014] Harnessing Private Regulation 307 
Private firms also engage in regulatory standard setting when they im-
pose social and environmental requirements on their suppliers.82 Every 
Fortune 500 Company and thousands of other major transnational corpora-
tions have adopted supplier codes of conduct, which usually set forth their 
expectations of suppliers with regard to the environment, labor, and human 
rights.83 These codes of conduct may then be incorporated into supplier 
contracts.84 Alternatively, or in addition, the parties to the contract may 
create a private standard or incorporate voluntary codes developed by in-
dustry groups or non-governmental organizations.85 By including private 
standards of these various sorts, supply chain contracts often require sup-
pliers to exceed public regulatory requirements.86 A 2007 study found that 
more than half of the top firms in eight different sectors imposed private 
environmental requirements on their suppliers.87  
2. Implementation 
In regulatory implementation, mechanisms are developed and deployed 
to monitor for compliance. Diverse private standards are implemented in 
diverse ways. As noted above, those private technical standards developed 
by SDOs that further the goals of uniformity and interchangeability are 
readily implemented by interested private actors for reasons of market 
expansion and profitability.88 Even voluntary consensus standards that deal 
with health and safety are likely to attract high levels of compliance because 
they are generally developed with industry participation and compliance 
                                                                                                                      
Magali A. Delmas, Barriers and Incentives to the Adoption of ISO 14001 by Firms in the United 
States, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3–4 (2000).  
 82. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 156 (stating that “a growing number of corporate 
buyers impose environmental requirements on their global suppliers”). 
 83. Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 6, at 6 (explaining that Levi Strauss was one of the 
first multinational companies to tout its corporate code of conduct in 1991); Michael W. 
Toffel, et al., Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: How States, Civil Society, and Codes of Conduct 
Promote Adherence to Global Labor Standards 6, (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 13-
045, 2012) (stating that codes typically call for the supplier to comply with domestic labor, 
environmental, and human rights law as well as forbid practices such as child labor and 
prison labor).  
 84. Toffel et al., supra note 83, at 2. 
 85. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 154–55. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 927–36. 
 88. See Tim Büthe, The Power of Norms; the Norms of Power: Who Governs International 
Electrical and Electronic Technology, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 292, 324 (Deborah D. 
Avant et al. eds., 2010); Scott, supra note 30, at 7. 
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with them may reduce legal risk.89 In these situations, private standards are 
often reliably implemented at the firm level. 
Implementation of voluntary codes developed by industries, NGOs, 
and firms tend to require more complex mechanisms. Voluntary codes 
developed by industry associations and NGOs are often implemented 
through voluntary programs. In voluntary programs, participating firms 
(often referred to as members) commit to adhering to a set of requirements 
designed to produce social benefits.90 Voluntary programs relating to envi-
ronmental and labor practices have particularly proliferated in the past 
several decades.91 They often award a product label or other public recogni-
tion to their members. Examples include the FSC label for sustainable 
forest management and Social Accountability International’s SA8000 logo 
for decent workplaces.92 Firms can implement self-regulatory standards 
through internal behavior modifications and supply-chain standards 
through contracts with their suppliers.  
The audit is a common mechanism to monitor for compliance in pri-
vate regulation.93 Audits may be conducted by firms subject to regulation 
(commonly referred to as self-audits), another organization interested in the 
firm’s compliance (for example, a purchaser of its products or an industry 
association to which it belongs), or an external entity paid by either the firm 
or an interested organization (commonly referred to as an independent or 
third-party audit). Voluntary programs increasingly rely on independent 
auditors to verify compliance. As explained by one observer, “[e]xternal 
inspection and monitoring have also become a standard part of private 
                                                                                                                      
 89. Büthe, supra note 88, at 327 (discussing how international standards are often 
considered “best practices” and may provide a safeguard in civil litigation, particularly 
product liability litigation). 
 90. Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Clubs: An Introduction, in 
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 2 (Matthew Potoski & Asseem 
Prakash eds., 2009). 
 91. Tim Bartley & Shawna N. Smith, Communities of Practice as Cause and Consequence 
of Transnational Governance: The Evolution of Social and Environmental Certification, in 
TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES: SHAPING GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 347 (Marie-
Laure Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2010) (stating that the “transformation of certification 
into a mode of social/environmental regulation has occurred mainly since the 1990s”); 
ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN 
CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS 60 (2006). 
 92. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 148–49 (discussing the FSC). See generally Tim 
Bartley, Standards for Sweatshops: The Power and Limits of the Club Approach to Voluntary Labor 
Standards, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 90 (on 
programs for labor standards).  
 93. For a theorization of the phenomenon of audit, see MICHAEL POWER, THE 
AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997); Michael Power, Expertise and the Con-
struction of Relevance: Accountants and Environmental Audit, 22 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y, 123, 
126 (1997). 
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regulation.”94 Others comment that third-party auditing is considered a 
“best practice” in voluntary programs.95 Third-party audits are also used to 
assess compliance with self-regulation and supply-chain regulation.96 
Dubbed the private “assurance industry” by one commentator, private 
auditing companies form a “rapidly growing global army of privately 
trained and authorized inspectors and certifiers.”97  
While third-party audits are considered more rigorous than self-audits, 
many issues of reliability remain.98 The auditors are formally independent 
but may still lack objectivity because the companies whose products or pro-
cesses are being audited often arrange and pay for the audit.99 Scholars o� 
financial accounting have identified many reasons for auditor bias in this 
situation.100 Concerns about auditor competence also arise. Because of com-
petitive pressures, third-party verifiers will seek to reduce their costs, which 
may result in inadequate audits. An observer of garment factory audits in 
Asia conducted by a major auditing firm found that auditors had not effec-
tively gathered information because they made short visits and failed to 
conduct sufficient interviewing or inspection.101 A related concern is that 
                                                                                                                      
 94. Meidinger, supra note 31, at 238; see also Wood, supra note 72, at 242–43 (noting 
the trend toward increased third party verification of voluntary codes). But see Vogel, supra 
note 74, at 269 (“Relatively few industry and corporate codes are independently monitored; 
some contain no monitoring provisions at all, and others are monitored by the firms them-
selves.”).  
 95. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 91, at 59. 
 96. See, e.g., Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems 
of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 11 (2003) (describing the “small army 
of monitors”); Toffel et al., supra note 83 (analyzing data obtained from one of the largest 
social auditing forms). 
 97. Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assur-
ance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 329 (2008); see also Wood, supra note 72, 
at 261 (referring to the “huge industry of auditors, certifiers, and accreditation bodies that 
has emerged”). 
 98. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional 
Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 368 (1997) (discussing how the Gap’s sourcing standards 
initially included only “seriously defective” internal monitoring, but then the company 
agreed to use third-party monitoring which was much more effective); McAllister, supra note 
21, at 38–45 (discussing the problems of auditor independence and competence). 
 99. Blair et al., supra note 97, at 334. 
 100. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Nov. 2002, at 97, 98; Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role 
of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
1167, 1167 (2003); Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors’ Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 
990 (2003) (stating that the basic problem afflicting the accounting industry is that “ac-
counting firms work for the companies they audit”).  
 101. Dara O’Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate Third-Party Labor 
Monitoring, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 196–208 (Rhys Jenkins et al. eds., 2002) (documenting observa-
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auditing might consist of mechanically applied checklists and “box-ticking” 
that fail to capture the true compliance situation of a regulated entity.102  
Given the importance to business actors of auditing themselves and 
others for compliance with private standards, ISO and IEC developed a 
series of applicable international standards. ISO/IEC’s 17000 series stand-
ardizes “conformity assessment,” defined as the “demonstration that 
specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person or 
body are fulfilled.”103 These standards set forth the various types of con-
formity assessment and how organizations that conduct conformity 
assessment should look and act. As specified in ISO/IEC 17000, first-party 
conformity assessment is performed by the organization that provides the 
object of the assessment, second-party conformity assessment is performed 
by an organization that has a user interest in the object, and third-party 
conformity assessment is performed by a body independent o� both the 
organization that provides the object and organizations with user inter-
ests.104  
The main forms of conformity assessment under ISO/IEC standards 
are testing, inspection, and certification.105 “Testing” means the “determina-
tion of one or more characteristics of an object of conformity assessment, 
according to a procedure,” while inspection is an “examination of a product 
design, product, process or installation and determination of its conformi-
ty” with requirements.106 “Certification” refers to the issuance of a 
statement by a third party whose products, processes, systems, or persons 
fulfill specified requirements.107 Different ISO/IEC standards in the 17000 
series apply to testing bodies (usually laboratories), inspection bodies, and 
                                                                                                                      
tions o� factory audits in Asia by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which was the world’s largest 
private monitor o� labor and environmental practices). 
 102. Friederike Albersmeier et al., The Reliability of Third-Party Certification in the Food 
Chain: From Checklists to Risk-Oriented Auditing, 20 FOOD CONTROL 927, 933 (2009); Gun-
ningham, supra note 77, at 360; McAllister, supra note 21, at 43. 
 103. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM. 
[ISO/IEC], ISO/IEC DOC. 17000:2004, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT—VOCABULARY AND 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 2.1 (2004) [hereinafter CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT] (internal cross-
references omitted). 
 104. Id. at 2.2–2.4.  
 105. What is conformity assessment?, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/conformity-assessment.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 106. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 4.2–4.3. INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION & UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEV. ORG. [ISO/UNIDO], BUILDING 
TRUST: THE CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT TOOLBOX 34–35 (2010), available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/casco_building-trust.pdf.  
 107. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 5.5 (defining certification with the 
use of the term attestation) and 5.2 (defining attestation). 
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certification bodies, which are collectively referred to as conformity assess-
ment bodies.108  
Certification is the most well-known form of conformity assessment, 
and it differs from testing and inspection in an important way.109 Unlike 
testing or inspection, certification is by definition performed by a third 
party, and it requires that the third party conduct not just initial conformity 
assessment activities like testing and inspection but also the surveillance 
necessary to attest to the continuing conformity of a product, process, sys-
tem, or person.110 “Surveillance” is defined by ISO/IEC as a “systematic 
iteration of conformity assessment activities as a basis for maintaining the 
validity of the statement of conformity.”111 Market surveillance is a particu-
lar form of surveillance used in some certification schemes where samples 
of certified products in the marketplace are tested to determine whether 
they conform to specified requirements.112 
Accreditation is another key aspect of conformity assessment under 
ISO standards.113 “Accreditation” is a “third-party attestation related to a 
conformity assessment body conveying formal demonstration of its compe-
tence to carry out specific conformity assessment tasks.”114 Accreditation 
bodies determine whether testing, inspection, and certification bodies are 
operating in accordance with the ISO/IEC standards that apply to them. 
                                                                                                                      
 108. Testing is regulated by ISO/IEC 17025. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 17025:2005, 
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND CALIBRATION 
LABORATORIES (2005). Inspection is regulated by ISO/IEC 17020. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC 
DOC. 17020:2012, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT—REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OPERATION OF 
VARIOUS TYPES OF BODIES PERFORMING INSPECTION (2012). Certification is regulated by 
ISO/IEC Guide 65 or ISO/IEC 17065. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC GUIDE 65:1996, GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES OPERATING PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS (1996), 
revised by ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 17065:2012, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT—
REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES CERTIFYING PRODUCTS, PROCESSES AND SERVICES (2012) 
(replacing Guide 65, with the transition to the new standard expected to be completed by 
September 2015). 
 109. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 105 (stating that testing is most 
common, but certification is best known). 
 110. Telephone Interview with Gordon Gillerman, Chief, Standards Servs. Div., Nat’l 
Inst. of Standards & Tech. (Aug. 15, 2012); ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 52–55 (setting 
forth various systems that include surveillance and meet the definition of product certifica-
tion).  
 111. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 6.1; ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, 
at 44. 
 112. ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 45. 
 113. Accreditation is regulated by ISO/IEC 17011. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 
17011:2004, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION BODIES ACCREDITING 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES (2004). 
 114. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 5.6; ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, 
at 24. 
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Accreditation bodies may be public or private entities, and some countries 
have one or more private accreditation bodies in addition to or instead of a 
national accreditation body.115 Accreditation bodies, in turn, are often mem-
bers of either the International Accreditation Forum (IAF) or the 
International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC), which require 
adherence to international standards for accreditation bodies and use a 
system of peer evaluation to assess accreditation bodies for membership.116 
Their objective is that conformity assessment bodies accredited by member 
accreditation bodies will be recognized as competent in multiple jurisdic-
tions and markets.117 In the words of the accreditation industry, “tested or 
certified once—accepted everywhere.”118  
It is useful to understand that conformity assessment encompasses a 
spectrum of rigor and independence.119 Depending on the level of confi-
dence or assurance required, the technical activities of conformity 
assessment may be more or less rigorous, and the organizations that conduct 
conformity may be more or less independent. When the user of a conformi-
ty assessment system—for example, a purchaser—needs just a basic level of 
assurance, a first-party testing or inspection may be adequate. When the 
purchaser needs more assurance, it could require, for example, testing in an 
accredited third-party laboratory. When the purchaser needs much more 
                                                                                                                      
 115. ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 25, 86–88. 
 116. See e.g., INT’L LAB. ACCREDITATION COOPERATION, https://www.ilac.org/ (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2013). IAF is comprised of accreditation bodies that accredit certification 
bodies whereas ILAC is comprised of accreditation bodies that accredit laboratories. Both 
IAF and ILAC have established voluntary agreements through which member accreditation 
bodies agree to adhere to international standards when accrediting testing and certification 
bodies: the IAF Multilateral Recognition Agreement (IAF MLA) and the ILAC Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (MRA). OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 
REPORT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 28 (2012), available at http://www.us 
tr.gov/webfm_send/3323; see also INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM & INT’L LAB. 
ACCREDITATION COOPERATION [IAF/ILAC], IAF/ILAC-A3:01/2013, IAF/ILAC MULTI-
LATERAL MUTUAL RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENTS (ARRANGEMENTS): NARRATIVE 
FRAMEWORK FOR REPORTING ON THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACCREDITATION BODY (AB) 
(2013), available at https://www.ilac.org/documents/IAF-ILAC_A3_01_2013.pdf. 
 117. ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 89; see also USTR, supra note 116, at 28 (explain-
ing that by demonstrating the equivalence of the accreditation bodies that accredit testing 
and certification bodies, they aim to “provide governments, as well as suppliers, assurances 
that a body—regardless of its location—is competent to test and certify products for rele-
vant markets”).  
 118. IAF: What is the International Accreditation Forum, INC.?, U.K. ACCREDITATION 
SERVICE, http://www.ukas.com/technical-information/international-role/iaf.asp (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2013); see also INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM, http://www.iaf.nu/ (last visited Nov. 
29, 2013) (showing the slogan “certified once, accepted everywhere” in the bottom right 
hand corner of the page). 
 119. Telephone Interview with Gordon Gillerman, supra note 110. 
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assurance, it could require certification by an accredited third party based 
on testing conducted in an accredited third-party laboratory. 
ISO conformity assessment standards are increasingly being adopted by 
private regulators. For example, since 2006, FSC has required that its certi-
fication bodies be accredited by ASI International, which operates in 
accordance with the ISO/IEC standard for accreditation bodies.120 Also, in 
2009, FSC promulgated a standard specifying the requirements for FSC 
certification bodies that explicitly incorporates many of the requirements of 
the ISO/IEC standard for certification bodies.121  
3. Enforcement 
Enforcement, the process by which deviance from regulatory standards 
is corrected, is often a weakness of private regulatory regimes that impose 
requirements relating to health, safety, and the environment.122 According 
to one scholar of private regulation, few voluntary codes contain explicit 
sanctions for nonconformity or formal mechanisms for enforcement or 
dispute resolution.123 In the words of another, “business compliance with 
most codes has been uneven” and few are effectively enforced.124  
Notably, the subjects of private regulation—whether they are members 
of a voluntary program, firms that self-regulate, or suppliers subject to 
contract conditions—have incentives to cheat. Companies may establish 
codes of conduct or join voluntary programs for public relations reasons and 
lack a serious commitment to changing their behavior.125 Companies may 
find monitoring their compliance with codes to be costly and have limited 
incentives to enforce them.126 Not all voluntary programs require third-
                                                                                                                      
 120. Programs, ACCREDITATION SERVICES INT’L, http://www.accreditation-services.co 
m/programs (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 121. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC-STD-20-001 (VERSION 3-0) EN, FSC 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FSC ACCREDITED 
CERTIFICATION BODIES—APPLICATION OF ISO/IEC GUIDE 65:1996 (E) (2009), available 
at http://ic.fsc.org/download.fsc-std-20-001-v3-0-en-general-requirements-for-fsc-accredit 
ed-certification-bodies.a-1130.pdf.  
 122. Cf. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 370 (“According to the critics, self-
regulatory standards are usually weak, enforcement is ineffective and punishment is secret 
and mild.”). 
 123. Wood, supra note 72, at 261–62 (stating further that “[t]his lack of sanctions and 
enforcement is often identified as one of the key weaknesses of voluntary codes”). 
 124. Vogel, supra note 6, at 80. 
 125. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 708 n.14 (2003) (discussing 
the incentives o� firms to cheat).  
 126. Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 6, at 19. 
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party monitoring, and even fewer involve the public disclosure of monitor-
ing information and sanctions for members that do not comply.127  
Even companies that impose codes of conduct on their global suppliers 
may have weak incentives to enforce them. Companies have often devel-
oped codes in response to pressure from NGOs, shareholders, and 
governments. This pressure may subside once the code is adopted.128 Also, 
rigorously enforcing compliance with codes is likely to increase the cost of 
doing business, which runs against the very reason for global supply 
chains.129 Importantly, it is easy for buyer and supplier firms to hide code 
violations, given that supplier firms tend to be numerous and geographical-
ly dispersed and their identities are often confidential.130  
When private regulators are serious about enforcement, there are a va-
riety of sanctions they may employ to correct deviations. In voluntary 
programs that award a label or recognition, the private regulators may re-
voke or threaten to revoke this benefit.131 Removal from a voluntary 
program might also involve expulsion from an industry association, which 
may limit the firm’s economic opportunities.132 When the administrator of a 
voluntary program has such strong sanctions available, it may also be able to 
impose remedial measures such as product recalls or environmental repara-
tions.133 Buyers that include private standards in supply chain contracts can 
respond to violations by refusing to buy from offending suppliers.  
Public disclosure of code violations also constitutes a powerful sanction. 
Private regulators can require the public release of third-party audit reports 
regarding the compliance o� firms with voluntary programs or supply chain 
requirements. Also, a label or other recognition may be revoked in a way 
that involves a public process of “naming and shaming.”134 NGOs, trade 
unions, consumers, and investors may thereby contribute to the sanction by 
denying a company’s “social license to operate.”135  
                                                                                                                      
 127. Potoski & Prakash, supra note 90, at 27 (referring to programs that require all 
three components as “strong sword” programs). 
 128. Toffel et al., supra note 83, at 7.  
 129. Id. at 8. 
 130. Id. at 9. 
 131. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 396; see also Meidinger, supra note 31, at 
238 (stating that “[t]he only formal sanction in most private regulatory systems is the loss of 
the certifying organization’s approval, or the threat of that loss”). 
 132. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 396. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: A 
Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: 
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 443, 447 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss 
eds., 2009); Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 137–38. 
 135. Gunningham et al., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 36–37 (2003) (introducing the concept of the social license to operate, that 
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Responsible Care illustrates how enforcement mechanisms can be weak 
even in a voluntary program characterized by significant industry mobiliza-
tion and other conditions favoring effective private regulation.136 While 
Responsible Care has been implemented by fifty-five national chemical 
industry associations and thousands of their member companies participate, 
revocations of a company’s Responsible Care status have occurred rarely, if 
at all, over its twenty-five-year history.137 Moreover, third-party auditing is 
generally not required and national industry associations do not make 
membership contingent on participation in Responsible Care.138 
The FSC stands as an example of a private regulatory regime with rela-
tively well-developed monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.139 The 
FSC requires that an accredited third party certify that a forestry operation 
is in compliance with its standards.140 The FSC has at times removed the 
accreditation status of certifiers,141 and forestry operations have at times had 
their certifications revoked.142 The negative impact of a certification revocation 
                                                                                                                      
depend on a firm meeting social expectations concerning environmental performance and 
other forms of social responsibility); RHYS JENKINS, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INST. 
FOR SOC. DEV., CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 8–18 (2001) (discussing the attitudes of various stakeholders toward self-
regulation).  
 136. See Gunningham, supra note 77, at 339–44 (discussing the characteristics of the 
chemical industry and the Responsible Care program that favor its effectiveness). 
 137. INT’L COUNCIL OF CHEM. ASS’NS, ICCA RESPONSIBLE CARE PROGRESS 
REPORT: GROWING OUR FUTURE (2012), available at www.icca-chem.org/ICCADocs/ 
RC%20annual%20report.pdf (documenting membership and practices in various countries, 
with no reference to revocation actions); Freeman, supra note 16, at 647 (stating that there 
have been no expulsions from Responsible Care); Gunningham, supra note 77, at 348 (stat-
ing that the likelihood of expulsion is very low and there have been no documented cases).  
 138. See INT’L COUNCIL OF CHEM. ASS’NS, supra note 137, at 22–50 (surveying the 
“verification and performance” descriptions). 
 139. Scott, supra note 14, at 73 (referring to FSC as one of the “more complete regimes, 
which involve not only the setting of norms but also the generation of mechanisms for 
monitoring and enforcement”). 
 140. FSC relies on another private organization, Accreditation Services International, 
to perform the accreditation. Accreditation Program: Ensuring Excellence in Certification, 
FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://ic.fsc.org/accreditation.28.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 
2013). As of 2013, there were thirty-three accredited certification bodies for the program. 
Certification Bodies for FSC, ACCREDITATION SERVS. INT’L, http://www.accreditation-servic 
es.com/archives/standards/fsc (last visited Jan. 27, 2014).  
 141. Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The 
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 74 (2006).  
 142. See, e.g., Jeremy Hance, Paper Company Loses Green Certification After Rainforest 
Destruction in Indonesia, MONGABAY.COM (Apr. 18, 2010), http://news.mongabay.com/2010/ 
0418-hance_april.html. 
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is amplified by NGOs that publicize the loss of certification and buyers that 
are committed to buying only certified forest products.143  
B. Harnessing Private Regulation 
Under certain circumstances, private regulation may “prove more effec-
tive than public regulation.”144 As early as 1937, one legal commentator 
observed that actors who are “part of the relation to be regulated are likely 
to have a more urgent sense of the problem and the possibilities of effective 
solution: experience and experiment lie immediately at hand” and therefore 
suggested that “public administrations . . . should not be the exclusive 
method of regulation.”145 Oft-cited advantages of private regulation include 
the proximity of the regulator to the regulated activity, the flexibility of the 
regulatory process, greater compliance, and additional regulatory re-
sources.146 Private regulation developed to certify Kosher food and the fire 
safety o� building materials and electrical products have been cited as two 
cases in which private certification overcame political and resource con-
straints that hampered government regulation.147  
However, private regulation often suffers from limitations that reduce 
its effectiveness. An important limitation is the inherently voluntary nature 
of participation. Firms that no longer want to comply can choose not to 
participate. Other “[p]otential disadvantages include conflicts of interest, 
inadequate enforcement and accountability, and insufficient monitoring of 
compliance.”148 In the evaluation of one observer, private regulatory 
schemes are often not “effectively enforced and most cover only a minority 
of relevant global producers.”149 Scholars have noted that private regulation 
is more likely to be effective in some contexts than others. Factors favoring 
more effective private regulation include the extent to which companies 
care about their reputation, “the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity 
                                                                                                                      
 143. Meidinger, supra note 141, at 75. 
 144. Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the 
Labyrinth 12 (CEPS Working Document, No. 370, 2012).  
 145. Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L REV. 201, 212 (1937) 
(further observing that “group self-government” is likely to develop positive qualities such 
as efficiency and the sense of responsibility). 
 146. Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 144, at 12; see also Lytton, supra note 40 (citing 
technical expertise, flexibility, monitoring, responsiveness, cooperation, and efficiency as 
comparative institutional advantages of private certification over government regulation).  
 147. Lytton, supra note 40. 
 148. Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 144, at 12. 
 149. Vogel, supra note 6, at 80. 
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and autonomy on the part of nongovernmental regulators,” and “the degree 
of transparency in [the] regulatory process.”150  
Recognizing that private regulation is prevalent and that it may have 
advantages over public regulation in certain situations raises the question o� 
how private and public regulation might be combined to create stronger, 
more effective regulatory regimes. Scholarly writing on co-regulation and 
“public-private partnerships” has explored this idea to some extent.151 
Scholars tend to approach the issue from one of two directions. They may 
analyze how the effectiveness and legitimacy of private regulation might be 
improved by being more closely integrated into public regulation.152 Alter-
natively, they may recognize that private actors are “regulatory resources 
capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy” of public regulation 
and ask how “private capacity [could be harnessed] to serve public goals.”153  
Harnessing, as used in this Article, analyzes how public legislators and 
regulators can intentionally construct regulatory frameworks that rely upon 
and incorporate private regulation. When private regulation is harnessed by 
public regulation, “structures of private governance” are embedded and 
integrated into a “broader framework of public oversight.”154 Public regula-
tors tap into private regulatory capacity, constituting a “state-sanctioned 
                                                                                                                      
 150. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 34, at 131.  
 151. See especially Balleisen, supra note 134, at 468–76; Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 
34, at 129; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1288 (2003); Freeman, supra note 16, 549. 
 152. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 125, at 726 (discussing how management-based 
regulation gets an enforcement edge from government presence); Freeman, supra note 151, at 
1285 (examining how privatization might extend public norms); Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 
6, at 19 (“In our view, unless private governance is supplemented and reinforced by public 
institutions of governance, it cannot provide adequate governance capacity for the global 
economy.”); Scott, supra note 20, at 1334–35 (discussing how private regulatory regimes can 
gain legitimacy though having relationship to governmental policy); Vogel, supra note 6, at 
83 (“Until the world’s developed countries are willing to more closely integrate the norms of 
civil regulations into their domestic laws and international relations, the global regulatory 
failures private social regulation was intended to redress will persist.”).  
 153. Freeman, supra note 16, 549; see also Balleisen, supra note 134, at 445 (stating that 
this “essay offers an analytical framework for evaluating the growing reliance on nongov-
ernmental rule making and oversight as a basic tool of regulatory policy”); Ian Bartle & 
Peter Vass, Self-Regulation within the Regulatory State: Towards a New Regulatory Paradigm?, 85 
PUB. ADMIN. 885, 885, 903 (2007) (discussing how “the achievement of regulatory outcomes 
can be delegated downwards to the regulated organizations and self-regulatory bodies while 
being offset by increasing public regulatory oversight based on systems of accountability and 
transparency”); Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 399–400 (asking “how should co-
regulatory mechanisms best be designed, in order to take advantage of the strengths and 
virtues of industry self-regulation, while compensating for its weaknesses as a stand alone 
mechanism?”); Meidinger, supra note 31, at 243 (discussing how government agencies can act 
as conductors when public and private regulation interacts). 
 154. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 34, at 129. 
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and state-bolstered involvement of private actors in governance process-
es.”155 The public policy objective o� harnessing private regulation is to 
exploit the strength and resources of private regulatory institutions and 
actors in support of public goals.156 Concerns likely to be raised about har-
nessing include the legality of delegating power to private actors and the 
ability of government to ensure that private power does not impede the 
attainment of those goals.157 
This Article is concerned primarily with strong forms o� harnessing in 
which public regulation incorporates elements of private regulation such 
that they become an essential part of the regulatory regime. In weaker 
forms o� harnessing, public regulation may provide incentives to private 
actors to fulfill one or more complementary regulatory function, but the 
private regulatory function does not become essential. An example is EPA’s 
Audit Policy, which provides an incentive to regulated entities for self-
auditing by reducing the penalties for violations that entities discover 
through environmental audits.158 Weak harnessing is also effectuated by 
provisions in federal environmental laws that grant a right of action to 
private citizens to sue violators.159 Citizen enforcement is thought to moti-
vate and improve governmental enforcement by serving as a “competitive 
spur” and helping to “keep compliance issues high on the agendas of top 
agency officials.”160  
In strong forms o� harnessing, the private regulatory function can take 
the place of or substitute for a public regulatory function in a regulatory 
regime constructed by public actors. In strong harnessing, legal regulation 
                                                                                                                      
 155. See ANDREAS KRUCK, PRIVATE RATINGS, PUBLIC REGULATIONS: CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 5 (2011). 
 156. Cf. Perritt, supra note 42, at 215 (“Hybrid regulation—the combination o� broad 
public law frameworks within which private regulatory regimes work out the details—is a 
promising way to realize the advantages of private regulation while mitigating the disad-
vantages.”).  
 157. See especially Coglianese, supra note 125, at 721–23; Hamilton, supra note 19, at 
1437–38; McAllister, supra note 21, at 29–30; Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design and 
Innovation in Privatized Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1091, 1125–27 
(2006); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 410–11. 
 158. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention o� 
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (defining environmental audit as a 
“systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated entities o� facility 
operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements”); see also Short & 
Toffel, supra note 18, at 366–67. 
 159. On environmental citizen suits, see especially Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, 
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal 
Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing 
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185. 
 160. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 159, at 957.  
McAllister_to_PDF 9/26/2014  9:42 AM 
Spring 2014] Harnessing Private Regulation 319 
and private governance are “yoked together” and “integrated into a single 
system in which the functioning of each element is necessary for the suc-
cessful operation of the other.” 161 When strong harnessing is present, 
public regulators often assume new roles relating to the evaluation and 
oversight of the private regulators.162  
1. Incorporation o� Private Standards 
A longstanding example of strong harnessing is the incorporation of 
private standards into public law. 163 A 1978 study reported “that most regu-
latory standards applicable today were developed initially by the 
nongovernmental sector and made mandatory by incorporation by refer-
ence” and that “government-developed standards were a relatively 
insignificant fraction of all mandatory standards.”164 By 2013, over 9,500 
private standards had been incorporated by reference into federal regula-
tion.165 A variety of public benefits may be attained through public reliance 
on existing private standards. As explained by one commentator, relying on 
private standards is more cost-effective for the federal government, allows 
agencies to tap into expertise in the private sector, and facilitates industry 
compliance.166  
Federal regulatory laws such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 and the Consumer Products Safety Act of 1972 directed agencies to 
rely on existing voluntary standards in various ways.167 In its first two years, 
                                                                                                                      
 161. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 17, at 541, 543. 
 162. Cf. Gunningham et al., Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate Regulators: Achieving 
Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 211, 219 (1999) 
(explaining that “there is an essential policy role for government to shape market orderings 
and to facilitate the constructive activities of non-governmental institutions”); Perritt, supra 
note 42, at 250 (“Hybrid regulation can be understood as providing public law frameworks 
to assure accountability.”).  
 163. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 19; Mendelson, supra note 19; Strauss, supra note 19, at 
502 (explaining that private standards are sometimes converted into regulatory require-
ments). 
 164. Hamilton, supra note 54, at 459 (considering, for example, building codes, plumb-
ing codes, electrical codes, fire protection). 
 165. Bremer, supra note 19, at 135; Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database, 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://standards.gov/sibr/query/index.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2013) (showing 10,562 records in the “All Regulatory” link). 
 166. Bremer, supra note 19, at 140. But see Shapiro, supra note 17, at 406–11 (analyzing 
the possibilities for opportunistic behavior, incomplete contracting, and hold-up problems). 
 167. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 19; Elliot Klayman, Standard Setting Under the Consumer 
Product Safety Amendments of 1981—A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
96, 100–01 (1982); see also OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., supra note 63 (citing 
additional examples in the work of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other agencies).  
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the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) was directed 
to adopt voluntary consensus standards as governmental standards unless 
such adoption would not result in improved worker health or safety.168 After 
this initial period, a preference for consensus standards was maintained by 
the law’s requirement that OSHA state its reasons for adopting any rule 
that differs substantially from an existing consensus standard.169 Similar 
statutory support for the use of consensus standards led the Consumer 
Products Safety Administration to adopt a policy not to develop govern-
mental standards if “acceptable” consensus standards were developed and 
adhered to by consumer product manufacturers.170  
The federal government has also endorsed the public use of private 
standards in general laws and policies. In 1982, the Office o� Management 
and Budget (OMB) issued a Circular stating that it was the “policy of the 
Federal Government in its procurement and regulatory activities to [r]ely 
on voluntary standards, both domestic and international, whenever feasible 
and consistent with law and regulation pursuant to law.”171 Congress gave 
statutory force to this endorsement in 1995 with the National Technology 
Transfer Advancement Act (NTTAA), mandating that federal agencies use 
technical standards developed by voluntary consensus standards bodies 
rather than government-unique standards as a means of carrying out policy 
objectives unless “inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impracti-
cal.”172 While the Act’s legislative history acknowledges a distinction 
between technical standards and regulatory standards, this Congressional 
endorsement strengthened the authority o� federal agencies to rely on 
voluntary consensus standards in carrying out their regulatory objectives.173  
                                                                                                                      
 168. Freeman, supra note 16, at 640 n.401; Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1388.  
 169. HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT 
STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS 95 (2005) (discussing OSHA 
Section 6(b)(8)). 
 170. Hamilton, supra note 54, at 467. 
 171. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR 
NO. A-119, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE 
OF VOLUNTARY STANDARDS (1983), available at http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/ 
dmp/daos/dao216_14.html (revised by the passage of the National Technology Transfer 
Advancement Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998)). 
 172. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 
110 Stat. 775, § 12(d)(3) (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 173. The NTTAA formally covers only technical standards, as distinguished from 
regulatory standards. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 526, 526 n.201 (discussing legislative 
history o� NTTAA suggesting that the Act’s and the Circular’s endorsement of incorpora-
tion by reference applies to technical standards and not regulatory standards, wherein the 
former pertain to matters such as the “size, strength, or technical performance of a product, 
process, or material” and the latter “establish[] overall regulatory goals and outcomes”). 
However, as Strauss recognizes, the Act and Circular are used to support the incorporation 
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Although a longstanding practice, incorporation of private standards 
continues to raise important policy concerns. One is that public regulation 
will incorporate standards that were created without the due process protec-
tions of public standardization. To some extent, this concern has been  
addressed by the norms that govern the creation of voluntary consensus 
standards.174 According to one commentator, “private standardization has 
assimilated the canons of administrative law to such an extent that it is hard 
to find a difference” between its procedures and those of public law.175 
Yet while procedures may seem similar, private interests may over-
whelm public interests more than in public rulemaking. A 1990 study that 
compared public and private safety standards in several industries found 
that private standard setting may be “controlled by those who want the least 
done,” resulting in standards that are “watered down.”176 The study also 
found that the consensus process allows industry interests to outweigh 
consumer and other public interests.177 A consumer advocate, for example, 
may cast a negative vote, but be overridden by a larger number of industry 
advocates.178 While consumer advocates are not excluded from the process, 
they are less likely to have the resources for effective participation.179  
Another significant concern is raised by the copyrighted status of many 
private standards that are incorporated by reference.180 When private stand-
ards are incorporated by reference in regulation, the text of the regulation 
simply refers to the standard by name or other identifying information 
rather than reproducing it in the Federal Register.181 Often, to be accessed, 
these incorporated private standards must be purchased from SDOs at 
                                                                                                                      
of regulatory standards as well. Id. at 558–59 (recommending that regulatory standards not 
be able to be incorporated by reference); see also Mendelson, supra note 19, at 792 (discussing 
how “[s]o-called ‘technical’ standards often function to define substantive policy”). 
 174. See supra notes 49–52 and associated text; see also Hamilton, supra note 54, at 462–
64 (describing the development process for consensus standards). 
 175. SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 409; cf. CHEIT, supra note 7, at 15 (stating “there is a 
surprising degree of similarity in procedural requirements in the public and private sec-
tors”); Meidinger, supra note 31, at 237 (stating that “certain institutional patterns have 
become common in private regulation for each of these functions [standard setting, etc.], 
and they bear many similarities to government regulation”). 
 176. CHEIT, supra note 7, at 176.  
 177. Id. at 176–77. 
 178. Id. at 176. 
 179. Id. at 177. But see Hamilton, supra note 54, at 467 (observing that SDOs have been 
sensitive to the charge that consumer and other public interests are not well represented and 
citing ASTM and other organizations’ policies to encourage participation). 
 180. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking 
and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (2005) (“Government increasingly 
leverages its regulatory function by embodying in law standards that are promulgated and 
copyrighted by non-governmental organizations.”). 
 181. Bremer, supra note 19, at 133. 
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commercial prices.182 This practice undermines the principle that the con-
tent of public law should be publicly available.183  
Various reforms have been proposed to make incorporated standards 
publicly accessible. A 2011 recommendation of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States recommended that agencies “work with the 
copyright owner to ensure that material will be reasonably available to 
regulated and other interested parties both during rulemaking and follow-
ing promulgation.”184 One observer has argued that, at a minimum, 
incorporated standards should be available to all interested parties without 
charge through digital, read-only access.185 Another recommends that the 
federal government derecognize the copyright of incorporated standards in 
certain situations.186 
2. Public Endorsement of Self-Regulation 
Strong harnessing is also present in regulatory approaches like enforced 
self-regulation and audited self-regulation where the government endorses 
the role of private regulators in making and implementing their own rules. 
In enforced self-regulation, firms are required to propose particularized 
regulatory standards that will fulfill the public regulator’s policy objectives, 
and then these standards can be enforced by the public regulator.187 In 
audited self-regulation, a private self-regulatory organization (SRO) is  
                                                                                                                      
 182. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 743–44 (discussing the prices charged by SDOs). 
 183. Id. at 767–76.  
 184. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE, at 5 (adopted Dec. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Recommendation-2011-5-Incorporation-
by-Reference_0.pdf; see also Mendelson, supra note 19, at 744 (referring to it as a “tepid 
recommendation”). 
 185. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 799–800; see also Strauss, supra note 19, at 558 (call-
ing for the “[c]reation of a digital archive of incorporated standards to replace (or 
supplement) the current physical archive”). 
 186. Cunningham, supra note 180, at 338–41 (calling on the Director of the Federal 
Register to, in certain circumstances, derecognize copyright). 
 187. Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101 (1992) (referring to this approach as 
“enforced self-regulation”); Robyn Fairman & Charlotte Yapp, Enforced Self-Regulation, 
Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement, 
27 LAW & POL’Y 491, 493 (2005) (explaining that enforced self-regulation “refers to the 
regulator imposing a requirement for business to determine and implement their own 
internal rules and procedures to fulfill the regulator’s policy objectives”). This approach has 
also been called management-based regulation. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 125, at 
691 (stating that the public regulator directs regulated companies to “engage in a planning 
process that aims toward the achievement of public goals, offering firms flexibility in how 
they achieve public goals”). 
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empowered “to implement and enforce laws or agency regulations with 
respect to the regulated entities, with powers of independent action and 
review retained by the agency.”188 The former involves public endorsement 
o� firm-level self-regulation, while the latter involves public endorsement of 
industry-level self-regulation. In both, firms generally devise their own 
rules and standards, subject to review and oversight by a public regulatory 
agency.  
The USDA’s Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
regulation serves as an example of enforced self-regulation.189 The HACCP 
regulation requires firms to assess the risks of potential hazards associated 
with all stages o� food processing and then identify all points in the produc-
tion process at which hazards can likely be eliminated, minimized, or 
reduced.190 Similarly, OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) regula-
tion requires that certain firms “implement a multistep management 
practice to assess risks for chemical accidents, develop procedures designed 
to reduce those risks, and take actions to ensure that procedures are carried 
out in practice.”191 The agencies assess compliance by reviewing the man-
agement plans and other documentation generated by the firms and by 
undertaking inspections and other activities to determine whether firms are 
implementing their plans.  
In audited self-regulation, the SRO is generally an industry-level or-
ganization, which sets rules and standards that regulate the firms in its 
industry.192 A long-standing use of audited self-regulation is provided by 
the 1965 law that created Medicare.193 The law determined that hospitals 
accredited by a hospital industry association, the Joint Commission (JC), 
would have “deemed status,” meaning that it was deemed to have met the 
federal standards referred to as the Medicare Conditions o� Participation 
and was thus eligible to provide Medicare-funded services.194 In this way, 
                                                                                                                      
 188. Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 251 (1995). 
 189. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 125, at 697–98. 
 190. Id. at 697. 
   191.  Id. at 698. 
 192. Cf. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 365–66; see also AYRES & 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 187, at 102 (calling this “industry co-regulation”).  
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (2012). See generally Freeman, supra note 16, at 649; Eleanor 
D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government Regulation in Public 
Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate? 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1994); 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations: A Healthy Relationship? 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (1994). 
 194. Jost, supra note 193, at 18 (“Since its inception, the Medicare program has accept-
ed, or ‘deemed,’ Joint Commission accreditation as equivalent to compliance with Medicare 
certification standards.”). 
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the JC’s accreditation process served as a substitute for direct public regula-
tion of the quality o� hospital care by the Department o� Health and 
Human Services (HHS).195 Amid concerns that HHS lacked necessary 
oversight power, a 2008 amendment to the Medicare law removed the au-
tomatic deeming authority of the Joint Commission and made it necessary 
for the JC to apply to HHS for approval to maintain its accrediting sta-
tus.196  
3. Third-Party Verification 
A final example of strong harnessing is third-party verification, which 
is the focus of the remaining parts of this Article. In third-party verifica-
tion, governmental agencies rely on private third parties to verify 
regulatory compliance.197 Regulated entities are either required or have the 
option to contract with a verifier or verification body that has been ap-
proved, or accredited, by an agency or an agency-designated accreditation 
body. Third-party verification harnesses the private testing, inspection, and 
certification capacity that has been developed to implement and monitor 
compliance with private regulation. In this way, third-party verification can 
substitute for direct compliance monitoring by a governmental agency.198  
A variety of state and federal regulatory programs in the United States 
employ third-party verification. At the state level, Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia require third-party verification in their greenhouse gas reporting 
regulations.199 In Massachusetts, third-party verifiers assess compliance 
with underground storage tank laws200 and hazardous waste site remediation 
standards, a practice that has been dubbed “rent-a-regulator” by one observ-
                                                                                                                      
 195. Id. at 15; see also Michael J. Astrue, Health Care Reform and the Constitutional Limits 
on Private Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (1994) (noting that the subagency within the Department o� 
Health and Human Services responsible for the accreditation process resisted becoming an 
independent regulator and instead chose to contract its work out to private accrediting 
agencies).  
 196. Juliet Battard Menendez, The Impetus for Legislation Revoking the Joint Commission’s 
Deemed Status as a Medicare Accrediting Agency, 12 JONA’S HEALTHCARE L. ETHICS & REG. 
69, 69 (2010) (noting that the legislative change was preceded by a 2004 GAO report: U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-850, MEDICARE: CMS NEEDS ADDITIONAL 
AUTHORITY TO ADEQUATELY OVERSEE PATIENT SAFETY IN HOSPITALS (2004)). In No-
vember 2009, CMS approved the continuation of the Joint Commission’s deeming authority 
for hospitals through July 15, 2014. The Joint Commission’s Hospital Accreditation Recognized by 
CMS, 30 JOINT COMMISSION PERSP., no. 1, Jan. 2010, at 1. 
 197. McAllister, supra note 21, at 2 (providing an overview of third-party verification, 
its strengths, and potential weaknesses). 
 198. Id. at 3.  
 199. Id. at 7. 
 200. Id. at 10. 
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er.201 Private smog-check stations and building inspectors are relied on by 
regulatory agencies in many states and localities.202  
At the federal level, agencies in diverse areas of regulation are using pri-
vate third parties to carry out inspections and verify that regulated entities 
are in compliance with federal standards and other requirements. Third 
parties are charged with assessing the safety of imported food, children’s 
products, medical devices, cell phones, and other telecommunication and 
electrical equipment used in workplaces.203 Third parties also ensure that 
products labeled as organic, energy-efficient, and water-efficient meet ap-
plicable federal standards.204 In these regulatory third-party programs, third 
parties carry out product testing, facility inspections, and other regulatory 
compliance activities in the place of regulatory agencies. Regulatory agen-
cies take on new roles in coordinating and overseeing these private actors. 
A variety of reasons motivate the use of third-party verification. It is a 
form of public-private partnership, which many view as a promising way to 
capitalize on the different strengths of public and private regulation while 
compensating for their different weaknesses.205 In particular, third-party 
verification taps into the monitoring and compliance expertise held by the 
large private verification industry that has developed through private regu-
lation.206 Moreover, third-party verification seems suited for an era of 
growing regulatory demands and diminishing governmental resources.207 
New regulatory programs such as cap-and-trade need very accurate compli-
ance data, old regulatory programs suffer from serious deficiencies in com-
compliance monitoring, and the budgetary resources of regulatory agencies 
seem to grow ever scarcer.208 Also, some regulatory goals are particularly 
difficult to meet using traditional monitoring approaches such as ensuring 
the safety of imported food and other products manufactured in complex 
international chains of production. 
Yet concerns about third-party verification also abound. Compliance 
monitoring could be considered a core governmental function that should 
                                                                                                                      
 201. Seifter, supra note 157, at 1091, 1096–97; Third-Party UST Inspector Frequently Asked 
Questions, MASS. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, http://www.mass.gov/eea/ 
agencies/massdep/toxics/ust/third-party-ust-inspector-frequently-asked-questions.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013).  
 202. McAllister, supra note 21, at 10. 
 203. See infra Part II.A.  
 204. See infra Part II.B.2–4. 
 205. Cf. Balleisen, supra note 134, at 454–59 (discussing how the strengths of self-
regulation can help overcome the weaknesses of governmental regulation). 
 206. McAllister, supra note 21, at 15–20. 
 207. Id. at 2. 
 208. Id. at 20–28. 
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not be performed by private actors.209 Third-party verifiers may not be 
adequately independent from the regulated entities they assess or adequate-
ly competent to reliably detect noncompliance. Potential problems of 
accountability arise in third-party verification, as they do in other forms of 
public-private partnerships.210 And while third-party verification offers the 
possibility of shifting some of the cost of assessing compliance from gov-
ernment agencies to regulated industry, it also creates new types of costs for 
both, which may not be cost-effective.211  
4. Harnessing in the European Union 
These various forms of strongly harnessing private regulation are more 
prevalent in the European Union than the United States. The “New Ap-
proach,” established by EU directive in 1985 to harmonize the health, safety, 
and environmental requirements o� EU Member States and thereby facili-
tate trade, gave European standards bodies a great deal of regulatory 
authority.212 Under the New Approach, EU directives lay down the “essen-
tial requirements” for product safety, and technical specifications are drawn 
up by one of three European standards bodies.213 These “harmonized stand-
ards” are automatically transposed into member state standards, and 
conflicting standards must be withdrawn.214 Companies that comply with 
                                                                                                                      
 209. Id. at 28–31. 
 210. Balleisen, supra note 134, at 465–68; Freeman, supra note 151, at 1326–27; Minow, 
supra note 3, at 1259.  
 211. McAllister, supra note 21, at 44–46. 
 212. Council Resolution on a New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Stand-
ards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:C:1985:136:0001:0009:EN:PDF; SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 63–65; 
EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, PRIMER ON STANDARDS: 
UNCOVERING THE MYSTERIES OF STANDARDIZATION IN EUROPE 30–31 (2002), available at 
http://oek.ove.at/CenelecInfo.pdf.  
 213. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., A GUIDE TO EU STANDARDS AND 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 14 (Helen Delaney & Rene van de Zande eds., 2000), available 
at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/EU_Stds&CA_2000.pdf. New Approach directives exist 
for example on topics such as energy efficiency requirements, low-voltage equipment, 
medical devices, and toy safety. Id. at 5–6. The three European standards bodies are CEN, 
the European Committee for Standardization, responsible for standards in all fields except 
electrotechnology and telecommunications; CENELEC, the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization, responsible for electrotechnology standards; and ETSI, 
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, responsible for telecommunications 
standards. EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 212, 
at 31. 
 214. EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra  note 212, 
at 17; The “New Approach”, EUROPEAN COMM., http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/ 
european-standards/harmonised-standards/new-approach_en.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 
2013). 
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the harmonized standards are presumed to be in compliance with the EU 
directive and their products can circulate freely in the EU.215 Manufacturers 
can also choose not to comply with the harmonized standards, but member 
states can impose costly testing and certification requirements to ensure 
that their products still comply with the directive’s essential require-
ments.216  
Also, European countries have employed various forms of co-regulation 
to a greater extent than the United States. 217 Enforced self-regulation is 
widespread in European health, safety, and environmental regulation.218 In 
the Netherlands, audited self-regulation pertaining to the environment has 
taken the form of “negotiated agreements,” wherein industry legally binds 
itself to achieve the environmental objectives embodied in legislation.219 
Such agreements have been common in agriculture, oil refining, and waste 
disposal.220 In France, the Ministries o� Industry and Environment negoti-
ated with car manufacturers, importers, and trade associations to reduce the 
amount o� landfill waste resulting from automobile disposal.221  
Forms of third-party verification are also much more common in Euro-
pean regulation. Complementing its New Approach to set product safety 
standards, the EU developed a Global Approach to Testing and Certifica-
tion to implement standards.222 The global approach relies on third-party 
verifiers, referred to as “notified bodies,” to certify that products  
                                                                                                                      
 215. SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 64–65. 
 216. Id. at 65. 
 217. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, Introduction: Environmental Contracts 
and Regulatory Innovation, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 5 (Eric W. Orts & 
Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) (stating that “environmental ‘agreements’ or ‘covenants’ have 
been used for several decades in many European countries” including Belgium, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands).  
 218. Fairman & Yapp, supra note 187, at 493. 
 219. Anastasia Telesetsky, Experimenting with International Collaborative Governance for 
Climate Change Mitigation by Private Actors: Scaling Up Dutch Co-Regulation, 4 EUR. J. OF 
LEGAL STUD. 58, 64–65 (2011); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Understanding Project XL: A 
Comparative Legal and Policy Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE 
APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra 
note 217, at 115, 122–26; Orts & Deketelaere, supra note 217, at 6–7. 
 220. Telesestsky, supra note 219, at 65. 
 221. Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 7, at 80. 
 222. Commission Proposal for a Global Approach to Certification and Testing, COM (1989) 
209 final (July 24, 1989) (completed by Council Decision 90/683/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L380) 
(EEC), replaced and updated by Council Decision 93/465, 1993 O.J. (L 220) (EEC)); 
EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 212, at 43; see 
also MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION, 
AND GOVERNANCE 125–28 (2001) (describing negotiations to develop the Global Approach 
in the 1980s). 
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conform to relevant EU directives.223 Notified bodies are accredited by 
national accreditation bodies and “notified” to the European Commission, 
which is the reason for their name.224 As explained by one commentator, 
the “EU has created an administrative structure . . . supported, above all, by 
private entities, which ultimately and bindingly decide on market access for 
products in their function as ‘Notified Bodies.’ ”225 Member states have the 
authority to withdraw the accreditation of notified bodies and are required 
to conduct surveillance activities to ensure that marketed products comply 
with legal requirements.226  
Third-party verification is also used in a variety of other EU regulatory 
programs. Entities regulated by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, for 
example, must generally contract with an accredited third party to verify 
the accuracy of their annual emissions reports.227 Also, a company or other 
organizations can earn the right to display the European Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) logo by having an accredited third party verify 
that it has established an environmental management system, carried out an 
internal audit, and provided a public statement of its environmental per-
formance.228  
II. FEDERAL THIRD-PARTY VERIFICATION PROGRAMS  
Third-party verification programs operated by federal agencies in the 
United States vary in important ways. In many cases, Congress provided 
                                                                                                                      
 223. Hans Christian Röhl, Conformity Assessment in European Product Safety Law, in 
THE EUROPEAN COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATION 201, 206 (Oswald Jansen and Bettina 
Schöndorf-Haubold eds., 2001) (explaining that certified products receive the CE mark and 
noting that manufacturers can often certify themselves, but for more dangerous products, 
they must consult a Notified Body). 
 224. Id. at 206, 222–23 (explaining that notified bodies are generally accredited to ISO 
standards 17000 and 17011).  
 225. Id. at 201.  
 226. Id. at 223–25. 
 227. McAllister, supra note 21, at 7; see also Commission Decision 2004/156, Establish-
ing Guidelines for the Monitoring and Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pursuant to 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, arts. 1–2, 2004 O.J. 
(L 59) 1, 1. The Commission adopted a revised version of these guidelines on July 18, 2007. 
Commission Decision 2007/589, Establishing Guidelines for the Monitoring and Reporting 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, arts. 2–3, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 3. 
 228. European Eco-Management & Audit Scheme, EMAS Reporting, Question 7 of 
Frequently Asked Questions, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/ 
tools/faq_en.htm#Section7Question1 (last updated Jan. 16, 2014); see also David W. Case, 
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspec-
tive, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 402 (2005); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 
NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1290 (1995).  
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legislative authority for the third-party program and set forth certain design 
elements in statutes. In other cases, agencies have implemented third-party 
programs under existing statutory authority. Several programs are a decade 
or two old, but most have been established more recently. Depending on 
the program, third parties assess compliance with mandatory or voluntary 
regulatory standards, and regulated entities may either be required or may 
have the option to contract with third parties for such assessment. Table 1 
summarizes several relevant program attributes such as the assessment 
activities that third parties perform, whether the applicable standard is set 
by the government or privately (i.e. a voluntary consensus standard), and 
whether the agency directly accredits the third parties or relies on private 
accreditation bodies. 
Notably, federal agencies have increasingly incorporated ISO standards 
and terminology relating to conformity assessment into their third-party 
programs. Agencies have most often relied on international standards that 
concern how testing bodies should conduct testing (ISO/IEC 17025); how 
certification bodies should conduct certifications (ISO/IEC Guide 65 or 
ISO/IEC 17065, issued in 2012 to replace Guide 65); and how accreditation 
bodies should conduct accreditations (ISO/IEC 17011). By doing so, agen-
cies tap into the international networks of accreditation bodies, certification 
bodies, and testing bodies that operate in accordance with these standards 
and perform the work of conformity assessment.  
In most of the programs discussed below, regulatory agencies rely on 
third parties that serve the function of certification bodies. Regulatory 
agencies have used a variety of names for these third parties, such as Third-
Party Auditors, Telecommunications Certification Bodies, and Accredited 
Persons. The programs tend to share the same basic structure (see Figure 
1). Regulated entities contract with a third-party certification body to assess 
and certify whether they are in conformity with an applicable regulatory 
standard. The certification bodies are generally private entities that have 
been accredited to perform this task by an accreditation body that has been 
approved or recognized by the regulatory agency.  
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TABLE 1: FEDERAL REGULATORY THIRD-PARTY PROGRAMS WITH 
SELECTED PROGRAM ATTRIBUTES 
McAllister_to_PDF 9/26/2014  9:42 AM 
Spring 2014] Harnessing Private Regulation 331 
Figure 1: General Structure o� Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, this general structure varies. In some programs, for example, 
the regulatory agency itself accredits the certification bodies directly, with-
out reliance on an accreditation body. In other programs the regulatory 
agency may require the certification body to be accredited by an accredita-
tion body, but the agency may not explicitly approve or recognize 
accreditation bodies. Also, several of the programs rely on a combination of 
certification bodies and testing bodies.  
The first section below discusses four programs designed to assess 
compliance with mandatory standards, with which regulated companies 
must comply. The second section discusses four programs designed to 
assess compliance with voluntary standards with which companies can 
choose to comply.  
A. Programs for Mandatory Standards 
Several federal laws enable regulatory agencies to rely on third parties 
to assess compliance with mandatory standards. Mandatory standards are 
those that regulated entities must comply with in order to legally operate or 
sell a regulated product. In two of the programs—imported food programs 
administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and children’s 
product safety rules administered by the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission (CPSC)—the third-party certifier is an obligatory part of the 
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compliance process: the regulated company is required to contract with the 
third party for compliance assessment.229 In FDA’s programs for medical 
devices, in contrast, the use of a third party is optional: companies have the 
choice o� hiring a third party or having the agency conduct the review or 
inspection instead.230 In the FCC’s program for telecommunications 
equipment, the use of a third party was optional for most types of equip-
ment in the past, but a proposed regulation would make it obligatory for all 
types.231  
1. Imported Food  
As amended by the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 (FSMA), 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) enables the FDA to 
rely on third-party audits in its regulation of imported foods.232 Overall, 
the FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of about 80% of the U.S. 
food supply, all but the meat, poultry, and processed egg products that are 
regulated by U.S. Department of Agriculture.233 Increasingly, much of this 
food supply is imported, including 80% of seafood and 60% o� fruits and 
vegetables.234  
FSMA significantly strengthened FDA’s authority to regulate imported 
food, and it relies on accredited third-party auditors in two different ways. 
First, the law provides that the FDA may require that an importer present a 
certification from a third-party auditor in order to import food into the 
United States.235 With this authority, the FDA may require that imported 
food be accompanied by a certification that it satisfies the applicable re-
quirements of the FDCA.236 To decide whether a food import requires 
certification, the law instructs FDA to consider factors such as the safety 
risks of the food and its place of origin.237 The law also instructs the FDA 
to make a scientifically supported finding that the “food safety programs, 
systems, and standards in the country, territory, or region of origin of the 
                                                                                                                      
 229. See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 230. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 231. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 232. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) of 2011 § 307, Pub. L. No. 111-
353, 124 Stat. 3885, 3959 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 384d (2012)). 
 233. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-933, FOOD SAFETY: FDA CAN 
BETTER OVERSEE FOOD IMPORTS BY ASSESSING AND LEVERAGING OTHER COUNTRIES’ 
OVERSIGHT RESOURCES 1 (2012). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 801(q), 21 U.S.C. § 381(q) 
(2012) (amended by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act § 303); see also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 384d(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
 236. 21 U.S.C. § 381(q) (2012). 
 237. Id. § 381(q)(2). 
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food are inadequate to ensure that the article o� food is as safe as a similar 
article o� food that is manufactured, processed, packed, or held in the Unit-
ed States in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.”238  
Second, the law requires FDA to create a Voluntary Qualified Importer 
Program (VQIP) through which participating importers may receive expe-
dited importation if the facility from which the imported food comes has 
been certified by a third-party auditor.239 In contrast to mandatory food 
certifications, these facility certifications are voluntary. Importers that 
import foods from facilities that have received certification from a third-
party auditor may request to have that food become part of the VQIP.240 
The law directs the FDA to consider a range o� factors to make a determi-
nation on whether the food should receive expedited review and importation 
through the VQIP, including the safety risks of the food, the compliance 
history of the suppliers used by the importer, and the capability of the 
exporting country’s regulatory system.241  
In both programs, the third-party auditors would be responsible for 
performing the audits to assess and certify compliance with the mandatory 
requirements of the law.242 Under the statute, a third-party auditor refers to 
a “foreign government, agency of a foreign government, foreign coopera-
tive, or any other third party” as deemed appropriate by the FDA in its 
regulations.243 Private third-party auditors can be single individuals, but are 
more likely to be companies that employ “audit agents.”244 Under the stat-
ute, the audits for food and facility certifications are termed “regulatory 
audit[s].”245 Importers and other regulated entities may also contract with 
                                                                                                                      
 238. Id. § 381(q)(2)(C)(i). 
 239. FDCA § 806, 21 U.S.C. § 381(b) (2012) (amended by FSMA § 302); see also 21 
U.S.C. § 384d(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).  
 240. An importer “means the person that brings food, or causes food to be brought, 
from a foreign country into the customs territory of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 384b(g) 
(2012). Elsewhere the law defines an importer as “the United States owner or consignee of 
the article o� food at the time of entry,” or if none, “the United States agent or representa-
tive of a foreign owner or consignee of the article o� food at the time of entry.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 384a (2012). 
 241. 21 U.S.C. § 384b(d) (2012). 
 242. The law provides that the FDA may provide certifications, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 384d(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2012), but it seems likely that FDA will generally require the use of an 
accredited third-party auditor. 
 243. Id. § 384d(a)(3). 
 244. Id. § 384d(a)(3) (stating that a third-party auditor may be a single individual and 
third-party auditors may employ “audit agents,” defined at 21 U.S.C. § 384d(a)(1) (2012) as 
“an individual who is an employee or agent of an accredited third-party auditor and, alt-
hough not individually accredited, is qualified to conduct food safety audits on behalf of an 
accredited third-party auditor”).  
 245. Id. § 384d(a)(7). 
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an accredited third-party auditor to conduct a “consultative audit,” defined 
in the law to be for internal purposes only.246  
The structure of the third-party program contemplated by FSMA is 
shown in Figure 2. The law provides that the FDA will recognize accredita-
tion bodies that will, in turn, accredit the third-party auditors that can audit 
and certify foreign food imports and facilities.247 An accreditation body is 
“an authority that performs accreditation of third-party auditors.”248 The 
law requires FDA to establish a system for the recognition of accreditation 
bodies249 and to develop model accreditation standards, including require-
ments for regulatory audit reports.250 If the FDA has not recognized any 
accreditation bodies within two years after establishing a system, the FDA 
may directly accredit third-party auditors.251 The law further provides that 
FDA will establish a user-fee program through which accredited third-party 
auditors and audit agents will reimburse the FDA for “the work performed 
to establish and administer the accreditation system.”252  
                                                                                                                      
 246. Id. § 384d(a)(5). 
 247. See generally FDCA § 808, 21 U.S.C. § 384d (2012) (amended by FSMA § 307).  
 248. Id. § 384d(a)(2). 
 249. Id. § 384d(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 250. Id. § 384d(b)(2).  
 251. Id. § 384d(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 252. Id. § 384d(c)(8). 
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FIGURE 2: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR FOOD 
AND FACILITY CERTIFICATIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The statute sets forth certain requirements for the accreditation of dif-
ferent types of third-party auditors. It states that foreign governments and 
their agencies may be accredited based on a review of their food safety 
programs to ensure that the foreign government is capable of determining 
that U.S. requirements are met.253 Foreign cooperatives and other third 
parties may be accredited based on a review of internal systems and the 
training and qualifications of their audit agents to ensure conformity with 
the model standards to be issued by the FDA.254  
The statute addresses the potential of conflicts of interest between ac-
credited third-party auditors and the companies that contract with them to 
perform audits. 255 It provides that third-party auditors may not perform a 
regulatory audit of an entity for which it has performed a consultative audit 
or a regulatory audit in the previous thirteen months.256 It also states that 
third-party auditors cannot be owned or operated by the same person as the 
entities they certify, must have procedures to protect against financial con-
flicts of interest, and must annually disclose to the FDA how they have 
                                                                                                                      
 253. Id. § 384d(c)(1)(A). 
 254. Id. § 384d(c)(1)(B). 
 255. Id. § 384d(c)(5)(C). 
 256. Id. § 384d(c)(4)(C)(i). 
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complied with conflicts-of-interest rules and procedures.257 Similarly, audit 
agents cannot own or operate the entity they certify, must have procedures 
to protect against financial conflicts of interest, and must make an annual 
disclosure.258 The law also requires FDA to promulgate regulations to fur-
ther protect against conflicts of interest.259  
The law contains several specific provisions regarding how the FDA 
should oversee accreditation bodies and accredited third-party auditors and 
what audit information must be made available to the agency and to the 
public. Accreditation bodies are required to provide a list of all third-party 
auditors they have accredited and their audit agents,260 and the FDA is 
required to establish a public registry of all accreditation bodies and accred-
ited third-party auditors.261 FDA must re-evaluate accreditation bodies at 
least once every four years262 and must revoke the recognition of an accredi-
tation body that is out of compliance with its rules.263 
Accredited third-party auditors are directly answerable to the FDA in a 
variety of ways. The FDA may at any time require an accredited auditor to 
submit an onsite audit report from a regulatory audit and any related re-
ports or documents.264 In contrast, the FDA may not directly require an 
auditor to submit the reports from a consultative audit, but can still access 
the results of such audits based on its general authority to inspect records 
when FDA has a reasonable belief that an article o� food “presents a threat 
of serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals.”265 
Also, an accredited auditor must immediately notify the FDA if it “discov-
ers a condition that could cause or contribute to a serious risk to the public 
health” during either a regulatory or a consultative audit.266  
                                                                                                                      
 257. Id. § 384d(c)(5)(A). 
 258. Id. § 384d(c)(5)(B). 
 259. Id. § 384d(c)(5)(C) (further stating that FDA’s conflict-of-interest regulations 
shall require that audits performed by accredited third-party auditors be unannounced; shall 
establish timing, disclosure, fee payment and other rules that decrease the potential for 
conflicts of interest; and shall place limits on the extent to which there may be financial 
affiliations between auditors and audit agents and the entities they certify). 
 260. Id. § 384d(b)(1)(B). 
 261. Id. § 384d(g).  
 262. Id. § 384d(�)(1). 
 263. Id. § 384d(b)(1)(C). 
 264. Id. § 384d(c)(3)(B). 
 265. Id. § 384d(c)(3)(C) (referring to FDA’s authority to inspect records at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 350c (2012)). 
 266. 21 U.S.C. § 384d(c)(4)(A) (2012); see also Imports, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm257980.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) 
(answering in the affirmative the question, “I.4.2 Is the accredited auditor required to notify 
the FDA if a condition of concern is found during a consultative audit?”). 
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In addition, FDA is required to evaluate the performance of each ac-
credited third-party auditor at least once every four years, which should 
include the review of its regulatory audit reports and the compliance histo-
ry of its certified entities.267 The FDA may also conduct its own onsite 
audit of any certified entity whether or not the certifying third-party audi-
tor is present.268 The FDA may withdraw accreditation from an auditor i� 
food from a facility it has certified is linked to a serious outbreak o� food-
borne illness, i� FDA evaluates it and finds it to be out of compliance with 
accreditation requirements, if it refuses to allow the government to conduct 
necessary audits and investigations, or if the FDA revokes the recognition 
of the accreditation bodies which accredited it.269 Also, false statements or 
representations made to an accredited third-party auditor by a regulated 
entity or to the FDA by an accredited third-party auditor are subject to 
criminal penalties.270 
In July 2013, FDA proposed a rule to implement many of these statuto-
ry provisions.271 The regulations set forth FDA’s system for recognizing 
accreditation bodies, including the requirements and procedures for recog-
nition. To be recognized, accreditation bodies must be able to, inter alia, 
show certain levels of competency and capacity, protect against conflicts of 
interest, assess and monitor third-party auditors, and meet recordkeeping 
and reporting requirements.272 The regulations also address the require-
ments and procedures for the accreditation of third-party auditors. 
Accredited third-party auditors, like recognized accreditation bodies, must 
show certain levels of competency and capacity, protect against conflicts of 
interests, and meet recordkeeping and reporting requirements.273 The rule 
further specifies how third-party auditors must ensure the competence of 
its audit agents, conduct audits, write audit reports, and monitor foods and 
facilities that it has certified.274 While the proposed rule contains a frame-
work for accreditation standards, FDA has committed to issuing Model 
                                                                                                                      
 267. 21 U.S.C. § 384d(�)(2) (2012). 
 268. Id. § 384d(�)(3). 
 269. Id. § 384d(c)(6)(A)-(B). 
 270. Id. § 384d(e); see also CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE, IMPORTED FOOD PROVISIONS 
OF THE FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT (2011), available at http://www.food-label-
compliance.com/Sites/5/Downloads/White-Paper-FSMA-IMPORT-PROVISIONS-
Woodhouse-Nov-8-2011.pdf (a white paper emphasizing the significance of specific inclu-
sion of provisions relating to False Statements).  
 271. Accreditation o� Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food 
Safety Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782 (Jul. 29, 2013) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16). 
 272. Id. at 45,827–31. 
 273. Id. at 45,831–38.  
 274. Id. at 45,832–34. 
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Accreditation Standards that will elaborate on the framework and detail the 
qualifications that third-party auditors must demonstrate for accredita-
tion.275 
It is worth noting that the FSMA also requires FDA to establish a sys-
tem for the accreditation o� laboratories to conduct food safety tests.276 
Accredited labs must be used to test food in certain situations, such as when 
FDA identifies or suspects a food safety problem.277 Similar to its accredit-
ed auditor program, FDA is to establish an accredited laboratory program 
and publish a registry of accreditation bodies and accredited laboratories.278 
The statute also states that FDA shall develop model accreditation stand-
ards that include, for example, appropriate sampling methods and employee 
training requirements.279  
2. Children’s Products 
Pursuant to the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 
(CPSIA), the CPSC requires manufacturers and importers of nearly all 
children’s products to demonstrate that they meet mandatory product safety 
standards through third-party testing.280 Testing must be conducted by a 
Third Party Conformity Assessment Body (TPCAB), defined by regulation 
as “a testing laboratory whose accreditation has been accepted by the CPSC 
to conduct certification testing on children’s products.”281 Based on the 
                                                                                                                      
 275. Id. at 45785. 
 276. 21 U.S.C. § 350k. 
 277. Id. § 350k(b)(1). 
 278. Id. § 350k(a)(1). 
 279. Id. § 350k(a)(6). 
 280. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2063(a)(2) (2012). The law defines a “children’s product” as a consumer product designed 
or intended primarily for children twelve years of age or younger. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(2) 
(2012). In 2011, Congress enacted amendments to the CPSIA that, among other things, 
provided an exemption from third-party testing for some products produced by “small batch 
manufacturers,” defined as those that produce fewer than 7,500 units and collect less than $1 
million in consumer products revenues. Authority and Discretion—Consumer Product 
Safety Commission § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 112-28, 125 Stat. 273 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
2063(d) (2012)); see also Small Batch Manufacturers and Third Party Testing, U.S. CONSUMER 
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/business--manufacturing/small-business-
resources/small-batch-manufacturers-and-third-party-/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). An exemp-
tion was also provided for ordinary books for children aged four to twelve. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2063(d)(5)(A)(i) (2012).  
 281. 16 C.F.R. § 1107.2 (2014); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2063(�)(2)(A) (2012) (defining a 
“third party conformity assessment body” to mean a conformity assessment body that is not 
owned, managed, or controlled by the manufacturer or private labeler of a product assessed 
by the laboratory, unless such a laboratory has satisfied certain statutory criteria). It is worth 
noting that while the statute uses the term certification, the third-party program that it 
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results of the third-party testing, the manufacturer or importer submits a 
Children’s Product Certificate indicating compliance.282 Under the law, 
third-party testing is mandatory: manufacturers cannot opt out of the third-
party testing system and rely instead on CPSC to assess compliance. The 
structure of this third-party program is shown in Figure 3.  
Different rules and standards apply depending on the product. For ex-
ample, the CPSC has promulgated safety rules with standards for products 
such as bicycle helmets,283 bunk beds,284 infant bath seats,285 and electrically 
operated toys or articles.286 CPSC product safety rules containing standards 
for flammability,287 small parts,288 and lead content289 may also apply. In 
addition, CPSC has mandated compliance with a variety of toy safety 
standards established by ASTM regarding, for example, toy chests, stuffing 
materials, and sound producing toys.290  
                                                                                                                      
requires is a third-party testing program rather than a certification program under the 
definitions of international standards.  
 282. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(2) (2012); see also Consumer Product Safety Act Regulations, 
16 C.F.R. § 1110 (2014).  
 283. Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets, 16 C.F.R. § 1203 (2014). 
 284. Id. § 1513 (Requirements for Bunk Beds). 
 285. Id. § 1216 (Safety Standards for Infant Walkers). 
 286. Id. § 1505 (Requirements for Electrically Operated Toys or Other Electronically 
Operated Articles Intended for Use by Children). 
 287. Id. §§ 1610–11, 1615–16, 1630–33. 
 288. Id. § 1501 (Method for Identifying Toys and Other Articles Intended for Use by 
Children Under 3 Years of Age Which Present Choking, Aspiration, or Ingestion Hazards 
Because of Small Parts). 
 289. See DIV. OF CHEMISTRY, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, TEST 
METHOD CPSC-CH-E1001-08 (2008); DIV. OF CHEMISTRY, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. 
SAFETY COMM’N, TEST METHOD CPSC-CH-E1001-08.1 (2010). 
 290. ASTM F963 Standard Consumer Safety Specifications for Toy Safety, provided as a 
reference for List of CPSC-Accepted Testing Laboratories, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY 
COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/cgi-bin/labsearch/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (list of rules that 
require third-party testing and certification). 
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FIGURE 3: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR 
CHILDREN’S PRODUCT TESTING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CPSIA established a schedule for implementing third-party test-
ing and included a timeline for the accreditation of third-party conformity 
assessment bodies.291 The law specifies that “third party testing require-
ments apply to any children’s product manufactured more than 90 days 
after the [CPSC] has published requirements for accreditation of third 
party testing laboratories to assess conformity with a children’s product 
safety rule.”292 For example, the CPSC published such a notice of require-
ments for the lead paint rule on September 22, 2008 and the third-party 
testing requirement for lead paint became effective December 22, 2008 for 
products manufactured on or after that date.293 In total, CPSC published 
                                                                                                                      
 291. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3) (2012). 
 292. Memorandum from Scott Heh, Special Assistant, and Robert J. Howell, Acting 
Assistant Exec. Dir., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, to the Consumer Prod. Safety 
Comm’n (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.cpsc.gov//PageFiles/88264/thirdp.pdf; see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3)(A) (2012); Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity 
Assessment Bodies, 77 Fed. Reg. 31,086 (May 24, 2012) (stating that the third-party testing 
requirement does not commence until “more than 90 days” after the Commission publishes a 
notice of requirements pertaining to the regulation or standard to which the children’s 
product is subject). 
 293. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: TESTING AND 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
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nineteen notices of requirements between 2008 and 2011.294 However, there 
have been delays and stays of enforcement that have led to departures from 
the statutory schedule. For example, the CPSC stayed the enforcement of 
testing and certification requirements that would have gone into effect in 
February 2009 for new total lead content limits, phthalates limits for cer-
tain products, and mandatory toy standards, among other things.295 As of 
January 2012, almost all stays had been lifted, and third-party certification 
and testing was required under nearly all the children’s product safety 
rules.296 
Rulemaking for the CPSC third-party program has also progressed. In 
2011, the CPSC issued a final rule that establishes the “protocols and stand-
ards” for certification and testing of children’s products and details the 
requirements for the labeling of certified products.297 In 2012, the CPSC 
issued a final rule that sets forth requirements for the periodic audit of 
third party conformity assessment bodies as a condition of their continuing 
accreditation.298 And in 2013, the CPSC issued a final rule to establish the 
requirements related to CPSC acceptance of the accreditation o� laborato-
ries for purposes of testing children’s products.299 The requirements in this 
                                                                                                                      
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2008 (2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia10/ 
brief/102testing.pdf (proposed guidance document). 
 294. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, PROPOSED RULE: REQUIREMENTS 
PERTAINING TO THIRD PARTY CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia12/brief/tprequirements.pdf. 
 295. Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, CPSC Grants One Year 
Stay o� Testing and Certification Requirements for Certain Products (Jan. 30, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2009/CPSC-Grants-One-Year-
Stay-of-Testing-and-Certification-Requirements-for-Certain-Products/; see Notice of Stay 
o� Enforcement o� Testing and Certification Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 6396 (Feb. 9, 2009) 
(staying the enforcement of certain provisions of section 14(a) of the CPSA); Consumer 
Product Safety Act: Notice of Commission Action on the Stay o� Enforcement o� Testing 
and Certification Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,588 (Dec. 28, 2009) (revising the terms of 
stay of enforcement); Consumer Product Safety Act: Notice of Commission Action on the 
Stay o� Enforcement o� Testing and Certification Requirements, 76 Fed. Reg. 6765 (Feb. 8, 
2011) (continuing the stay of enforcement for testing and certification of children’s products 
for which a notice of requirements for accreditation o� laboratories had not yet been pub-
lished). 
 296. FAQs—Certification and Third Party Testing, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY 
COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/business--manufacturing/testing-certification/third-party-
testing/faqs-certification-and-third-party-testing/ [hereinafter CPSC FAQs] (last visited Feb. 
1, 2014).  
 297. CPSC Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification, 76 Fed. Reg. 
69,482 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1107). 
 298. CPSC Audit Requirements for Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 77 
Fed. Reg. 31,074 (May 24, 2012) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112). 
 299. CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 
78 Fed. Reg. 15,836 (Mar. 12, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1112, 1118). 
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final rule are largely the same as the requirements that the CPSC had set 
forth in the various notices of requirements that it published since 2008. 
There are three types of third-party testing: (1) initial certification test-
ing, (2) material change testing, and (3) periodic testing.300 Initial testing is 
required for all children’s products. They must be tested by a CPSC-
accepted, third-party laboratory to ensure compliance with applicable chil-
dren’s product safety rules.301 Material change testing by a third-party 
CPSC-accepted laboratory is required if a material change is subsequently 
made to any component part of that children’s product.302 Periodic testing 
refers to ongoing testing during production of the children’s product. Re-
gardless of whether a material change occurs, the production of certified 
children’s products is subject to periodic testing to ensure compliance with 
children’s product safety rules. These periodic and material testing require-
ments went into effect in February 2013.303 The requirements to test 
children’s products when there is a material change and to undertake peri-
odic testing became effective in February 2013.304 
The law provides that accreditation o� TPCABs may be conducted ei-
ther by the CPSC or by a designated accreditation body.305 Three types o� 
TPCABs are contemplated by the law: (1) those that are not owned, man-
aged, or controlled by a manufacturer or private labeler of a children’s 
product to be tested for certification purposes (“independent” laboratories); 
(2) those that are owned, managed, or controlled by a manufacturer or 
private labeler of the children’s product (“firewalled conformity assessment 
bodies”); and (3) those owned or controlled, in whole or in part, by a gov-
ernment (“governmental laboratories”).306 
For a TPCAB to be accepted to test children’s products for conformity 
with children’s product safety rules, it must be accredited by an accredita-
tion body that is a signatory to the ILAC MRA.307 To be an ILAC-MRA 
signatory, an accreditation body must, inter alia, operate in accordance with 
                                                                                                                      
 300. CPSC FAQs, supra note 296. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2063 (2012). 
 301. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(d)(2)(B)(i) (2012); CPSC FAQs, supra note 296. 
 302. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(d)(2)(B)(i) (2012); CPSC FAQs, supra note 296. 
 303. CPSC FAQs, supra note 296. 
 304. Id. 
 305. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3)(C) (2012). 
 306. See CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment 
Bodies, 78 Fed. Reg. at 15859 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.11); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2063(�)(2) (2012). 
 307.  See CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment 
Bodies, 78 Fed. Reg. at 15860 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.13(a)(2)); see also Requirements 
Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 73 Fed. Reg. 54564 (Sept. 22, 
2008), available in unpublished form at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/91441/tprequire 
ments.pdf. 
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ISO/IEC 17011.308 To make an accreditation determination, the accredita-
tion body assesses the laboratory’s conformity with ISO/IEC 17025.309 As 
described by the CPSC, ISO/IEC 17025 includes technical requirements 
relating to the competence o� laboratory staff, suitability and maintenance 
of test equipment, and quality assurance of test data.310 It also includes 
management requirements relating to organization, management systems, 
document controls, audits, and management reviews.311  
Laboratories are accredited with a defined scope of accreditation, which 
indicates the “children’s product safety rule and/or test methods” for which 
it is accredited to test.312 As required by the CPSIA, the commission main-
tains an online listing of accredited TPCABs and their scopes of 
accreditation.313 The current list includes hundreds o� laboratories in about 
thirty-five countries.314 For example, the U.S.-based laboratory NSF Inter-
national is accredited by International Accreditation Services Inc. (IAS), 
and its scope of accreditation includes about forty-five different product 
safety rules and ASTM standards.315  
Several measures exist to address conflicts of interest that could raise 
doubts about the impartiality of product certifications. As part o� being 
accredited to ISO/IEC 17025, a laboratory must “have policies and proce-
dures to avoid involvement in any activities that would diminish confidence 
in its competence, impartiality, judgment or operational integrity.”316 A 
laboratory must further demonstrate that its personnel are free from any 
undue “commercial, financial and other pressures and influences that may 
                                                                                                                      
 308.  See ILAC MRA and Signatories, INT’L LABORATORY ACCREDITATION 
COOPERATION, http://www.ilac.org/ilacarrangement.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 309. CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 15860 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.13(a)(2)). 
 310. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, THIRD PARTY CONFORMITY 
ASSESSMENT BODY ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS FOR TESTING COMPLIANCE WITH 16 
C.F.R. PART 1501 (SMALL PARTS REGULATIONS) 4 (2008), available at http://www.cpsc.gov 
//PageFiles/127865/smallparts.pdf. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See CPSC Form 223—Lab Accreditation, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/cgibin/labregentry/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 313.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3)(E) (2012) (requiring that the Commission maintain 
on its website an up-to-date list of entities that have been accredited to assess conformity 
with children’s product safety rules). 
 314. List of CPSC-Accepted Testing Laboratories, supra note 290. 
 315. Id. (detailed information displayed by highlighting the laboratory name and 
clicking “submit”). 
 316. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 17025, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND CALIBRATION LABORATORIES 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.saba.org.ir/saba_content/media/image/2011/04/1821_orig.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014). 
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adversely affect the quality of their work.”317 Accredited laboratories are 
subject to either an on-site surveillance or a full reassessment every two 
years to ensure that they maintain their standards of independence and 
technical expertise.318 
In addition to the baseline accreditation requirements, firewalled labor-
atories and governmental laboratories seeking CPSC approval must meet 
additional requirements that relate to their impartiality and independence. 
The CPSIA specifies that the CPSC may approve a firewalled laboratory if 
the laboratory has established procedures to ensure that “its test results are 
protected from undue influence by the manufacturer” and other interested 
parties, the CPSC is “notified immediately of any attempt by the manufac-
turer . . . or other interested party to hide or exert undue influence over test 
results,” and “allegations of undue influence may be reported confidential-
ly.”319 Similarly, the CPSIA contains five criteria that a governmental 
laboratory must satisfy for its accreditation to be accepted by the CPSC, 
including that manufacturers located in any nation are permitted to choose 
a laboratory that is not owned or controlled by the government of that 
nation and that the governmental laboratory does not exercise undue influ-
ence on the decisions of other governmental authorities that make decisions 
affecting its operation or controlling distribution of products.320  
TPCABs undergo a periodic audit that includes reassessment by its ac-
creditation body and reregistration with CPSC.321 CPSC does not specify 
the frequency of the periodic audit but rather says that it must occur at a 
minimum “at the frequency established by its accreditation body.”322 CPSC 
observes that, according to ISO/IEC 17011, a full reassessment must occur 
at least every two years, unless an accreditation body undertakes less com-
prehensive surveillance visits every six months.323 In this case, the time 
between reassessments must be no more than five years.324 
The law provides that the CPSC may withdraw its acceptance of a 
TPCAB if it finds that “(A) a manufacturer, private labeler, or governmen-
tal entity has exerted undue influence on such conformity assessment body 
or otherwise interfered with or compromised the integrity of the testing 
process with respect to the certification of a children’s product under this 
                                                                                                                      
 317. Id. 
 318. U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, supra note 310, at 4. 
 319. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(�)(2)(D)(ii) (2012). 
 320. Id. at § 2063(�)(2)(B). 
 321. CPSC Audit Requirements for Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 31083–85. 
 322. Id. at 31085 (codified at 16 C.F.R pt. 1112.35). 
 323. Id. at 31083. 
 324. Id. 
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section; or (B) such conformity assessment body failed to comply with an 
applicable protocol, standard, or requirement established by the Commis-
sion.”325 The law also provides that the CPSC may suspend a laboratory’s 
accreditation if it fails to cooperate with the CPSC in an investigation 
regarding its certification activities.326 Implementing these provisions, 
CPSC has issued regulations that establish whether, when, and how the 
CPSC may deny a TPCAB’s application, suspend accreditation, and with-
draw accreditation.327  
3. Medical Devices 
In fulfillment of statutory requirements, the FDA has developed two 
programs through which regulated entities can opt to have third parties 
perform compliance assessment tasks related to medical devices that the 
regulatory agency would otherwise perform. Through the first program, 
manufacturers of certain medical devices may have third parties review 
their 510(k) premarket notifications (“510(k) Review Program”). Through 
the second program, third parties may conduct inspections o� facilities that 
manufacture certain medical devices (“Accredited Person (AP) Inspection 
Program”). In both, third-party organizations recognized by FDA evaluate a 
manufacturer’s compliance with mandatory standards in the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.328  
The 510(k) Review Program was established pursuant to the FDA 
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). Congress directed FDA to accredit 
private third parties (referred to as either Accredited Persons (APs) or 
Recognized Third Parties) to conduct premarket review for low risk (Class 
I) and certain moderate risk (Class II) devices.329 FDA established  
                                                                                                                      
 325. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(e)(1) (2012); see also § 2063(e)(2) (setting forth procedures for 
accreditation withdrawals). 
 326. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(e)(3) (2012). 
 327. CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 15860 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.41). 
 328. As used in the program, the term “Persons” refers to organizations. See U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-157, MEDICAL DEVICES: STATUS OF FDA’S 
PROGRAM FOR INSPECTIONS BY ACCREDITED ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2007) [hereinafter 
STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM]. 
 329. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Implementation of Third Party Programs under the 
FDA Modernization Act of 1997: Final Guidance for Staff, Industry and Third Parties (2001), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
GuidanceDocuments/ucm094459.pdf [hereinafter Implementation of Third Party Programs] 
(noting that “FDA’s policy permitted third party review of class II devices only if device-
specific guidance or recognized consensus standards existed”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360m 
(2012) (containing the statutory requirement). See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
Guidance for Third Parties and FDA Staff: Third Party Review of Premarket Notifications (2004), 
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accreditation criteria (including criteria to prevent conflicts of interest) and 
conducted accreditations,330 published a list of APs,331 and conducted a 
training program for APs.332 By creating this option for device manufactur-
ers, Congress intended “to enable FDA to use its scientific review resources 
for higher-risk devices, while maintaining a high degree of confidence in 
the review o� low-to-moderate risk devices by Accredited Persons, and to 
provide manufacturers of eligible devices an alternative review process that 
may yield more rapid 510(k) decisions.”333  
Several years later, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization 
Act of 2002 (MDUFMA) authorized FDA to establish a program by which 
APs would be able to conduct inspections of certain medical device facili-
ties.334 Under the AP Inspection Program, certain manufacturers of Class II 
(medium-risk) and Class III (high-risk) medical devices may voluntarily 
contract with an AP to conduct a “Third-Party Inspection” of their facility. 
The structure of the program is shown in Figure 4.  
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
GuidanceDocuments/ucm082194.pdf.  
 330. See Medical Devices; Implementation o� Third Party Review under the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997; Emergency Processing Request Under 
OMB Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,388 (May 22, 1998) (publishing these criteria); Implementa-
tion of Third Party Programs, supra note 329. 
 331. See Current List of Accredited Persons for 510(k) Review under the FDA Modernization 
Act of 1997, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/ 
cfthirdparty/accredit.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 332. Implementation of Third Party Programs, supra note 329, at 13. 
 333. Id. at 4. 
 334. See Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
250, § 201, 116 Stat. 1588 (2002) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 374 (g) (2012)) (amended section 
704 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by adding subsection (g)). The rest of this 
section focuses on this program rather than the premarket program because information 
about it was more readily available.  
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FIGURE 4: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR MEDICAL 
DEVICE FACILITIES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FDA considers an inspection by an AP to be “an alternative to the tra-
ditional inspection by an FDA official.”335 In requiring its establishment, 
Congress sought to address the FDA’s inability to meet its inspection bur-
den.336 The program also purported to offer an advantage to manufacturers 
that produce for both the U.S. market and foreign markets by providing the 
opportunity to undergo a single inspection process that satisfies multiple 
jurisdictions.337 
The mandatory standard that applies in such inspections is the Quality 
System (QS) regulation and other device requirements in the FDCA and 
its regulations.338 The QS regulation requires that domestic and foreign 
manufacturers establish a quality system that implements current good 
manufacturing practices relevant to the “design, manufacture, packaging, 
labeling, storage, installation, and servicing of all finished devices intended 
                                                                                                                      
 335. Accredited Persons Inspection Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequiremen
ts/ThirdPartyInspection/ucm125410.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating that accredited 
third parties may conduct inspections “in lieu” of the FDA). 
 336. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-428T, MEDICAL 
DEVICES: CHALLENGES FOR FDA IN CONDUCTING MANUFACTURER INSPECTIONS (2008) 
[hereinafter CHALLENGES FOR FDA] (statement o� Marcia Crosse, Director, Health Care, 
United States Government Accountability Office) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-728, pt. 1, at 
35–36 (2002)). 
 337. Id. 
 338. 21 C.F.R. § 820 (2010). 
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for human use” in the United States.339 In a QS inspection, FDA inspectors 
“examine manufacturing controls, processes, and records.”340 When a manu-
facturer participates in the AP Inspection Program, the AP prepares and 
submits its reports to FDA, which remains responsible for making a final 
compliance assessment.341  
FDA has also implemented the MDUFMA’s third-party inspection 
provisions through its Pilot Multipurpose Audit Program (PMAP).342 
PMAP was established in 2006 in partnership with FDA’s Canadian coun-
terpart Health Canada, which also had a third-party certification and 
inspection program for medical devices.343 PMAP aimed to include ten 
inspections in which manufacturers would hire a single accredited third 
party to conduct an audit that would serve the regulatory purposes o� both 
FDA and Health Canada.344 In total, eleven such inspections were conduct-
ed, and the agencies produced a final joint report to summarize lessons 
learned.345 
Importantly, the AP Inspection Program is completely voluntary. Eligi-
ble manufacturers may choose to utilize an AP to conduct an inspection or 
they may continue to have FDA perform inspections.346 If a manufacturer 
is inspected by an AP, FDA removes the manufacturer from its routine 
inspection work plan for two years.347 In effect, the manufacturer receives a 
                                                                                                                      
 339. Id. § 820.1(a)(1). 
 340. STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, at 1.  
 341. See Accredited Persons Inspection Program, supra note 335; see also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 374(g)(7)(A) (2012) (stating that APs shall prepare an inspection report and that “[a]ny 
official classification of the inspection shall be determined by the Secretary”). 
 342. See Pilot Multi-Purpose Audit Program (PMAP)—Questions and Answers Related to 
the Pilot, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device 
RegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ThirdPartyInspection/ucm125453.htm 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter PMAP Q&A]; see also CHALLENGES FOR FDA, supra 
note 336, at 9, 19–21. 
 343. PMAP Q&A, supra note 342. 
 344. Final Joint Report of the Pilot Multipurpose Audit Program (PMAP), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Postma 
rketRequirements/ThirdPartyInspection/ucm232806.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) [herein-
after PMAP Report]. On international cooperation in regulation, see generally ADMIN. 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-6 
(2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/acus-recommendations/international-
regulatorycooperation/. 
 345. PMAP Report, supra note 344; Telephone Interview with Kim Trautman, Assoc. 
Dir., Int’l Affairs, Office of the Ctr. Dir., Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin. (Jun. 5, 2012) (reporting that eleven PMAP inspections were conducted).  
 346. Accredited Persons Inspection Program, supra note 335. 
 347. Telephone Interview with David Kalins, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Compli-
ance, Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (July 31, 2012). 
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two-year “inspection holiday” from regular FDA inspections unless FDA 
receives a complaint or has other cause to inspect.  
Only certain manufacturers are eligible to participate in the program. 
The manufacturer must manufacture a Class II or Class III device.348 Fur-
ther, it must market at least one of these medical devices in the United 
States and also market or plan to market at least one of these medical de-
vices in a foreign country that certifies, accredits, or otherwise recognizes 
the chosen AP as having the authority to conduct device inspections.349 
Also, the program was limited to establishments whose “most recent inspec-
tion . . . [was classified] as ‘no action indicated’ or ‘voluntary action 
indicated.’ ”350 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 (FDAAA) “streamlined the Accredited Person for Inspection Program 
by eliminating the requirement that a device establishment must seek prior 
FDA approval for a Third Party Inspection” and by “eliminat[ing] the limit 
of two consecutive Third Party Inspections unless FDA granted a waiv-
er.”351 After the amendments, eligible manufacturers may simply submit 
notification of their intent to use the program.352 
Unlike the two programs reviewed above, FDA does not utilize inde-
pendent accreditation bodies in this program. Rather, accreditation 
                                                                                                                      
 348. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA STAFF, AND FDA-
ACCREDITED THIRD PARTIES: MANUFACTURER’S NOTIFICATION OF THE INTENT TO USE 
AN ACCREDITED PERSON UNDER THE ACCREDITED PERSONS INSPECTION PROGRAM 
AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 228 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS 
ACT OF 2007 (FDAAA) (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ 
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm085187.htm#3.  
 349. Id. at 6 (stating that “[a]t least one foreign country where you market or intend to 
market your class II or class III device must certify, accredit, or otherwise recognize the AP 
you have chosen as a person authorized to conduct device inspections”); see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 374(g)(6)(A)(ii)(IV)(bb) (2012). 
 350. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(6)(A)(i); see also STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, 
at 6 (“Based upon its findings during inspection, FDA classifies completed inspections into 
one of three categories based on the extent to which the establishment deviates from appli-
cable requirements of the quality system regulation: No action indicated (which indicates no 
deviations or only minor deviations), voluntary action indicated (which indicates minor to 
significant deviations), or official action indicated (which indicates significant deviations 
and warnings).”); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA STAFF, 
AND THIRD PARTIES: INSPECTION BY ACCREDITED PERSONS UNDER THE MEDICAL 
DEVICE USER FEE AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2002 AND THE FDA AMENDMENTS ACT 
OF 2007; ACCREDITATION CRITERIA (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Medical 
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm089702.htm (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].  
 351. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350 at 4.  
 352. Manufacturer’s Notification of the Intent To Use an Accredited Person Under the 
Accredited Persons Inspection Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,764 (May 23, 2011); see also 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 4 (noting the specific information that the 
notice must include).  
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determinations are made by FDA’s Third Party Recognition Board (TPRB), 
which was established in 1998 to make accreditation determinations for the 
510(k) Review Program.353 MDUFMA required FDA to establish criteria 
for the accreditation of APs and to conduct further activities to approve 
their employees to conduct inspections.354 Under the law, an applicant for 
accreditation must not be a federal government employee and must be a 
legally constituted independent entity with no organizational, material, or 
financial affiliation with a manufacturer, supplier, or vendor of articles 
regulated under the Act.355  
According to FDA guidance, the applicant must agree to “operate in 
accordance with generally accepted professional and ethical business prac-
tices and agree in writing” to, inter alia, limiting its “work to that for which 
competence and capacity are available,” promptly responding and attempt-
ing to resolve complaints regarding accredited activities, and protecting 
against officer and employee financial conflicts of interest.356 FDA also 
requires that APs have sufficiently trained personnel, including at least one 
individual with supervisory capability and authority, and the necessary 
infrastructure “to interface with FDA’s electronic data systems” and protect 
confidential information.357 After an organization is approved as an AP, its 
employees must complete classroom training and perform several inspec-
tions jointly with FDA.358  
FDA instructs APs to prepare an inspection report to be submitted to 
both the manufacturer and the FDA “using the format defined in the Inves-
                                                                                                                      
 353. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 5. The Third Party Recognition 
Board is situated within the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health and chaired 
by William Sutton. Id. at 22. On how the TPRB interacts with applicants and reviews 
applications, see Implementation of the Inspection by Accredited Persons Program under 
the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002; Accreditation Criteria: 
Guidance for Industry, FDA Staff, and Third Parties; Availability, 68 Fed. Reg. 22,400, 
22,402–03 (Apr. 28, 2003). On the 510(k) program generally, see supra notes 322–25 and 
accompanying text.  
 354. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(2) (2012). These criteria were published at 68 Fed. Reg. 
22,400–01 (Apr. 28, 2003), and most recently revised in 2009. See GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY, supra note 350.  
 355. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(3) (2012). See also GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350. 
 356. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 6–8. 
 357. Id. at 6–8, 13 (noting that an AP “must protect from public disclosure trade secret, 
confidential commercial or financial information, and private personal identifier information 
in records . . . except that such information may be made available to FDA”); see also 21 
U.S.C. § 374(g)(2) (2012); § 374(g)(3)(E)(iii); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 
5 (indicating that AP personnel should be as qualified as FDA personnel). 
 358. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 9–10 (providing that APs are not 
eligible to conduct independent inspections until they successfully complete classroom 
training and three joint inspections with FDA). 
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tigations Operations Manual (IOM).”359 The report must describe in detail 
each significant nonconformity found and identify any “other matters that 
relate or that may influence compliance with this act.”360 The report must 
also “describe any recommendations made to the establishment during the 
inspection or at the inspection’s closing meeting” and “describe any prom-
ised corrective actions or other discussions with the management at the 
conclusion of the inspection.”361 APs are required to maintain certain rec-
ords regarding their initial and continuing qualifications to be APs and 
regarding each inspection.362 The law also requires an AP that discovers a 
problem that “could cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public 
health” to immediately report it to FDA.363  
MDUFMA and its regulations require that APs and their employees 
(including contract employees) be “free from conflicts of interest and the 
appearance of conflicts of interest” that could “affect the inspection process” 
or the preparation of reports.364 APs may not be owned, operated, or con-
trolled by a “manufacturer, supplier, or vendor” of any article “regulated 
under the [A]ct,” and no “personnel” of an “AP involved in inspections,” nor 
“their spouse or minor children,” may have ownership of or other financial 
interest in any product, manufacturer, supplier or vendor regulated under 
the Act.365 Potential conflicts of interest are also present if the AP or any of 
its inspection personnel “provides consultative services to any manufacturer, 
supplier, or vendor of products regulated under the [A]ct”; if inspection 
personnel participate “in an inspection of a firm they were employed by 
within the last 12 months”; or if the “fees charged or accepted are contin-
gent or based upon the observations in the report made by the AP.”366  
FDA is also required by statute to monitor manufacturers’ requests to 
use a particular AP, and it can “stop inspections by APs who may have 
developed inappropriate business relationships” with manufacturers.367 As 
described by FDA, “[b]usiness relationships that may undermine the  
                                                                                                                      
 359. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12; see 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(7)(A) 
(2012) (stating that APs are required to prepare inspection reports in the form and manner 
designated by U.S. FDA); Investigations Operation Manual, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/default.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2013). 
 360. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12. 
 361. Id.  
 362. Id. at 13–14. 
 363. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(7)(E) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12. 
 364. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 17; see 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(2)-(3) 
(2012). FDA uses a rating criteria checklist to evaluate whether APs have adequately pro-
tected against conflicts of interest. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 15.  
 365. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 8; see 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(3) (2012). 
 366. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 9. 
 367. Id. at 11. 
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independence or objectivity of an AP include contracts between a manufac-
turer and an AP that represent a significant share of the AP’s income such 
that continuation or termination of the contract may create undue financial 
influence or at least the appearance of such influence.”368 Evidence of a 
“financial conflict of interest between the AP and the owner or operator of 
the inspected device establishment” may constitute cause for withdrawal of 
the AP’s accreditation.369 Finally, the statute requires each AP to “annually 
make available to the public the extent to which the AP complies with 
conflict of interest requirements.”370 Also, “inspection records and infor-
mation collected from the manufacturer and submitted to FDA by APs” are 
generally available for public disclosure “after the agency issues a compli-
ance decision, unless such information is exempt from disclosure by law.”371  
The law provides that FDA will audit APs on a periodic basis, and the 
FDA states in guidance that it will “make onsite visits on a periodic basis to 
each AP to audit performance and inspect records, correspondence, and 
other materials relating to” the AP Inspection Program.372 FDA may with-
draw accreditation when an AP is substantially not in compliance with the 
standards of accreditation, poses a threat to the public health, or fails to act 
in a manner consistent with the Act.373 FDA may also “withdraw accredita-
tion” where “FDA determines that there is a financial conflict of interest 
between the AP and the owner or operator of a device establishment that 
the AP has inspected.”374 Before FDA withdraws an AP’s accreditation, it 
notifies the AP and provides “an opportunity for an informal hearing.”375  
Since 2003, the FDA has accredited sixteen U.S.- and foreign-based 
organizations as APs.376 For example, the U.S.-based Underwriters Labora-
tories, Inc. (UL) is recognized to inspect facilities that make all regulated 
medical devices, as are other organizations based in the U.K. and China.377 
                                                                                                                      
 368. Id. at 11–12. 
 369. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(5) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12. 
 370. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(3)(E) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 17. 
 371. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 13. Applicable disclosure laws 
include the Freedom o� Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1905), relevant provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(j)) and FDA regulations implementing these statutes (see, for example, 21 C.F.R. § 20 
(2013) (the FDA regulations implementing the Freedom o� Information Act) and Freedom of 
Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/ 
foi/default.htm) (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).  
 372. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 5, 11 (further stating that it audits 
APs on a periodic and “for cause” basis); see 21 U.S.C. § 374 (g)(5)(A)(i) (2012).  
 373. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(5) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 14. 
 374. 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(5) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 14. 
 375. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 14. 
 376. Id. at 3–4.  
 377. For a list of APs, see Accredited Persons Inspection Program, supra note 335.  
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However, by 2012, the AP Inspection Program was largely inactive and a 
single FDA employee administered the program as a collateral duty.378 Also 
by 2012, the 510(k) Review Program had no full-time positions committed 
to it; rather, administrative responsibilities were spread over three employ-
ees as part of their other workload.379  
4. Telecommunications Equipment 
In 1998, the FCC adopted rules for the establishment o� Telecommuni-
cation Certification Bodies (TCBs) that have the authority to certify that 
equipment meets the FCC’s requirements and issue a written grant of 
equipment authorization.380 FCC requirements generally apply to all devic-
es that generate radio frequency (RF) energy to ensure that they operate 
effectively without causing harmful interference to radio communications. 
Certain devices must also be evaluated for radiofrequency radiation expo-
sure to protect human health.381  
Only certain types of equipment require certification, and often the 
certification can be conducted by either a TCB or the FCC.382 Examples of 
devices that may be submitted to either include, but are not limited to cell 
phones, RF lights, microwave ovens, RC transmitters, family radios, telem-
etry transmitters, wireless phones, and walkie-talkies.383 Some devices may 
only be submitted to the FCC (such as certain new technologies) or TCBs 
                                                                                                                      
 378. E-mail from Jean Cooper, Senior Staf� Fellow, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to 
author (July 17, 2012) (on file with author).  
 379. Id. 
 380. Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters, 64 Fed. Reg. 4995 (Feb. 2, 
1999); 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.960–62, 68.160–62 (2013). The applicable telecommunications equip-
ment regulations are at 47 C.F.R. §§ 0-101. See also OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, TCB POST-MARKET SURVEILLANCE 1 n.1 (2008), available at 
http://ftp.tiaonline.org/tr-41/TR-41.9/Public/0-Archive/2008-Archive/2008-02-New%20Or 
leans/TR41.9-08-02-011-TCB%20Survelliance%20Guidelines.pdf (“The requirements for 
Telecommunication Certification Bodies (TCBs) were specified in the Commission’s Report 
and Order (R&O) in GEN Docket 98-68 (FCC 98-338), adopted on December 17, 1998. 
Further guidance on the requirements for TCBs was given in Public Notice DA 99-1640, 
FCC Provides Further Information on the Accreditation Requirements for Telecommunication 
Certification Bodies GEN Docket 98-68, released on August 17, 1999.”).  
 381. 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.1091, 2.1093 (2013); see also Radio Frequency Safety, FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/radio-frequency-safety (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2013). 
 382. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.907 (2013) (on “certification”). Equipment with a low risk of 
causing harmful interference may generally satisfy FCC requirements through a manufac-
turer’s “verification,” 47 C.F.R. § 2.902 (2013), or “Declaration of Conformity,” 47 C.F.R. 
§ 2.906 (2013).  
 383. See Office o� Eng’g & Tech., Equipment Authorization (EA), FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N, http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ea/procedures.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2013). 
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(all computers and computer peripherals). When a manufacturer seeks 
certification directly from the FCC, equipment authorization fees apply.384  
Figure 5 shows the third-party structure of the TCB program. TCBs 
are required to be accredited as operating in accordance with ISO/IEC 
Guide 65 and FCC’s technical requirements for TCBs.385 Under its Nation-
al Voluntary Conformity Assessment Evaluation (NVCASE) program, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for 
recognizing the private accreditation bodies that accredit TCBs in the Unit-
ed States. The two recognized accreditation bodies are American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Association for Laboratory 
Accreditation (A2LA).386 “Certification bodies located outside the United 
States may be recognized [by the FCC] as a TCB when there is a govern-
ment-to-government [Mutual Recognition Agreement] between the 
country they are located in and the United States.” 387 In that case, the TCB 
is accredited by appropriate authorities in that country.388 An online list of 
recognized TCBs is maintained by FCC.389 The TCB program went into 
effect in June 2000 with thirteen recognized TCBs, and as of 2012, there are 
thirty-four recognized TCBs.390  
                                                                                                                      
 384. See Office o� Eng’g & Tech., What Fees Are Applicable to an Equipment Authoriza-
tion?, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/kdb/forms/FTSSearchResult 
Page.cfm?id=41712&switch=P (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (showing fees ranging from $490-
$3,870 for certification of devices). 
 385. OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, TCB PROGRAM ROLES 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES (2006), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/kdb/GetAttachment.html? 
id=LRwF49tahbJq3RjO7IgzAg%3D%3D; see also 47 C.F.R. § 68.160(b) (2013).  
 386. See OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 385, at 1.  
 387. Id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 68.160(c) (2013).  
 388. See OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 385, at 1; see also 47 C.F.R. § 68.160(c) 
(2013).  
 389. See Office o� Eng’g & Tech., OET Telecommunications Certification Bodies System, 
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://apps.fcc.gov/tcb/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
 390. David A. Case & William Graff, Approval Options: A Look at the FCC and TCB 
Approval Processes, COMPLIANCE ENGINEERING, Sept.-Oct. 2001, available at http://www.ce-
mag.com/archive/01/09/case.html (providing 2001 number); Telephone Interview with 
George Tannahill, Office o� Eng’g and Tech., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, (Aug. 27, 2012) 
(providing 2012 number). 
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FIGURE 5: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR 
TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The task of the TCB has two steps: first, to evaluate the product 
(which involves laboratory testing or reliance on testing conducted by the 
manufacturer); and second, to make the certification decision.391 TCBs are 
accredited with certain scopes, which indicate the product types they may 
approve (e.g., Scope A: Unlicensed Radio Frequency Devices; Scope B: 
Licensed Radio Service Equipment). For accreditation, TCBs must 
“demonstrate expert knowledge of the regulations” for the product types in 
each of their scopes.392 Also, the TCB must have the “technical expertise 
and capability to test the equipment it will certify and shall also be accred-
ited in accordance with ISO/IEC Guide 25 to demonstrate it is competent 
to perform such tests.”393 Testing of products may be performed by subcon-
tractors o� TCBs, but the TCB must maintain oversight and remains 
responsible for the test results.394 The FCC has not established conflict-of-
                                                                                                                      
 391. See OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 380, at 2–3; see also 47 C.F.R. 
§ 68.162(b)(2) (2013).  
 392. 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(c)(2) (2013).  
 393. 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(c)(3) (2013); OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 380, at 2.  
 394. See 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(d) (2013).  
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interest rules for TCBs beyond what is required for accreditation to ISO 
Guide 65.395  
Before a TCB can grant an equipment authorization, it must submit all 
required information to the FCC’s online system.396 After the system au-
tomatically performs certain validity checks, it can be used to grant the 
authorization. FCC reserves to itself thirty days to review the completed 
action and set aside the authorization if necessary. Much of the information 
that is uploaded, such as pictures of the product, pictures of the label, and 
certain testing data, becomes publicly available. Other information entered 
into the system may be considered proprietary and kept confidential.  
Also, the FCC requires TCBs to conduct certain surveillance testing of 
equipment they certify.397 TCBs must test additional equipment samples 
for at least 5 percent of the grants they issue and electronically submit an 
annual surveillance report. If a TCB finds that a certified product fails to 
comply, it must notify FCC and the manufacturer, which will be asked to 
take actions to correct the situation.398 Subject to certain procedural re-
quirements, the FCC retains authority to withdraw its recognition o� TCBs 
and revoke the certification of products by TCBs.399 FCC itself also con-
ducts market surveillance activities that may include pre-grant testing, post-
grant testing, and off-the-shelf product testing. Upon receiving a complaint 
from a TCB or the public about a problem with another TCB or certified 
equipment, FCC may pursue the complaint itself, request an assessment by 
the relevant accreditation body, or require further testing by the relevant 
TCB.400 
In May 2013, the FCC issued a proposed rule that would significantly 
reform the TCB program.401 Under the new rule, the FCC would rely on 
                                                                                                                      
 395. Guide 65 states that a certification body should “ensure that activities of related 
bodies do not affect the confidentiality, objectivity and impartiality of its certifications, and 
it shall not 1) supply or design products of the type it certifies, 2) give advice or provide 
consultancy services to the applicant as to methods of dealing with matters which are barri-
ers to the certification requested, 3) provide any other products or services which could 
compromise the confidentiality, objectivity or impartiality of its certification process and 
decisions.” ISO/IEC, GUIDE 65: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES OPERATING 
PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS, at 3 (1996). 
 396. Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390. 
 397. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.962(g)(2) (2013); see also OFFICE OF ENG’G AND TECH., FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, TCB Post-Market Surveillance 1 (2011), available at  https://apps.fcc. 
gov/oetcf/kdb/forms/FTSSearchResultPage.cfm?id=20540&switch=P. 
 398. See 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(g)(3) (2013).  
 399. Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(�)(6) (2013).  
 400. Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390. 
 401. See Authorization o� Radiofrequency Equipment, 78 Fed. Reg. 25,916 (May 3, 
2013) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 2, 15, 68). 
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TCBs to perform all certifications.402 The rule clarifies the post-market 
surveillance that is required o� TCBs and the steps that the FCC can take 
when the performance of a TCB is deficient.403 It also incorporates updated 
ISO/IEC standards, replacing ISO/IEC Guide 65 with ISO/IEC 17065.404 
B. Programs for Voluntary Standards 
In four programs, federal agencies rely on third parties to assess and 
certify compliance with voluntary standards. Unlike mandatory standards, 
companies do not have to comply with voluntary standards in order to 
conduct their business. Rather, companies may choose to comply in order to 
receive a marketing label or other desired benefit. The four programs de-
scribed below all offer companies the opportunity to display a label on their 
products attesting to their compliance. In all of them, the use of third par-
ties is obligatory: to participate in the program, the company that sells the 
labeled product has to contract with a third party.  
1. Workplace Product Safety 
Since 1988, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) has operated a third-party program through which it ascertains 
that specified equipment and materials (products) used in OSHA-regulated 
workplaces meet safety standards.405 The program’s structure is illustrated 
in Figure 6. Under OSHA’s Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory 
(NRTL) Program, private sector organizations approved by OSHA are 
hired by manufacturers of specified products to test and certify them. The 
NRTL then authorizes the manufacturer to affix a label (or mark) on the 
products, which is visible to the OSHA workplace inspector.  
OSHA requires NRTL certification for many different types of prod-
ucts, such as printers and copiers, electric heaters and air conditioners, 
alarm systems, fire extinguishers, acetylene torches, and liquefied petroleum 
                                                                                                                      
 402. Id. at 25,920. 
 403. Id. at 25,922–24. 
 404. Id. at 25,925.  
 405. See Safety Testing or Certification of Certain Workplace Equipment and Materi-
als, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,102 (Apr. 12, 1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1907, 1910); 29 
C.F.R. § 1910, sbpt. S (2013); see also Bernard Pasquet, OSHA Requirements for Nationally 
Recognized Testing Laboratory Approval of Products, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha. 
gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/NRTLarticle.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (stating that workplaces 
subject to OSHA’s jurisdiction include the “vast majority of private employers in the United 
States and its territories”; “most Federal Government places of employment”; and “State 
and local government places of employment in States that have received OSHA approval to 
administer their own occupational safety and health program”).  
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gas ovens.406 The standards that the products must meet to be certified by 
an NRTL are voluntary consensus standards, rather than government-
unique OSHA standards.407 These standards are set by national standards-
producing organizations such as ANSI, ASTM, Factory Mutual Research 
Corporation (FMRC), and UL.408 In effect, manufacturers are not required 
by law to meet these standards to market their products, but workplaces 
that are regulated by OSHA are required to utilize products that are certi-
fied to these standards.  
NRTLs are private organizations that are recognized by OSHA to be 
qualified to perform safety testing and product certification.409 OSHA 
regulations set forth the requirements for NRTLs.410 NRTLs must be 
capable of performing the proper testing, meaning that they must have the 
proper equipment and facilities, staff, procedures, and quality control pro-
grams.411 They shall, as necessary, implement control procedures, inspect 
the production of items at factories, and conduct field inspections to moni-
tor the proper use of their marks on products.412 They must be “completely 
independent” o� both the manufacturers and vendors of equipment subject 
to testing and the employers subject to the tested equipment require-
ments.413 NRTLs must maintain effective procedures for producing 
objective and unbiased reports and for fairly handling complaints and dis-
putes.414  
                                                                                                                      
 406. See Pasquet, supra note 405; see also Occupational Safety & Health Admin. 
[OSHA], Type of Products Requiring NRTL Approval, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.os 
ha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/prodcatg.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (setting forth thirty-seven 
product categories, of which electrical equipment is the largest, and citing to General Indus-
try Standards, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (2013)). 
 407. See OSHA, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha. 
gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/faq_nrtl.html#8 (answering the question “What product safety test 
standards can an NRTL use in certifying products?”). 
 408. See OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TESTING 
LABORATORY PROGRAM APPLICATION GUIDELINES 1 (2000), available at https://www.osha. 
gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/applguid.pdf [hereinafter OSHA APPLICATION GUIDELINES]. A list of 
standards recognized by OSHA is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch. 
search_form?p_doc_type=STANDARDS&p_toc_level=0&p_keyvalue=. 
 409. See OSHA, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www. 
osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/faq_nrtl.html#1 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (“OSHA’s recognition is 
not a government license or position, or a delegation or grant of government authority. 
Instead, the recognition is an acknowledgment that an organization has necessary qualifica-
tions to perform safety testing and certification of the specific products covered within its 
scope of recognition.”). 
 410. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.7 (2013). 
 411. See id. § 1910.7(b)(1). 
 412. Id. § 1910.7(b)(2). 
 413. Id. § 1910.7(b)(3). 
 414. Id. §§ 1910.7(b)(4)(i)–(ii). 
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FIGURE 6: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR 
WORKPLACE PRODUCT SAFETY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If its application is approved by OSHA, an NRTL’s initial recognition 
is valid for five years.415 OSHA approves NRTLs with certain “scopes of 
recognition” by specifying the test standards with which they can certify 
conformity. OSHA maintains an online registry o� NRTLs and their scopes 
of recognition.416 Currently, fifteen NRTLs are recognized by OSHA.417 
Twelve are headquartered in the United States, and three NRTLs are head-
quartered in other countries.418 Some NRTLs are based in one country but 
also have offices in others. For example, CSA International is based in 
Toronto, Canada and also has offices in Ohio and California, and UL is 
based in Illinois and also has offices in four other U.S. states and ten for-
eign countries. 
NRTLs and applicants for NRTL recognition must pay fees.419 OSHA 
assesses fees for processing applications for “initial recognition, expansion 
of recognition, or renewal of recognition, including on-site reviews; review 
and evaluation of the applications; and preparation of reports, evaluations 
                                                                                                                      
 415. See OSHA APPLICATION GUIDELINES, supra note 408 at 1. 
 416. See OSHA, Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs), U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (listing recognized 
NRTLs).  
 417. E-mail from Kevin Robinson, OSHA, U.S. Dep’t o� Labor (Oct. 11, 2012). 
 418. Id. 
 419. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.7(�) (2013). 
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and Federal Register notices; and audits of sites.”420 Fees first went into 
effect on October 1, 2000.421 They were revised in 2002, 2007, and 2011.422 
A current listing of the applicable fees is maintained online.423 For example, 
total fees to become recognized as an NRTL currently amount to over 
$40,000 (including an initial application review fee of $17,750, an assess-
ment fee of $4,440 plus travel expenses, and a final report and Federal 
Register notice fee of $19,520).424 Substantial fees also apply when an 
NRTL expands or renews its recognition. For the audits that OSHA re-
quires of recognized NRTLs, OSHA charges at least $4,400 plus travel 
expenses for an on-site audit and $1,120 for an office audit.425 Audit fees are 
significantly higher if nonconformances are found or if more than one day 
is required.  
2. Organic Food 
The National Organic Program (NOP), administered by the United 
States Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), 
relies on a system of third-party certification. The Organic Foods Produc-
tion Act of 1990, the authorizing legislation for the NOP, states that the 
“Secretary shall implement the program . . . through certifying agents.”426 
In regulations promulgated in 2000, AMS set the organic standards that 
cover the production, postharvest handling, and processing of organic foods 
and specified the third-party certification system that would determine 
whether a certain product met those standards.427  
These regulatory standards are voluntary in that food producers or 
handlers are only required to conform to them if they label their products 
                                                                                                                      
 420. Id. § 1910.7(�)(1)(i)–(ii) (describing how fees are determined and stating that the 
fees reflect the full cost of performing the listed activities). 
 421. OSHA, Fee Payment Instructions and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/nrtlfees.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2013); see also OSHA, 
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories—Fees; Public Comment Period on Recognition 
Notices, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,798 (July 31, 2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910), available 
at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGIS 
TER&p_id=15480.  
 422. Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,500 (Feb. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-25/html/2011-3937.htm (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2013) (revising the fee regulations). 
 423. OSHA, Fee Schedule (effective March 28, 2011), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/nrtlschedule.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. 7 U.S.C. § 6503(d) (2012). 
 427. The final organic rule was published on December 21, 2000, and the regulations 
implementing the NOP became effective October 21, 2002. See 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2013).  
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as organic. However, i� food producers or handlers label their products as 
organic, it is mandatory that they use an accredited third party to provide 
the required certification.428 The certifying agents are responsible for all 
aspects of the certification process: conducting inspection as necessary to 
verify compliance with regulatory requirements, issuing certification deci-
sions, issuing notices of noncompliance, and suspending or revoking the 
certification of clients that are out of compliance.429  
As shown in Figure 7, third-party certifying agents are directly accred-
ited by the AMS. They may be private or governmental entities, and under 
certain circumstances, the agency may accept a foreign government’s ac-
creditation o� foreign certifying agents.430 To be accredited, the entity must 
have sufficient expertise and adequately trained personnel to comply with 
the terms of the organic certification program.431 Certifying agents must 
also conduct an annual program review of their certification activities and 
correct any noncompliance,432 and they must maintain records of certifica-
tion processes and make them available for inspection upon request.433 As 
of 2012, about ninety entities—about fifty domestic and forty foreign—
were accredited by the NOP to act as certifying agents.434 Examples of 
domestic certifying agents include private organizations like Global Organic 
Alliance, Inc., based in Ohio, and the Idaho State Department of Agricul-
ture’s Division o� Plant Industries.435 Overall, state agencies constituted 
seventeen of the fifty-one domestic organic certifiers.436 Examples o� for-
eign domestic certifying agents include Argencert S.A., based in Argentina, 
and CAAE Certification Service, based in Spain.437 
The NOP regulations include several provisions to avoid potential con-
flicts of interest.438 Certifying agents are required to prevent conflicts of 
interest by not certifying operations that they have any commercial interest 
                                                                                                                      
 428. National Organic Program: Organic Certification & Accreditation, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=Template 
N&navID=NationalOrganicProgram&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPAccre
ditationandCertification&description=Accreditation%20and%20Certification&acct=nopgen 
info (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 429. 7 C.F.R §§ 205.403–205.406 (2013). 
 430. Id. § 205.500(c) (2013). 
 431. Id. § 205.501(a)(1)–(6) (2013). 
 432. Id. § 205.501(a)(7) (2013). 
 433. Id. § 205.501(a)(9) (2013). 
 434. National Organic Program: Organic Certification & Accreditation, supra note 428.  
 435. See Complete Domestic ACA List, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/ 
AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5074486 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).  
 436. Id.  
 437. See Complete Foreign ACA List, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AM 
Sv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5074487 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 438. 7 C.F.R. § 205.501(a)(11) (2013). 
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in, excluding the participation of employees or contractors that have any 
such commercial interests, not permitting employees or contractors to 
accept any payment or gifts other than prescribed fees for certification, not 
providing consultation services to certified operations, requiring employees 
and contractors to complete annual conflict-of-interest disclosure reports, 
and requiring that the decision to certify be made by someone different 
from those conducting prior certification activities.439  
FIGURE 7: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR ORGANIC 
FOOD LABEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regulations provide that AMS will conduct on-site reviews of ac-
credited certifying agents. Such reviews encompass “the certifying agent’s 
certification procedures, decisions, facilities, administrative and manage-
ment systems, and production or handling operations certified by the 
certifying agent.”440 Such reviews should occur before or soon after initial 
accreditation, before renewal of accreditation, and one or more times during 
the five-year period of accreditation.441 NOP reports that fifty-six such 
onsite reviews or inspections occurred in 2012.442 
                                                                                                                      
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. § 205.508(a). 
 441. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.508(b), 205.500 (2013) (specifying that the duration of ac-
creditation is five years). 
 442. Telephone Interview with Cheri Courtney, Acting Dir., Accreditation & Int’l 
Activities Div., Nat’l Organic Prog. (Aug. 16, 2012). Some audit reports and corrective 
action reports can be found on the NOP website. See Appeals and Settlement Reports, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template= 
TemplateJ&page=NOPReadingRoomHome (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
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The authorizing legislation stated that the NOP should provide for the 
“collection of reasonable fees from producers, certifying agents and handlers 
who participate in such program.”443 The NOP regulations specify that the 
cost of the program’s accreditation services will be collected from applicants 
for initial accreditation and accredited certifying agents for review of annual 
reports and accreditation renewal.444 In 2010, the average cost to a domestic 
certifying agent applicant was $4,428, and the average cost to a foreign 
certifying agent was $24,082.445  
3. Energy Efficiency 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Energy 
Star Program in 1992 as a labeling system for products that met specified 
voluntary efficiency standards.446 The Department o� Energy (DOE) has 
jointly administered the program since 1995, when labeled products ex-
panded from computers and monitors to “additional office equipment and 
residential heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) equipment.”447 Over 
sixty product categories may now carry the Energy Star label including 
major appliances, office equipment, lighting, home electronics, new homes, 
and commercial and industrial buildings.448 As of 2010, more than 40,000 
individual product models made by over 1,600 manufacturers had earned 
the Energy Star label.449  
Effective in 2011, after a critical report by the Government Accounta-
bility Office, Energy Star was significantly restructured by EPA to require 
                                                                                                                      
 443. 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(10) (2012). 
 444. 7 C.F.R. § 205.640 (2013). 
 445. National Organic Program FAQ: Becoming a Certifying Agent, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navI
D=NOPFAQsHowAccredited&topNav=&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPF
AQsHowAccredited&description=FAQ:%20%20Becoming%20a%20Certifying%20Agent& 
acct=nopgeninfo (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 446. See infra note 528. 
 447. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-470, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM: 
COVERT TESTING SHOWS THE ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS 
VULNERABLE TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 3 (2010).  
 448. For general information, see History, subsection of About ENERGY STAR, 
ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=abou 
t.ab_history (last visited Nov. 29, 2013) (discussing the history of the Energy Star labeling 
system and the types of products labeled). 
 449. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR OVERVIEW OF 2010 ACHIEVEMENTS 
(2011), available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/2010%20CP 
PD%204pgr.pdf. 
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that products carrying the label be certified by third parties.450 The new 
third-party structure for the program is shown in Figure 8. “Previously, 
manufacturers self-declared . . . that their products met the Energy Star 
requirements. With the new third-party certification requirement, product 
testing must be conducted in an [EPA-recognized] laboratory and the re-
sults must be certified and submitted to EPA by an [EPA-recognized] 
certification body.”451 EPA recognition, in turn, generally depends on ac-
creditation to an appropriate ISO standard by an EPA-recognized 
accreditation body.  
                                                                                                                      
 450. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 447. See generally Third-
Party Certification, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/ 
index.cfm?c=third_party_certification.tpc_index (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).  
 451. McAllister, supra note 21 at 19. 
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FIGURE 8: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR ENERGY 
STAR PRODUCT LABEL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accreditation bodies play the role of providing the accreditation that 
certification and laboratories require to become EPA-recognized. To accred-
it certification bodies, an accreditation body must be a signatory to the IAF 
MLA.452 In 2013, there were about seventy signatories to the IAF MLA 
based in about fifty different countries.453 In the United States, there are 
four IAF MLA signatories, including A2LA, IAS, and ANSI. 
To accredit laboratories, an accreditation body must be itself recognized 
by the EPA. For recognition, the accreditation body must operate its ac-
creditation program in accordance with ISO/IEC 17011 and maintain an 
affiliation with ILAC.454 By 2013, EPA had recognized twenty-seven  
                                                                                                                      
 452. Accreditation Body Resources, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=third_party_certification.tpc_accred_bodies (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2013).  
 453. See IAF Members and Signatories, INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM, 
http://www.iaf.nu/articles/Accreditation_Body_Members_by_Name/52, accessible from IAF 
MLA, INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM, http://www.iaf.nu/articles/IAF_MLA/14 (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2014). 
 454. Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Accreditation Bodies for Energy Star Labora-
tory Recognition, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads 
/mou/Criteria_Accreditation_Bodies_Labs.pdf?e75e-ee91 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).  
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accreditation bodies around the world, including A2LA, IAS, and three 
others in the United States.455  
EPA-recognized certification bodies (CBs) certify that eligible prod-
ucts meet the requirements of the Energy Star label. A key requirement for 
recognition is accreditation to ISO/IEC Guide 65 or ISO/IEC 17065 by an 
accreditation body that is an IAF MLA signatory.456 These standards re-
quire, for example, that the CB operate in a non-discriminatory manner and 
make certification decisions based on information gathered during the 
evaluation process.457 EPA also imposes a variety of other requirements 
regarding how CBs determine whether a product qualifies for the Energy 
Star label and how CBs must conduct a verification testing program to 
verify that their certified products continue to meet Energy Star require-
ments.458 More specifically, CBs are required to annually select and test at 
least 10 percent of all models they have certified, with half the models being 
randomly selected and half selected based on EPA referrals. As of 2013, 
Energy Star had recognized about twenty-five certification bodies around 
the world.459  
In general, qualifying Energy Star products should be tested in an 
EPA-recognized laboratory. For recognition, laboratories must be accredit-
ed to ISO/IEC 17025 by an EPA-recognized accreditation body. ISO/IEC 
17025 requires, for example, that a laboratory employ experienced personnel 
with adequate training, have adequate physical plant facilities and test 
equipment, and ensure that measuring equipment is accurate.460 Recognized 
labs must also agree to a variety of other requirements, such as reporting to 
EPA and otherwise enabling EPA oversight.461 Recognized labs need not be 
independent; they may be owned by the manufacturers of the products they 
test. 
                                                                                                                      
 455. See EPA-Recognized Accreditation Bodies, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.epa_recognized_accreditation_bo 
dies (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).  
 456. See Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Certification Bodies for the ENERGY 
STAR Program, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/ia 
/partners/downloads/mou/Conditions_and_Criteria_for_Recognition_of_Certification_Bodi
es.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id.  
 459. EPA-Recognized Certification Bodies (CBs) and Laboratories, ENERGY STAR, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=recognized_bodi 
es_list.show_RCB_search_form (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (generating a list of certification 
bodies with the search menu). 
 460. Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Laboratories for the ENERGY STAR Pro-
gram, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at 1, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/par 
tners/downloads/mou/Criteria_Laboratories.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 461. Id.  
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Manufacturers’ laboratories that are not accredited may also be used for 
testing under the Energy Star’s Witnessed Manufacturers’ Testing Labora-
tory or Supervised Manufacturers’ Testing Laboratory programs.462 Under 
these programs, a CB may operate a testing program to accept test data 
from such a lab if the CB commits to exercising and documenting a high 
degree of oversight, including on-site assessment and monitoring to ensure 
the laboratory’s compliance with ISO 17025 and applicable test methods. As 
of August 2012, Energy Star testing was being conducted in 463 laborato-
ries: 224 accredited labs, 180 supervised labs, and 59 witnessed labs.463 
About 200 of these labs were located in the Asia-Pacific region, most of 
which were fully accredited.464  
4. Water Efficiency 
EPA’s WaterSense product certification program, which provides a la-
bel for high-performing, water-efficient products, also relies on third-party 
certification as shown in Figure 9. Modeled after Energy Star, WaterSense 
was launched in 2006 and has required third-party certification since 
2009.465 All products bearing the WaterSense label must be assessed for 
conformity with the WaterSense product specification by an accredited 
third-party certifying body. The certifying bodies, in turn, are accredited by 
an accreditation body approved by EPA.  
                                                                                                                      
 462. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 463. Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, Energy Star Program, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency (Aug. 6, 2012). 
 464. Id. 
 465. Comprehensive List of All Frequent Questions, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/full_list.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). EPA 
issued the first WaterSense product certification system in 2009. WATERSENSE, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSENSE PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEM (2009) available 
at, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/docs/cert_system_revised508.pdf. EPA issued a revised 
version in 2011. WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSENSE PRODUCT 
CERTIFICATION SYSTEM VOLUME 2.0 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
watersense/docs/cert_system_508.pdf [hereinafter WATERSENSE 2.0]. 
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FIGURE 9: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR 
WATERSENSE PRODUCT LABEL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The applicable standards in WaterSense are EPA’s “product specifica-
tions,” which are currently finalized for seven product categories: Tank-
Type Toilets, Lavatory Faucets, Flushing Urinals, Showerheads, Weather-
Based Irrigation Controllers, Commercial Pre-Rinse Spray Valves, and 
Product and Labeling Clarifications.466 Manufacturers seeking to use the 
WaterSense label on products in these categories first enter into a Water-
Sense partnership agreement with EPA and then have their product(s) 
“certified for conformance to the WaterSense specification by an EPA 
licensed certifying body.”467 “Manufacturers apply directly to the licensed 
certifying body for certification and to obtain the WaterSense label.”468 
To be approved by EPA, an accreditation body must be domiciled in 
the United States and show that it operates in accordance with the require-
                                                                                                                      
 466. Compendium of Product & Program Specifications, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/partners/product_program_specs.html (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2013). 
 467. Product Certification & Labeling, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/watersense/about_us/product_certification_labeling.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2013). 
 468. Id. 
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ments o� ISO/IEC 17011.469 Also, it must offer accreditation services to 
ISO/IEC Guide 65 and the IAF Guidance on the Application o� ISO/IEC 
Guide 65 and be an IAF MLA signatory for products.470 As of 2013, EPA 
had approved three accreditation bodies: A2LA, ANSI, and IAS.471 
Product-certifying bodies must be accredited by an approved accredita-
tion body in accordance with ISO/IEC Guide 65 and the IAF Guidance on 
the Application o� ISO/IEC Guide 65 to operate the WaterSense product 
certification system and certify products to the relevant WaterSense prod-
uct specifications. The accreditation body determines the certifying body’s 
scope of accreditation by accrediting it for any or all of the WaterSense 
product specifications established by EPA. Accredited certifying bodies also 
sign a licensing agreement with EPA to certify and label products for 
WaterSense.472 As o� May 2012, EPA had licensed six certification bodies to 
provide product certifications for one or more of the seven product catego-
ries.473 Examples o� licensed certification bodies include Intertek and NSF 
International, based in the United States, and CSA International, based in 
Canada.  
In addition, certifying bodies must have procedures in place to ensure 
that the testing data that they rely on is reliable. Independent testing labs 
that are used by certifying bodies must demonstrate compliance with 
ISO/IEC 17025 and the relevant WaterSense product specification.474 If a 
certifying body relies on testing data from a manufacturer’s laboratory, 
additional requirements are imposed.475 To the extent that a certification 
body outsources its evaluation process to contractors, it must have “docu-
mented policies and procedures for . . . qualifying, assessing, and 
monitoring” them, and it must make a list of them available to the EPA or 
accreditation body to review.476 
                                                                                                                      
 469. WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 4. The requirement that the accreditation 
body be domiciled in the United States is not present in EPA’s Energy Star program or 
other programs included in this review. 
 470. Id. (noting that references to ISO/IEC Guide 65 will be superseded by ISO/IEC 
17065 once ISO/IEC 17065 is published). 
 471. Accreditation & Licensed Certifying Bodies, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/about_us/cert_bodies.html#accreditation (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2013). 
 472. WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 6. 
 473. Accreditation & Licensed Certifying Bodies, supra note 471. 
 474. WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 8; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS RECEIVED ON JUNE 2011 WATERSENSE DRAFT REVISED 
PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEM 11 (Sept. 29, 2011) (clarifying that WaterSense does not 
require ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation for testing laboratories; it only requires that labs 
“demonstrate compliance with ISO/IEC 17025”). 
 475. WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 8. 
 476. Id. at 9. 
McAllister_to_PDF 9/26/2014  9:42 AM 
370 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 3:2 
III. MEASURING SUCCESS 
Given the growing prevalence of third-party verification programs, it is 
important to evaluate which work well and why. This section first sets forth 
five metrics to assess success. They include the reliability of third-party 
determinations, compliance rates, agency capacity to administer the third-
party system, public acceptance, and industry acceptance. The second part 
discusses the incentives that are necessary to attract participation in pro-
grams where regulated entities may choose whether to contract with a third 
party or rely on regulatory agency for verification of regulatory compliance. 
A. Reliability  
A key metric of success of third-party programs is whether the third-
party assessment produces determinations that are sufficiently reliable and 
accurate for the regulatory purpose at hand. This metric allows for some 
variation. It may be acceptable to the agency, for example, for the reliability 
of third-party determinations regarding conformity with voluntary stand-
ards to be lower than the reliability of those regarding conformity with 
mandatory standards. Similar to private conformity assessment systems that 
may vary depending on the needs of the purchaser, regulatory third-party 
systems may also be allowed to vary depending on regulatory needs.477  
To a large degree, the reliability of determinations made by third par-
ties will depend on their competence and independence. Generally, third 
parties must be competent to perform the required assessment tasks and 
independent (or unbiased) in their assessment. In addition, programs 
should be designed to enhance the consistency of third-party determina-
tions and avoid problems that have undermined the reliability of similar 
assessments in non-regulatory contexts.  
In some areas of regulation in which regulatory third-party programs 
are being constructed, third parties have been used by private parties to 
assess conformity for many years. However, these private systems have 
sometimes suffered from a lack of reliability. For example, in the food safe-
ty area, corporate purchasers have required suppliers to conduct 
independent third-party audits of their facilities. Newsworthy failures in 
these systems have suggested problems with the reliability of these audit 
determinations. In the case of the Peanut Corporation of America and the 
salmonella outbreak with which it is associated, third-party auditors had 
given the manufacturer a “superior rating,” but later investigation by FDA 
showed that product testing had revealed instances of salmonella contami-
                                                                                                                      
 477. Cf. infra note 612 and accompanying text (recommending that agencies calibrate 
the design of third-party programs to the level of risks associated with noncompliance). 
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nation.478 In cases like this, questions have been raised about both the com-
petence and the independence of third-party auditors. 
To ensure competence, an agency may have to give serious attention to 
the training of third parties. Two recent pilot programs undertaken by FDA 
have underscored the importance of such training. In a pilot program con-
ducted by FDA in which certification bodies were selected to inspect 
establishments in the aquacultured shrimp industry for compliance with 
U.S. food safety standards, the agency’s audits of the CBs found that some 
were not using the correct standards in their inspections even though they 
had been instructed to do so.479 Rather, they were using standards of other 
countries, which they had presumably used in other audits.480 FDA con-
cluded that it would have to conduct additional training to implement a 
full-scale third-party program.481 Similarly, in PMAP, FDA’s pilot program 
with Canada for medical device facility inspections, FDA found that train-
ing was needed to ensure that “additional regulatory requirements outside 
of the ISO 13485:2003 standard and the QS regulation are adequately 
covered during audits/inspections.”482  
Despite the training issues, however, the FDA concluded in PMAP 
that the use of third-party auditors held promise. FDA gave an overall vote 
of confidence in its workability, stating that “[Health Canada] and FDA 
have confidence in the ability of a qualified and competent auditing organi-
zation to plan, carry out, and report on the audit/inspection according to 
basic [Health Canada] and FDA requirements.”483 In a similar vein, an 
FDA staffer who has worked with the AP Inspection Program indicated 
that he perceived APs to be very competent, particularly in performing ISO 
13485 facility inspections.484 He noted, however, that because they rarely do 
inspections for the AP Inspection Program, the information they provide to 
                                                                                                                      
 478. Andrew Martin, Peanut Plant Says Audits Declared It in Top Shape, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/business/05peanuts. 
html?_r=1&ref=peanutcorporationofamerica. 
 479. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
ASSESSMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION PILOT FOR AQUACULTURED SHRIMP 
12 (2011); see also Draft Guidance for Industry on Voluntary Third-Party Certification 
Programs for Foods and Feed Availability, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,704-05 (Jul. 10, 2008) (announc-
ing the pilot program and calling for applications from certification bodies). 
 480. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 7. 
 481. Id. at 26. 
 482. PMAP Report, supra note 344 (stating that Canada and many other countries rely 
directly on ISO 13485: Medical devices—Quality management systems—Requirements for 
regulatory purposes in their regulation of medical devices). The QS regulation of the United 
States is similar, but not the same. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347. 
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FDA is generally not adequate to support an FDA enforcement action.485 
He opined that if the program were mandatory or otherwise attracted high 
participation by regulated entities, an entire industry of competent inspec-
tors could emerge.  
In the shrimp aquaculture pilot, in contrast, the FDA’s conclusions 
were more pessimistic. It found that the agency needed “to more fully 
explore communication, logistic, administration, and training options for 
conducting future third-party programs.”486 Indeed, FDA noted significant 
deficiencies when it observed and assessed third parties to see if they met 
eleven “critical performance elements.”487 These critical audit performance 
elements were defined as “key knowledge, skills, and abilities that, if not 
demonstrated by the auditor, could result in the failure of the auditor to 
detect the processing of potentially unsafe food.”488 FDA conducted twen-
ty-eight audits and found that only three out of eleven of its critical 
elements were met in the majority of the audits and only one was met in all 
of the audits. For example, only four out of the twenty-eight audits met 
elements as critical as the following: “Did the auditor demonstrate an un-
derstanding o� how to identify, evaluate and control the food safety hazards 
associated with the product and process being audited?” and “Did the audi-
tor recognize, through in-plant observations, deficiencies in the 
identification and control o� hazards?”489  
Another prevalent concern about third-party auditors relates to their 
independence. When an auditor is paid by a regulated entity to assess that 
entity’s compliance, concerns about the objectivity of the third party arise. 
As discussed in the literature on financial auditing, in addition to potential-
ly conscious motivations, a variety of unconscious biases can affect an 
auditor’s judgment.490 For example, the standards with which the auditor 
must assess conformity may have ambiguities, and “[b]ias thrives wherever 
there is the possibility of interpreting information in different ways.”491 Also, 
an “attachment bias” results from the fact that the auditor has strong business 
reasons to please the client and equates his own interests with those of the 
client.492 In addition, the certain and immediate beneficial consequences of 
                                                                                                                      
 485. Id.  
 486. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 26.  
 487. Id. at 17. 
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. at 31 (Appendix B). 
 490. Bazerman et al., supra note 100, at 97–98. 
 491. Id. at 98. 
 492. Id. at 99; see also Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing 
Regulation and Clients’ Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1040 (2005) (discussing the 
attachment bias and explaining that working for a client creates a tendency for an auditor to 
make judgment calls that favor a client). 
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giving a positive audit opinion may outweigh the uncertain and distant nega-
tive consequences of not doing so.493 Another threat to independence occurs 
when auditors provide their clients with additional “non-audit” consulting and 
tax services.494 In this case, an auditor that renders a negative audit opinion 
risks losing not just the audit engagement but the additional business as well.  
Similar issues of auditor independence can be expected to appear in 
third-party verification programs. An example of an issue involving third-
party independence is provided by the NRTL program. Curtis Straus LLC 
(CSL) was recognized as an NRTL in 2000 and applied to have its recogni-
tion renewed in 2004.495 In 2007, OSHA informed CSL by letter that it did 
not appear to meet the NRTL program policy on independence because of 
a change in its ownership in 2005.496 After the change in ownership, the 
investment firm (Wendel) owned 58 percent of CSL as well as 32 percent 
o� Legrand, a manufacturer of electrical products that require NRTL test-
ing and certification.  
Over the next several years, CSL sought OSHA approval by providing 
more information and making some changes to its business structure. For 
example, it sought to convince OSHA that a firewall existed to assure the 
independence of its certification process and that it would use external and 
internal audits to ensure its independence.497 In 2010, however, OSHA 
made a negative finding of renewal based in part on concerns that OSHA 
would not be able to effectively monitor CSL’s efforts, given the extent and 
complexity o� Wendel’s and Legrand’s business operations.498 In its contin-
ued efforts to persuade OSHA to renew, Wendel decreased its ownership 
stake in Legrand to 11 percent in 2011.  
In 2011, OSHA published notice of its preliminary finding to deny re-
newal.499 In the preliminary finding, OSHA explained that the NRTL 
program requires “complete independence,” meaning that NRTLs “must be 
free from commercial, financial and other pressures that could compromise 
. . . its testing and certification.”500 CSL’s substantial relationship with 
                                                                                                                      
 493. Bazerman et al., supra note 100, at 100. 
 494. Keith A. Houghton & Christine A. Jubb, The Market for Financial Report Audits: 
Regulation of and Competition for Auditor Independence, 25 LAW & POL’Y 299, 308–09 (2003). 
 495. Curtis-Straus LLC, Application for Renewal o� Recognition, 76 Fed. Reg. 
62,850–51 (Oct. 11, 2011). 
 496. Id. at 62,850–56. 
 497. Id. at 62,852. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at 62,856; Telephone Interview with Robert Biersner, Office of the Solicitor, 
Dep’t o� Labor (Aug. 10, 2012). 
 500. Id. at 62,852 (quoting OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CPL 01-00-003, NRTL 
PROGRAM POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND GUIDELINES (1999), available at https://www.osha. 
gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIRECTIVES&p_id=2004). 
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Legrand deriving from Wendel’s partial ownership o� both violates this 
independence requirement. By 2013, however, OSHA’s final determination 
on CSL’s renewal had still not been published, suggesting that a lengthy 
process is required when an agency seeks to terminate the accreditation of a 
certification body.501  
In addition to questions of competence and independence, agencies 
should be concerned about the consistency of third-party determinations. If 
third-party firms and individuals are able to conduct the required assess-
ment tasks in different ways, their determinations may be less consistent 
than governmental determinations, particularly if the latter would be cen-
tralized. For example, when EPA decided to verify greenhouse gas 
emissions data itself rather than require emitters to contract with a third-
party verifier, it suggested that this would allow it to comprehensively 
review the data and provide the necessary consistency and quality.502 I� 
EPA had opted to incorporate third-party verification, it “would still need 
to review and perform consistency checks after the third party verification 
was complete.”503  
Aside from competence and independence, there are other characteris-
tics common in auditing that may also be preventing reliable and accurate 
results. One scholar of private third-party systems in the food sector found 
that auditors focus their review on the records kept by companies rather 
than actual company practices. In a study of audits performed to check the 
compliance of agricultural suppliers with buyers’ standards, the scholar 
observed that “what are mostly audited are not the practices of suppliers, 
but their records. Put differently, auditors largely rely on proxy measures to 
verify compliance.”504 As such, the audit may verify that there is documen-
tation showing that a certain standard was met but not actually verify that 
the standard was met.  
Other scholars have pointed out that audits may verify compliance with 
many detailed performance specifications while failing to assess true 
                                                                                                                      
 501. E-mail from Kevin Robinson, OSHA, U.S. Dep’t o� Labor (Mar. 5, 2013) (ex-
plaining that OSHA was reexamining its independence policy and had decided to delay a 
final determination on CSL). It is worth noting that throughout the history of the program, 
two NRTLs have had their recognition revoked due to deficiencies in their testing and 
certification operations, and one NRTL’s renewal application was denied due to independ-
ence issues. Id.  
 502. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,282 (Oct. 
30, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86–87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 
1054, 1065).  
 503. Id. at 56,283. 
 504. Maki Hatanaka, Certification, Partnership, and Morality in an Organic Shrimp Net-
work: Rethinking Transnational Alternative Agrifood Networks, 38 WORLD DEV. 706, 710 
(2010). 
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risks.505 To standardize their task, auditing organizations may develop de-
tailed checklists, so there may be lots of “ticking the boxes” even though 
“crucial quality risks can go unnoticed at the same time because they are not 
specifically provided for on the checklist of technical requirements.”506 
Moreover, there are reasons that the checklists may be favored in third-
party programs run by federal agencies. Namely, it removes discretion from 
the auditor and may be perceived as more standardized and fair.507  
When constructing third-party programs to serve regulatory purposes, 
agencies have many ways to respond to these various concerns and increase 
the reliability of third-party determinations.508 With rules regarding how 
third parties are accredited and how regulated entities select third parties, 
the agency can create a high bar for third-party competence and independ-
ence. With rules regarding how assessment tasks are performed, an agency 
can further enhance the reliability and consistency of third-party determi-
nations. Importantly, agencies can also employ a variety of oversight 
mechanisms to make sure that third parties comply with program rules.  
B. Rates of Compliance 
Another metric to assess third-party verification programs can be found 
in the extent to which a program ensures and enhances regulatory compli-
ance. When third-party programs are used for regulatory purposes, they 
should increase—not reduce—rates of compliance. A third-party program 
that enables a greater degree of noncompliance, and thereby eviscerates or 
dilutes valuable regulatory protections, cannot be considered a success.  
In many existing regulatory programs, compliance inspections occur in-
frequently and compliance rates are hard to determine. For example, in 
2011, about 254,000 foreign food facilities and 167,000 domestic food facili-
ties were registered with the FDA.509 With limited inspectorial resources 
(about 1,000 inspectors), FDA inspected only 6 percent of the 421,000 
registered facilities in 2010.510 Also, according to the FDCA, domestic 
manufacturers of a class II or III medical device shall be inspected by the 
                                                                                                                      
 505. Albersmeier et al., supra note 102, at 930–33. 
 506. Id. at 933. 
 507. See id. 
 508. Cf. McAllister, supra note 21, at 47–62 (recommending “clear and enforceable 
rules” for: the accreditation verifiers, “the selection of verifiers by regulated entities, the 
performance of verifications, and the disclosure and reporting of verification information”). 
 509. Kathy Gombas & Howard Seltzer, The Reportable Food Registry: A Valuable New 
Tool for Preventing Foodborne Illness, FOOD SAFETY MAG., June–July 2011, available at 
http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/article.asp?id=4117&sub=sub1. 
 510. Dina ElBoghdady, Taking New Look at Food Inspection, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2012, 
at A1. 
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FDA at least once in every two-year period.511 However, with limited re-
sources, FDA had not satisfied this biennial inspection mandate. As 
reported by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008, do-
mestic high-risk facilities receive inspections only once every three years 
and medium-risk facilities only once every five years.512 While the law does 
not impose an inspection frequency for foreign manufacturers, those that 
are high-risk are reportedly inspected only once every six years and medi-
um-risk only once every twenty-seven years.513  
Third-party verification programs can enable more frequent inspections 
and more complete data about compliance. A program may be designed, for 
example, to require an assessment of the compliance status of all regulated 
entities or products each year or every few years. Such regular third-party 
inspections can help improve compliance by regulated entities. As this 
author has noted elsewhere, “[e]vidence suggests that when managers ex-
pect outside observers, they tend to change how they perform their jobs and 
how they relate to other managers in ways that favor adherence. As such, 
the performance of an individual or group improves when it is singled out 
for observation and study by an outsider. Also, in third-party assessment 
processes, there may be opportunities for third party assessors to educate 
and persuade the regulated entity to comply.“514  
Indeed, many third-party programs have been implemented by federal 
agencies in response to a perceived deficit in the agencies’ ability to inspect 
regulated entities. The low inspection rates o� foreign food facilities by 
FDA led to the new third-party programs for imported food in FSMA. A 
decade earlier, Congress mandated the AP Inspection Program due to con-
cern about FDA’s inability to conduct inspections every three or five years 
as legally required. Also, EPA introduced its third-party program for Ener-
gy Star in 2011 after a GAO inspection revealed the possibility o� fraud and 
abuse in the previous system of self-declaration. In these programs and 
others, legislators and regulators appear to hope that third-party programs 
will lead to higher compliance rates, and ultimately better regulatory out-
comes.  
                                                                                                                      
 511. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 2; see also 21 U.S.C § 360(h) (2012) 
(containing the statutory requirement). 
 512. CHALLENGES FOR FDA, supra note 336, at 2nd page (unnumbered), under head-
ing What GAO Found. 
 513. Id. 
 514.  MCALLISTER, supra note 22, at 45 (footnotes omitted).  
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C. Regulatory Agency Capacity 
Another metric for evaluating third-party verification programs is the 
sufficiency of agency resources for establishing and maintaining a program. 
Judging from existing programs, a great deal of agency resources may be 
required to set up a program. Also, without effective governmental over-
sight, third-party programs may lack transparency and accountability and 
ultimately erode public confidence in regulation and compromise public 
welfare. Although private actors may carry out many tasks in a third-party 
program, the agency must have the strength and resources to ensure that 
the program is effectively serving regulatory purposes. 
Depending to some extent on how a third-party program is designed, a 
large investment of time and resources may be necessary to get it up and 
running. In particular, if an agency approves certification bodies itself in-
stead of delegating this to an accreditation organization, it will need to do 
all the work of establishing the relevant rules and implementing them to 
verify the qualifications of the third parties. Even if an accreditation organ-
ization is used, the agency will have to establish the relevant rules and 
oversee the accreditation organization’s implementation of them.  
Several existing programs illustrate the challenges involved in accredit-
ing certification bodies. In FDA’s AP Inspection Program, selection and 
training of APs took many years to complete.515 FDA’s aquacultured shrimp 
pilot further demonstrates the resource requirements of verifying the quali-
fications of third parties, particularly when they are outside the United 
States. As part of the application process, FDA asked candidate certifica-
tion bodies to assess their own conformity with certain attributes that FDA 
determined were necessary for CB certification programs.516 These includ-
ed, for example, that “auditors should understand the food safety issues 
related to the processes and products that they audit”; the CB should have a 
“quality assurance program that monitors its auditors” and audits; and the 
CB “should have sufficient resources, such as equipment and infrastruc-
ture.”517 The FDA developed self-assessment checklists, and participants 
reported with few exceptions that they met most of the attributes. Howev-
er, when FDA performed its onsite certification program assessments, it 
                                                                                                                      
 515. See infra note 555 and associated text; cf. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 
350, at 9–10 (describing the requirements that APs complete a collaborative inspection (in 
which the trainee acts primarily as an observer of the FDA inspector); a modified perfor-
mance inspection (in which the trainee conducts the inspection with the assistance of an 
FDA inspector); and a full performance inspection (in which the trainee independently 
performs an inspection that is observed and evaluated by an FDA inspector)). 
 516. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 9. 
 517. Id. 
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found the information in the checklist responses was often unsupported by 
source documents and that the self-assessment checklists themselves were 
not sufficient to assure attainment of the attributes. Ultimately, FDA found 
that most CBs did not fully meet the majority of attributes.518 The FDA 
concluded that the “onsite program assessments and associated discussions 
with CB personnel” were “critical to FDA’s evaluation of the CB pro-
grams.”519  
Moreover, through this pilot FDA realized the difficulty of performing 
such onsite assessments. FDA reports that onsite assessments required at 
least four people to spend three to five days at the headquarters of each of 
the six CBs, four of which were outside the United States.520 It also found 
that not all supporting documentation and relevant personnel were available 
at the headquarters and, in this situation, “FDA’s ability to make a full 
assessment of one or more program attributes was limited.”521 For the CBs 
located outside the United States, the overseas travel and need for transla-
tion services further complicated FDA’s assessment efforts.522  
In the final phase of the pilot, FDA observed CBs conducting audits of 
shrimp processors and farms and conducted its own audits of the laborato-
ries CBs used. Spread across seven foreign countries, FDA confronted 
problems in coordinating the schedules of multiple stakeholders (e.g., FDA, 
the CB, the competent authorities in foreign countries, and the processors, 
farms, and labs being audited) and in receiving permission to observe some 
processors, farms, and labs.523 In addition, some changes in FDA’s plans 
were necessitated by international crises and civil unrest in countries where 
audits had been planned.524 Given the difficulties, some CBs conducted 
“mock audits” to accommodate the FDA.525 FDA concluded that the “coor-
dination among multiple stakeholders demanded significant time and 
resources.”526 
Finally, the pilot made clear that agencies that implement third-party 
programs are likely to need to provide training to their own personnel and 
                                                                                                                      
 518. Id. at 13 tbl.3. 
 519. Id. at 11. 
 520. Id. at 6–7 tbl.1, 11. 
 521. Id. at 12. 
 522. See id. at 25 (“Language barriers and different operating models and paradigms 
(i.e., industry vs. regulatory) made understanding between FDA and the CBs challenging 
and clear communication even more critical” and “[i]t should be noted that the number of 
interpreters needed for a full-scale third-party certification program are likely to be substan-
tial.”). 
 523. Id. at 16.  
 524. Id.  
 525. Id. 
 526. Id. at 24. 
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develop new information technology (IT) systems. FDA concluded that 
operationalizing a third-party certification program in the future would 
require “establishing robust formal training for Agency personnel involved 
in on-site program assessments and performance audits of CB auditors and 
supporting laboratories.”527 The pilot, which involved only six CBs, taxed 
existing FDA infrastructure and indicated “that an operating program in 
the future would need additional resources to be successful, as well as a 
central coordinating point within the Agency.”528 Moreover, FDA reported 
that “current IT systems and databases were not designed to accommodate 
third-party certification audits” and “more in-depth evaluation, updating, 
and the potential development of new systems and databases” would be 
required for FDA to operationalize a third-party certification program.529  
Energy Star provides an example of a program in which the agency 
delegates accreditation to private accreditation bodies. The accreditation 
bodies that accredit laboratories must themselves be approved by EPA. 
EPA relies extensively on that accreditation and does little oversight of 
accredited labs. The accreditation bodies that accredit CBs do not need 
specific EPA approval; any accreditation body that is a signatory to the IAF 
MLA may accredit Energy Star CBs. The accreditation bodies are respon-
sible for conducting periodic assessments of the CBs they accredit, and the 
Energy Star program itself conducts additional oversight including audits 
of product certifications.530  
Existing programs show that agencies may have difficulty maintaining 
the resources needed to provide adequate oversight. In 2010, the USDA 
Office o� Inspector General (OIG) found deficiencies in AMS’s oversight 
o� NOP certifying agents and organic operations.531 OIG also found that 
NOP officials “did not make required onsite assessments and did not iden-
tify inconsistencies in implementation o� NOP regulations.”532 Lacking 
sufficiently specific rules and adequate oversight, certification agents devel-
oped different criteria for determining whether noncompliances were 
                                                                                                                      
 527. Id. at 25. 
 528. Id. at 23. 
 529. Id. at 24–25. 
 530. See Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Certification Bodies for the ENERGY 
STAR Program, supra note 456, at 2 (authorizing EPA to conduct audits at its discretion); 
Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, supra note 463 (mentioning that Energy Star 
picked at random some product categories and had CBs send all related certification files). 
 531. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. [USDA OIG], U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., 
AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY, OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM 29–30 
(2010). 
 532. Id. at 3. 
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present and whether they were major or minor.533 OIG concluded that 
“AMS did not ensure consistent oversight of organic operations by its certi-
fying agents.”534 This lack of oversight, in turn, undermined the overarching 
goal o� NOP “to assure consumers that such products meet consistent, 
uniform standards.”535  
The OIG found even more serious deficiencies in AMS’s oversight o� 
foreign certifying agents.536 AMS is required to make onsite reviews o� 
foreign certifying agents, but five o� forty-four never received such a review 
and twenty-four o� forty-four received reviews more than two years after 
receiving their conditional accreditation.537 The NOP had underestimated 
the number of applications they would receive when the program began in 
2002 and had failed to develop a policy to handle the review of certifying 
agents located in countries with travel warnings issued by the Department 
of State.538 When NOP reviews were performed, NOP officials often found 
that certifying agents committed major noncompliances, such as failing to 
identify mislabeled products, maintain complete certification files, and 
complete annual conflict-of-interest disclosures.539  
The response of AMS to the OIG report indicates that the root of the 
problem was that the NOP program lacked sufficient resources. AMS stat-
ed that the NOP budget had increased in 2009 to $3.87 million and its staff 
to sixteen, and that a $3.1 million budget increase in 2010 would enable the 
program to grow to thirty-one staff members.540 In 2007, the NOP had 
“just nine staff members and an annual budget of $1.5 million.”541 
It is worth noting that the international scope of many third-party pro-
grams interacts with the issue of governmental oversight. The international 
dimensions of certain regulatory objectives like food safety may make third-
party programs particularly attractive, but these same international dimen-
sions complicate oversight. Not only may effective oversight be more costly, 
but the agency may not have the authority in foreign jurisdictions to do the 
kinds of oversight it would do in a domestic context.  
                                                                                                                      
 533. Id. at 21–27 (describing how NOP lacked clear and sufficiently focused rules and 
did not oversee their implementation).  
 534. Id. at 21. 
 535. Id. 
 536. Id. at 28–29. 
 537. Id. at 29–30.  
 538. Id. at 28–29. 
 539. Id. 
 540. Id. at 37–39 (Exhibit B: AMS response). 
 541. Andrew Martin, How to Add Oomph to ‘Organic’, UNCLE MATT’S ORGANIC BLOG 
(Aug. 20, 2007), http://unclematts.com/dev/how-to-add-oomph-to-organic/. 
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D. Public Acceptance 
Another metric of success is the support and acceptance that the third-
party program receives from stakeholders. The most relevant stakeholders 
are the concerned public (the beneficiaries of regulation) and the regulated 
industry (the target of regulation). Issues relevant to the industry’s ac-
ceptance of a program are discussed in the following section. 
One gauge of public support for regulatory change consists of the 
comments received by agencies in response to rulemaking processes and 
other requests for comments. The public is often represented by non-
governmental organizations. While most third-party programs described in 
this Article have garnered little public attention, there are a couple excep-
tions. 
First, NGOs concerned with food safety have been very wary of the in-
troduction of third-party auditors into the FDA’s regulatory framework. In 
comments to the agency, one NGO acknowledged that FSMA authorizes 
third-party certification for imported food, but emphasizes that “the law 
does not permit it for domestic facilities.”542 The commenter then stresses 
the need for the agency to rigorously apply conflict-of-interest require-
ments and otherwise conduct oversight of third-party auditors.543 Another 
NGO criticizes the legislative decision to allow FDA to rely on third-party 
auditors for regulatory audits, regretting that FDA will “expend precious 
resources” developing conflict-of-interest standards and overseeing third 
parties.544 It cites failures in the National Organic Program545 and private 
food safety audits546 to support its conclusion that FDA “should invest its 
                                                                                                                      
 542. Comments o� Make Our Food Safe & Safe Food Coal. on Proposed Rule, RE: 
Docket Nos. FDA-2011-N-0145, § 303 Authority to Require Import Certifications for Food, 
and FDA-2011-N-0146, § 307, Accreditation o� Third-Party Auditors, (May 6, 2011) at 2, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0145-0016 [hereinafter Make 
Our Food Safe & Safe Food Coal.]. 
 543. Id. at 3. 
 544. Comment o� Food & Water Watch on Proposed Rule, FDA Food Safety Modern-
ization Act: Title III-A New Paradigm for Importers; Public Meeting (Section 307. 
Accreditation o� Third-Party Auditors) (May 6, 2011) at 2, http://www.regulations. 
gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0146-0007 [hereinafter Food & Water Watch]. 
 545. Cf. USDA OIG, supra note 531 (finding that AMS fails to adequately oversee 
NOP third parties).  
 546. A prominent such failure involved the salmonella outbreak caused by peanuts 
processed by Peanut Corporation of America in a facility that had received a superior rating 
in a private food safety audit required by a buyer, Kellogg Corp. See Lessons From The Peanut 
Salmonella Outbreak: Audit System Broken, JIM PREVOR’S PERISHABLE PUNDIT (Feb. 19, 
2009), http://www.perishablepundit.com/index.php?date=02/19/09&pundit=1. 
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resources into doing as many of the imported food inspections itself and 
should avoid at all costs a reliance on a privatized inspection system.”547  
In the product safety arena, NGOs have been more supportive of third-
party testing. Major consumer NGOs such as the Consumer Federation of 
America and US PIRG expressed strong support for “a CPSC-
administered, third party safety certification program for monitoring the 
safety of all products” before the passage of the CPSIA in 2008.548 In the 
aftermath of its passage, they have participated in the regulatory process to 
voice support for a strong third-party testing system.549  
A common concern o� NGOs regarding the use of third-party inspec-
tion and certification systems is that they will weaken governmental 
accountability and transparency. A food-safety NGO, for example, express-
es a preference for inspections performed by FDA, other U.S. agencies, or 
foreign governments (in that order) over inspections by third-party audi-
tors, as the latter “may not have the same public health objective or may not 
be supported by the same level of expertise, training, resources, and ac-
countability as are FDA inspectors.”550 When the Energy Star program 
announced its intention to establish a third-party verification and testing 
program, an environmental NGO expressed strong support but stressed the 
need for “complete transparency of the program’s procedures and testing 
results.”551 
E. Industry Acceptance 
The other major group of stakeholders consists of the regulated enti-
ties. A very common reaction to an agency’s announcement that it is 
implementing a third-party verification program is industry concern about 
costs. Indeed, a third-party program will often shift some of the costs of 
                                                                                                                      
 547. Food & Water Watch, supra note 544. 
 548. Letter from Rachel Weintraub, Senior Counsel, Consumer Fed’n of America, et 
al., to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. (Oct. 26, 2007), availa-
ble at http://consumersunion.org/news/groups-ask-senate-commerce-comm-not-to-weaken-
product-safety-bill/.  
 549. Comments of Consumers Union, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Kids in Danger, and 
U.S. PIRG on Requirements for Accreditation o� Third Party Conformity Assessment 
Bodies to Assess Conformity with Part 1215 o� Title 16, Code o� Federal Regulations” (July 
6, 2010), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/ 
Comments%20on%203PT%20Bath%20Seats%20(Final)%20(2).pdf. 
 550. Make Our Food Safe & Safe Food Coal., supra note 542. 
 551. Comments o� Natural Res. Def. Council on ENERGY STAR’s Proposed En-
hanced Testing and Verification Program, (Apr. 30, 2010), at 4 (emphasis omitted), available 
at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/mou/Natural_Resources_Defense_Cou 
ncil_Comments.pdf. 
McAllister_to_PDF 9/26/2014  9:42 AM 
Spring 2014] Harnessing Private Regulation 383 
inspection and compliance assessment from the government to industry.552 
To augment industry support, third-party programs should reduce the 
burden on industry as much as possible while still achieving regulatory 
objectives. Third-party programs may also be able to provide benefits to 
industry, for example, by reducing the processing times of product approv-
als applications and by creating a single approval process that satisfies  
various national jurisdictions. Notably, third-party programs raise special 
concerns about costs for small businesses.  
One important way to contain costs in a third-party program is to ensure 
that there are a sufficient number of third parties to create competition 
among them.553 A representative of the Energy Star program stated that the 
primary way that the program responded to industry concerns about third-
party certification was by encouraging the rapid development of a strong 
market of certification bodies and laboratories.554 In contrast, in the FDA’s 
AP Inspection Program, it took the agency many years to get APs through 
all required training and cleared to conduct independent inspections: by 
May 2008, four years after the program was established, only eight APs out 
of sixteen had completed all training.555 Because of the delays, few APs were 
available to conduct independent inspections in the early years of the pro-
gram.  
As an agency seeks to encourage a competitive market, however, certain 
precautions need to be taken. First, an agency should not unduly lower its 
requirements for competence and independence in order to accredit more 
third parties. In the AP Inspection Program, for example, the training that 
was given may have been essential for APs to adequately carry out their 
tasks. Second, an agency should establish program rules to ensure that third 
parties cannot compete in ways that compromise the quality of the assess-
ment. The agency can require in its program rules, for example, that third 
parties inspect a certain number of product samples or make a certain num-
ber of site visits to a manufacturing facility.  
The CPSC’s third-party program for the testing of children’s products 
has provoked substantial industry resistance. As the CPSC has developed 
regulations, product manufacturers have repeatedly expressed concerns 
                                                                                                                      
 552. See McAllister, supra note 21, at 27.  
 553. Cf. Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, supra note 463 (discussing how 
Energy Star sought to keep costs low for regulated entities by encouraging the participation 
of a sufficient number of CBs and labs to create the possibility for competition among 
them). 
 554. Id. 
 555. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-780T, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA 
FACES CHALLENGES IN CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURING 
ESTABLISHMENTS 19 (2008). 
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about the cost of the required third-party testing. It was clear that these 
concerns had reached Congress when it amended the CPSIA in August 
2011.556 The amendments gave the CPSC new authority to exempt qualify-
ing small batch manufacturers (mostly small businesses) from third-party 
testing. They also required the CPSC to issue a request for public com-
ments on opportunities to reduce the cost of third-party testing 
requirements.  
Manufacturers expressed many concerns about the costs of third-party 
testing in their comments.557 For example, they recommended that CPSC 
exempt more individual products and categories of products by regulation; 
that CPSC make additional attempts to reduce testing requirements based 
on the actual likelihood of exposure; and that CPSC increase efforts to 
harmonize federal, international and state laws applicable to consumer 
products. Other suggestions included decreasing the frequency of retesting 
and allowing more retesting to be done by the manufacturers themselves 
rather than a third-party lab.558  
Small manufacturers have been most concerned about the new third-
party testing requirements. A trade association of small jewelry makers 
complains of the unreasonable cost burdens imposed by the CPSIA.559 It 
reports that almost one quarter of its members “have reduced their chil-
dren’s products offerings, and 16% have exited the children’s jewelry market 
entirely.”560 A European maker o� heirloom quality toys calls third-party 
testing of its small batches “prohibitive and impossible” and warns that 
“specialized toys with high playing value will disappear from the US mar-
ket” if the CPSIA is not amended.561 This manufacturer and other small 
manufacturers from Europe request that the CPSA exempt products tested 
to the European safety standards from CPSIA’s third-party testing re-
quirements.562 Also, a manufacturer that describes itself as “medium-sized” 
                                                                                                                      
 556. 15 U.S.C. § 2063(i) (2012); Application o� Third Party Testing Requirements, 
H.R. 2715, 112th Cong. §§ 2, 10 (2011) (creating a new section 14(i) of the CPSA); Reducing 
Third Party Testing Burdens, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,596 (Nov. 8, 2011). Public Comments in 
response are available at regulations.gov (search for Docket No. “CPSC–2011-0081-0001”) 
(listing 23 comments). 
 557. See generally PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS, APPLICATION OF THIRD PARTY TESTING 
REQUIREMENTS; REDUCING THIRD PARTY TESTING BURDENS, COSC DOCKET NO. 
CPSC-2011-0081, available at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/85937/testingburdencomm.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 558. See generally id. (especially comments submitted by the Society of the Plastics 
Industry, Inc., at 119–28; the Toy Industry Association, at 159–64; and Libbey, at 141–42). 
 559. See id. at 103–17 (comment submitted by the Fashion Jewelry and Accessories 
Trade Association).  
 560. Id. at 113 (emphasis omitted). 
 561. Id. at 11 (comment submitted by Glückskäfer).  
 562. Id. at 11–13 (comments submitted by Glückskäfer, Fagus and Grimm’s). 
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expressed that the exemption for small-batch manufacturers does not cover 
all low-volume manufacturers, even though they too are considerably dif-
ferent from large volume manufacturers.563  
In Energy Star, manufacturers also voiced concerns about the cost of 
third-party certification. As reported in a 2011 study o� Energy Star by the 
GAO, “[a]lmost all the manufacturing partners we spoke with stated the 
cost to participate in the program had increased. Some manufacturing 
partners—particularly small manufacturers or manufacturers with few 
Energy Star products—also told us the increasing costs could discourage 
their participation.”564 Energy Star program staff, however, perceive wide-
spread acceptance of the new rules and have not noticed a drop in 
applications for the Energy Star label.565 
As in the case of the CPSC rule, small businesses have been particular-
ly concerned about the new costs of certification. If they are not able to 
afford certification for their products, their consumer base may be reduced. 
Also, delays in getting products to market may be more prejudicial to small 
companies. As stated by one commenter on the WaterSense program, 
“[h]igh cost will discourage manufacturers, especially small ones, from 
participating in the program at all.”566 In effect, the costs of third-party 
certification may benefit larger companies at the expense of smaller ones.  
The Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy has been con-
cerned about third-party programs.567 One concern is that once agencies 
shift the costs of inspection to industry, the government will not be as 
limited in imposing regulatory requirements. Also, whereas many govern-
mental programs establish a lower fee for small businesses, third parties are 
not as likely to be as concerned with the affordability to small businesses. 
The Office of Advocacy suggests that when agencies establish third-party 
programs, they should consider mechanisms to help reduce the burden on 
small businesses. 
While a third-party program is likely to impose costs, it may also im-
part benefits that were not available without the program. The TCB program, 
for example, cut the approval time of telecommunications equipment from 
                                                                                                                      
 563. Id. at 179–82 (comment submitted by Orbit Baby, Inc.). 
 564. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-888, ENERGY STAR: PROVIDING 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF EPA’S DECISIONS COULD STRENGTHEN 
THE PROGRAM (2011) at 26. 
 565. Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, supra note 463. 
 566. WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMENTS ON THE MAY 2007 
DRAFT WATERSENSE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 19 (2007).  
 567. Telephone Interview with David Rostker, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of 
Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (Aug. 17, 2012). 
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thirty to ninety days in the late 1990s to often just a few days.568 In addi-
tion, a program may be designed such that a third-party assessment satisfies 
the regulatory requirements o� both the United States and other countries. 
FDA reports that it is currently developing a “single audit program” for 
medical devices that would result in a “saving of audit/inspection time in 
person days (and associated costs) and less disruption of the manufacturer’s 
day-to-day operations; and, greater control over the scheduling of regulato-
ry audits/inspections.”569  
Factors aside from costs and benefits may also play a role in how indus-
try reacts to a third-party program. A third-party program may be well 
explained and well implemented by an agency, or it may not be. In the 
latter case, industry is more likely to find the program to be overly complex 
and objectionable.  
F. Use of Optional Third Parties 
Programs in which regulated entities have a choice as to whether to 
contract with a third party have an additional metric of success: the rate of 
regulated entity participation. If regulated entities do not use a program, 
then the resources an agency used to create it may seem wasted. Differences 
in participation in three programs described in this Article illustrate the 
situation: FDA’s AP Inspection Program for medical device production 
facilities, FDA’s 510(k) Review Program for medical devices, and FCC’s 
TCB program.  
The FDA’s AP Inspection Program has had a very low rate of participa-
tion. Despite an estimated 8,000 manufacturers that could use the 
program,570 only eighty independent inspections (i.e., unaccompanied by 
FDA inspectors) have been conducted by APs in eight years of program 
operation.571 The FDA had hoped that manufacturers would be attracted by 
the possibility that a single AP inspection might satisfy regulatory require-
ments in multiple jurisdictions.572 However, the effect of this incentive has 
been limited because manufacturers have had doubts that APs could cover 
                                                                                                                      
 568. Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390. 
 569. PMAP Report, supra note 344. 
 570. Agency Information Collection Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,764 (May 23, 2011) 
(reporting FDA’s estimate that there are 4,000 domestic manufacturers and 4,000 foreign 
manufacturers that are eligible for inclusion in the AP Inspection Program). 
 571. Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347. 
 572. STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, at 13. This could occur if the same 
inspection could serve to both verify the manufacturer’s compliance with the FDA’s QS 
regulation and the manufacturer’s conformity with “ISO 13485: Medical devices—Quality 
management systems—Requirements for regulatory purposes,” which many other countries 
use as their standard. See also infra note 625 at 4.  
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the multiple requirements of various standards in a single inspection.573 
Also, the program allows manufacturers to control the scheduling of inspec-
tions574 and offers a two-year inspection holiday from regular FDA 
inspections.575  
Many disincentives to participation also exist. Under the AP Inspection 
Program, manufacturers have to bear the cost of the inspection, whereas 
FDA inspections are free. Moreover, the manufacturer may not think an 
FDA inspection will occur in the near future, and an AP inspection may 
result in further regulatory action.576 As reported by the GAO, “one indus-
try representative questioned why manufacturers would ask for—and pay 
for—inspections when the result could be that FDA closes them down.”577 
Manufacturers expressed concern that, because FDA makes the final de-
termination of compliance with its requirements, FDA might want to 
conduct an additional inspection after reading the report prepared by the 
third-party inspector.578 Observing the very small number of AP inspec-
tions in 2008, the GAO stated it raised “questions about the practicality and 
effectiveness of establishing similar programs that rely on third parties to 
quickly help FDA fulfill other responsibilities.”579  
The FDA’s 510(k) Review Program has attracted more participation 
than the AP Inspection Program. As described above, this program enables 
manufacturers to contract with third parties to conduct the primary pre-
market review for certain medical devices.  The FDA reported in July 2012 
that about 8 percent of all 510(k) reviews are conducted by third parties, 
which is close to 300 annually.580 One difference between the AP Inspec-
tion Program and the 510(k) Review Program is that in the latter, device 
manufacturers pay FDA a user fee if they do not use an AP. In FY 2014, the 
fee is $5,170 ($2,585 for qualified small businesses).581 However, it is likely 
                                                                                                                      
 573. Infra note 625 at 4. By being able to schedule inspections, they are able to mini-
mize facility disruptions and ensure that the necessary personnel and documentation is on 
hand at the right time. Also, FDA may only give a week of notice of an inspection, but AP 
inspections can be scheduled months in advance. See Telephone Interview with David 
Kalins, supra note 347. 
 574. STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, at 13. 
 575. Id. at 8 n.18. 
 576. Id. at 15. 
 577. Id. at 16. 
 578. Id. 
 579. CHALLENGES FOR FDA, supra note 336, at 22 (reporting seven inspections be-
tween March 2004 and January 2008). 
 580. E-mail from Jean Cooper, supra note 378. 
 581. FDA User Fees for 510(k) Applications, EMERGO GROUP, http://www.emergo 
group.com/fda-user-fees-510k-applications (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). The Medical Device 
User Fee and Modernization Act, enacted in 2002, gave the FDA authorization to charge 
manufacturers fees for premarket review. See E-mail from Jean Cooper, supra note 378.  
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that the user fee is lower than the amount that the manufacturer pays to a 
private third party.582 
Another incentive present in the premarket program but not in the AP 
Inspection Program is that manufacturers want this review to happen expe-
ditiously in order to get their products to market more quickly. According 
to the FDA, 510(k)s reviewed by APs in 2002 received FDA marketing 
clearance 29 percent faster compared to 510(k)s reviewed entirely by 
FDA.583 FDA also highlights that the APs generally “have specialized ex-
pertise in areas that may be helpful to 510(k) submitters, such as device 
testing, standards, or foreign regulatory requirements” and that they have 
locations throughout the world “so they often can provide local service.”584  
In the FCC’s TCB program, there is a very high participation rate for 
eligible products and third-party review has become the norm. In 2011, 98.5 
percent of equipment authorization certifications (13,427 out of 13,645) 
were issued by TCBs rather than the FCC.585 FCC staff explains that com-
panies prefer going to TCBs because their products are approved more 
quickly and they can get to market faster.586 In the late 1990s, product certi-
fications were all conducted by the FCC and processing times tended to 
range from thirty to ninety days. Presently, certifications conducted by 
TCBs may take just a few days. The 1.5 percent of certifications that con-
tinue to be conducted by FCC tend to involve new technology that the 
FCC excludes from TCB approval until it publishes a measurement proce-
dure.587 Also, given that the FCC charges fees for certifications, the costs of 
using a TCB may be lower. In 2011, the FCC’s device certification fees 
ranged from $490 to $1,265.588 
In sum, voluntary programs have varied greatly in terms of the costs 
and benefits of participation, and participation rates have reflected this 
variation. As illustrated by the AP Program, if the costs to participate are 
                                                                                                                      
 582. Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347. 
 583. Third-Party Review of 501(k)s, subsection of FY 2002 ODE Annual Report – Part 3 – 
Key Performance Indices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA 
/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm130097.h
tm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 584. FY 2003 OHIP Annual Report—Medical Device User Fees Modernization Act 
(MDUFMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Centers 
Offices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm130363.htm (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 585. Telephone Interview George Tannahill, supra note 390. 
 586. Id. 
 587. Id.; see also OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 385, at 4. 
 588. Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390; see also Office o� 
Eng’g & Tech., Equipment Authorization (EA), FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://transition 
.fcc.gov/oet/ea/feeguide.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
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high and the offsetting benefits are not clear, firms will not participate. On 
the other hand, the TCB program shows that in different circumstances, 
optional third-party certification may become the industry’s preference. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES  
This section sets forth recommendations to federal agencies regarding 
the use of private third parties to assess regulatory compliance. Third-party 
verification programs pose risks. If third-party programs are not well con-
ceived and well operated, they may both undermine the achievement of 
regulatory goals and impose high costs on regulated entities. Yet, third-
party programs also offer benefits. By harnessing conformity assessment 
expertise in the private sector, they may extend the reach of regulatory 
agencies in ways that increase regulatory compliance and otherwise improve 
the performance of regulated entities and products. The recommendations 
discussed below seek to help agencies minimize the risks and maximize the 
benefits of third-party programs.  
The first important question that agencies face may be whether or not 
to establish a third-party program. Alternatively, Congress may have di-
rected the agency to develop a third-party program. Of the eight programs 
surveyed in this Article, four were explicitly required by Congress.589 The 
first set of recommendations below is targeted to situations in which agen-
cies are themselves deciding whether to establish a third-party program. 
However, aspects of the recommendations will also be useful when agencies 
are required to do so. 
Agencies that are charged with or make the choice to establish a third-
party program will need to write the rules by which the program will oper-
ate. The key rules of a third-party program can be categorized into several 
types: accreditation rules, which determine who may be approved as a third 
party; selection rules, which govern how regulated entities select third 
parties; performance rules, which specify how third-party testing and certi-
fication should be performed; and reporting rules, which set forth what 
information is provided to the regulatory agency by various program ac-
tors.590 Moreover, the agency must make decisions about how it will 
conduct oversight and enforce these rules.591  
When a third-party program is required by statute, certain characteris-
tics of the third-party program may already be determined. Yet, within the 
                                                                                                                      
 589. See supra Table 1. The four that were required explicitly by Congress are the FDA 
programs for food imports, the CPSC program for children’s products, the FDA programs 
for medical devices, and the USDA National Organic Program. 
 590. Cf. McAllister, supra note 21, at 47–59.  
 591. Id. at 59–61. 
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constraints of the statute, agencies are still likely to have many options 
regarding program design. The second set of recommendations regards how 
to establish a third-party program, with most relevance to program aspects 
that have not been statutorily determined.  
A. Deciding Whether to Use a Third-Party Program 
1. Consult Public and Private Resources Related to Conformity 
Assessment  
There are several important governmental and nongovernmental re-
sources available to agencies considering third-party programs. The federal 
government has developed expertise in conformity assessment since the 
passage of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 
(NTTAA). Most importantly, the NTTAA directed NIST to coordinate 
the conformity assessment activities of governmental and private sector 
entities “with the goal of eliminating unnecessary duplication and com-
plexity.”592 Also, in 1998, the Office o� Management and Budget’s Circular 
A-119 instructed NIST to write guidance for agencies to ensure effective 
coordination of governmental and private conformity assessment activi-
ties.593 NIST published this guidance in 2000.594  
The Standards Services Division o� NIST is available to consult with 
agencies interested in incorporating third-party conformity assessment 
processes into their regulatory processes. Upon the request of an agency, 
NIST staff can become involved in helping an agency design a third-party 
program. For example, in the WaterSense program, the chief of the Stand-
ards Services Division essentially functioned as part o� WaterSense staf� for 
a few months to explain the relevant ISO standards and help establish the 
third-party program.595 NIST coordinates the Interagency Committee on 
Standards Policy (ICSP), which consists of one principal representative 
from each federal executive agency, who is referred to as the “agency stand-
ards executive.”596 According to NIST’s guidance, agency standards 
executives are responsible for, inter alia, promoting the development of 
“agency positions on conformity assessment related issues that are in the 
                                                                                                                      
 592. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 § 12(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 272 (2012); Guidance on Federal Conformity Assessment Activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,894 
(Aug. 10, 2000) [hereinafter NIST Guidance]. 
 593. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-
119 REVISED §§ 8, 13(e) (1998), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119/. 
 594. NIST Guidance, supra note 592. 
 595. Telephone Interview with Stephanie Tanner, WaterSense Program, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency (Aug. 10, 2012). 
 596. NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.5. 
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public interest”; ensuring “that agency participation in conformity assess-
ment related activities is consistent with agency missions, authorities, 
priorities, and budget[s]”; and establishing an “ongoing process” for identi-
fying “efficiencies” that “can be achieved through coordination with other 
agency and private sector conformity assessment activities.”597  
NIST also runs the NVCASE program, which has responsibility for 
recognizing the private accreditation bodies that accredit TCBs for the 
FCC. To confer recognition, NVCASE performs an initial assessment of 
the accreditation body and then performs a reassessment every two years to 
ensure that it continues to operate in accordance with ISO/IEC 17011.598 
Under its regulations, NIST accepts requests to perform these functions 
only in certain situations.599 Otherwise, private accreditation bodies can be 
recognized directly by federal agencies, and the assessment role played by 
NVCASE may be performed instead by an international organization like 
the IAF (for certification bodies) or ILAC (for laboratories).600 
OMB and NIST are both currently considering revising their guidance 
to agencies regarding conformity assessment. In March 2012, OMB issued a 
request for information and notice of public workshop regarding, inter alia, 
whether A-119 should be revised to set out relevant principles on conformi-
ty assessment.601 NIST has also expressed an interest in revising its 2000 
guidance.602  
Agencies can also tap into expertise about conformity assessment that 
exists in private standards organizations. Most significantly, agencies should 
become familiar with ISO’s conformity assessment standards and guides, 
                                                                                                                      
 597. Id.; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 587, § 15 (setting forth the 
roles of the ICSP and standards executives).  
 598. Telephone Interview with Ramona Saar, Standards Servs. Div., Nat’l Inst. of 
Standards & Tech. (Aug. 24, 2012) (explaining that NVCASE ensures that the accreditation 
bodies operate in accordance with ISO/IEC17011 in accrediting TCBs to ISO/IEC Guide 65 
and the FCC’s technical requirements for TCBs).  
 599. 15 C.F.R. § 286.2 (2013) (stating that NIST accepts requests for recognition of 
accreditation bodies “when (i) directed by U.S. law; (ii) requested by another U.S. govern-
ment agency; or (iii) requested to respond to a specific U.S. industrial or technical need, 
relative to a mandatory foreign technical requirement, if it has been determined after public 
consultation that (A) there is no satisfactory accreditation alternative available and the 
private sector has declined to make acceptable accreditation available, and (B) there is 
evidence that significant public disadvantage would result from the absence of any alterna-
tive”). 
 600. Telephone Interview with Ramona Saar, supra note 598; see also supra notes 116–18 
and accompanying text. 
 601. Request for Information and Notice o� Public Workshop, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 
(Mar. 30, 2012). 
 602. Id. 
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referred to collectively as the conformity assessment (or CASCO) 
toolbox.603  
It is important to note, however, that ISO standards and guides are or-
dinarily subject to copyright restrictions. Some have suggested that this 
could present a barrier to wider use of standardized conformity assessment 
in regulatory programs if the cost of purchasing copyrighted standards is 
high and other reasonable means of accessing the materials are not available 
to regulated entities and other stakeholders.604 Several documents that 
provide context for and explain these standards are publicly available.605 
                                                                                                                      
 603. ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 170–74 (providing a chart of all standards and 
guides related to conformity assessment). 
 604. See Adoption o� Recommendations, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-17/pdf/2012-621.pdf; ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY 
REFERENCE (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/research/the-conference-current-
projects/incorporation-by-reference/ (recommending best practices for federal agencies that 
incorporate by reference extrinsic materials, including voluntary consensus standards, into 
regulations); see also EMILY S. BREMER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATIONS 26-32 (Oct. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.acus.gov/report/incorporation-reference-report (discussing ways agencies have 
increased public access to copyrighted standards); SCOTT RAFFERTY, ENHANCING THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE AMERICAN STANDARDS SYSTEM BY RENEWING CIRCULAR A-
119, at 10–11 (2012), available at https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/regulations. 
gov.docket.01/090000648101c22e.pdf (response to Request for Information OMB-2012-
0003) (noting high cost o� ISO standards and suggesting that “[l]ack of meaningful access is 
a particularly serious barrier to wider use of standardized conformity assessments in federal 
regulatory program[s] . . . . Agencies can be reluctant to delegate inspection or audit func-
tions if the procedural and operational principles are not openly posted on the internet.”). 
 605. See AMERICAN NAT’L STANDARDS INST., NATIONAL CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 
PRINCIPLES FOR THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/ 
sites/apdl/Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/NCAP%20second%20editio
n.pdf; ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106; USTR, supra note 116; see also MAUREEN A. 
BREITENBERG, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., THE ABC’S OF THE U.S. 
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (1997), available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/ 
NISTIR_6014.pdf; Gordon Gillerman, Making the Confidence Connection: Conformity Assess-
ment System Design, 56 STANDARDS ENGINEERING, no. 6, 2004, available at http://www.astm 
.org/SNEWS/DECEMBER_2004/gillerman_dec04.html; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND TRADE: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY (1995), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=4921; Christopher Johnson, 
Technical Barriers to Trade: Reducing the Impact of Conformity Assessment Measures 4–7 (U.S. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. ID-19, 2008), available at http://www.usitc.gov/ 
publications/332/working_papers/ca-dft-rev-final082008.pdf. 
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2. Consider the Characteristics of the Regulatory Standards and the 
Regulatory Target  
Different types of regulatory standards and environments entail differ-
ent considerations about the suitability of a third-party program. Particular 
characteristics may weigh in favor or against suitability, though they may 
not be determinative. 
The regulatory standards used in a third-party program should facili-
tate the objective assessment of conformity. When possible, standards 
should be quantitative and the qualities of interest should be measurable.606 
In the absence of objective standards, the risk of unreliability and incon-
sistency in the determinations of third parties becomes higher. Notably, the 
majority of programs surveyed above involve product standards that lend 
themselves to objective measurement (e.g. the CPSC program, FDA’s 
premarket program, the FCC program, the OSHA program, and the EPA 
Energy Star and WaterSense programs).  
When noncompliance with the regulatory standard implies significant 
risks to health, safety, or other highly valued regulatory interests, a third-
party program may also be less suitable. Inherently, reliance on third parties 
reduces the agency’s control over regulatory implementation. If it is of 
paramount importance that a certain negative regulatory outcome be pre-
vented, then the agency should retain full regulatory control. Moreover, if 
the risks associated with noncompliance are high, a more complete and 
costly conformity assessment system is warranted. At some point, the costs 
of operating and overseeing the third-party program may be so high as to 
exceed the costs of direct regulatory implementation and enforcement. As 
explained by an NIST official, the more control that is needed, the greater 
the resources that are required.607 
Along these lines, voluntary regulatory standards established to confer 
a marketing label may be more suited to a third-party program than manda-
tory standards that directly protect public health and safety. Among the 
programs surveyed, the NOP, Energy Star, and WaterSense are the best 
examples of the former.608 When a program confers a marketing label, a 
failure in the compliance assessment system has a more limited impact than 
when a program is established directly to protect health and safety. Of 
                                                                                                                      
 606. Hatanaka, supra note 504, at 708 (emphasizing the importance of measurability 
and stating that “that which is being audited must be clearly identifiable, that is, it must be 
objective in the sense that it is (at least in principle) independently verifiable”). 
 607. Telephone Interview with Gordon Gillerman, supra note 110.  
 608. The NRTL program similarly confers a label, but it is different in that OSHA-
regulated workplaces are required to use labeled products and that the label is more related 
to health and safety than the other three programs.  
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course, the impact may still be significant and there is an important gov-
ernmental interest in the integrity of the marketing labels that agencies 
establish.  
The CPSC program and the various FDA programs, in contrast, in-
volve mandatory standards designed to protect public health and safety. In 
some ways, this represents the most difficult case for third-party compli-
ance assessment. Notably, these programs were all created directly by 
Congress in response to perceived deficiencies in the ability of the respon-
sible agencies to conduct an adequate level of testing or inspections directly.  
Relatedly, a third-party program may be more suitable when the stand-
ard is a voluntary consensus standard rather than a governmental-unique 
standard. In the NRTL program, the standards are all voluntary consensus 
standards. However, in the CPSC program, only some of the consensus 
standards are voluntary. When the standard is a voluntary consensus stand-
ard, private sector bodies may already be familiar with it and have relevant 
experience testing or certifying to it. Also, if the standard to be applied in 
the program is an international standard, it becomes more likely that regu-
lated entities will be able to utilize a single third-party conformity 
assessment process to satisfy multiple regulatory jurisdictions.609 
Finally, when the regulated product or activity (the regulatory target) is 
international in scope because of international trade, it may be better suited 
to a third-party program. Many of the existing programs have regulatory 
targets with significant international dimensions. FDA’s program for food 
safety is specifically focused on imported food. Children’s products, medical 
devices, telecommunications equipment, electrical equipment, organic food, 
and energy- and water-efficient products are all often manufactured in an 
international production chain. Third-party programs enable regulatory 
agencies to extend their reach outside national borders by incorporating 
private actors around the globe. On the other hand, a new challenge arises: 
agencies may have difficulty overseeing the private actors operating in other 
countries.  
                                                                                                                      
 609. An example is provided by ISO 13485, which by its name explicitly sets forth 
standards for quality management systems for regulatory purposes. An FDA official ex-
plained that ISO 13485 is directly used in the regulation of many other countries and could 
become the U.S. regulatory standard in the future. Telephone Interview with David Kalins, 
supra note 347. The official further explained that FDA’s current QS regulation is similar in 
many ways but demands more evidence that the quality system is being effectively imple-
mented. Id. 
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3. Compare the Benefits and Drawbacks o� Third-Party Programs 
with Other Approaches 
Agencies that are considering third-party compliance assessment pro-
grams to achieve regulatory goals should compare this approach with 
others. Most importantly, the agency should compare a third-party ap-
proach with direct governmental compliance assessment and with requiring 
regulated entities to make a self-declaration of compliance. 
An evaluation that EPA undertook when it decided not to require 
third-party certification of greenhouse gas emissions reports provides a 
good example.610 EPA commissioned a report that evaluated three options: 
(1) facility self-certification and third-party verification paid for by the 
reporting companies (i.e., third-party certification), (2) facility self-
certification with EPA verification of submitted data (i.e., direct govern-
mental compliance assessment), and (3) facility self-certification with little 
or no independent verification of submitted data (i.e., self-declaration of 
compliance).611  
There may be situations in which self-declaration can serve the regula-
tory purpose at hand.612 Some regulatory programs may involve “[l]ow- to 
medium-risk areas in which market mechanisms . . . can mitigate the nega-
tive consequences associated with non-compliances before those 
consequences are intolerable to society.”613 Some voluntary regulatory pro-
grams that confer marketing labels may fit this description well. However, 
if an agency is considering a third-party program, there may have already 
been a determination that self-declaration is insufficient. In the Energy 
Star program, for example, self-declaration had been used previously and a 
GAO audit had revealed that the self-declaration system opened the pro-
gram to fraud and abuse.  
Also, self-declaration with little or no verification is rarely considered 
sufficient for mandatory standards that relate to public health and safety. 
Indeed, laws to protect health and safety—and their effective enforce-
ment—are often necessary precisely because market mechanisms are 
                                                                                                                      
 610. Memorandum from Ruth Mead et al., ERG, to Suzanne Kocchi and Kong Chiu, 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Headquarters, Wash., D.C., Review o� Verification Systems in 
Environmental Reporting Programs (Feb. 10, 2009) available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ghgreporting/documents/pdf/archived/tsd/Verification%20approaches%20memo%20(2-10-
09)%20Final.pdf [hereinafter EPA Verification System Memo]. 
 611. Id. 
 612. Cf. Johnson, supra note 605, at 29 (stating that businesses prefer self-declaration of 
compliance (SDoC), and citing an economist who states that because SDoC “is surely the 
cheapest form of conformity assessment, it is to be preferred except when it cannot be 
trusted”).  
 613. Gillerman, supra note 605605. 
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ineffective in protecting against harm. For example, consumers are general-
ly unable to tell if children’s products contain lead or i� food is infected by 
salmonella. Environmental protection and other societal interests are simi-
lar: consumers cannot tell if a product came from a highly polluting facility 
or an unsafe workplace.  
As such, the question to be considered becomes whether the agency 
should directly assess compliance or rely on third parties. An agency should 
consider which would be less costly and which would provide greater bene-
fits. The EPA report, for example, found that setting up a third-party 
program would impose significant costs on the agency.614 Costs would be 
incurred in developing the program, approving third parties and training 
them, ensuring that conflicts of interest were not present, and performing 
ongoing oversight. The report also observed that, even with third-party 
certification, the EPA would probably need to develop specialized software 
to receive and review the data and accompany third parties on site visits.615 
In EPA’s decision not to require third-party verification, EPA also empha-
sized that the activities necessary to set up a third-party program would 
“slow down implementation of the [greenhouse gas reporting] rule.”616 
Several of the third-party programs reviewed above also suggest that pro-
gram establishment may be costly and slow.617  
On the other hand, even if there are significant set-up costs, they may 
be justified in light of the cost savings or benefits generated in later years. 
For example, with its reliance on TCBs, the FCC now oversees the issuance 
of more than four times the number of equipment authorizations annually 
as it did fifteen years ago with roughly the same number of staff (seven to 
ten employees).618 If the program had not been established, it can be  
                                                                                                                      
 614. EPA Verification System Memo, supra note 610, at 26. 
 615. Id. 
 616. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 502, at 56,283 
(“[D]eveloping the third party verification approach would require EPA to establish and 
develop emissions verification protocols and a system to qualify and accredit the third party 
verifiers, and to develop and administer a process to ensure that verifiers hired by reporting 
facilities do not have conflicts of interest. Such a program could require EPA to review 
numerous individual conflict of interest screening determinations made each time a reporter 
hires a third party verifier. Even i� EPA were to partner with an existing program or organi-
zation to accredit verifiers, EPA would still need to develop the criteria and systems 
described above to implement this rule and ensure high quality emissions verification given 
the unique reporting requirements of this rule. These efforts would slow down implementa-
tion of the rule and sharing of data.”). 
 617. See generally supra notes 515–29 and accompanying text (on the shrimp aquaculture 
pilot) and notes 570–79 and accompanying text (on the FDA AP Inspections program). 
 618. Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra 390. Between 2000 and 2011, 
the number of equipment authorization applications grew from 3,168 to 13,645. In the year 
2000, FCC processed 83.5 percent of the applications (2,645 applications). In 2011, FCC 
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expected that more staff would have been hired. Also, even high set-up 
costs might be justified if the long-term alternative is not having the pro-
gram at all. Due to EPA resource constraints, the WaterSense program 
might not have been pursued without a third-party approach.  
In some situations, set-up costs may not be as high because third par-
ties are already doing similar assessments for other purposes. An agency 
may not have to do as much in terms of identifying suitable third parties 
and training them. Also, the costs to industry may be lower because they 
are already contracting with these third parties. In WaterSense, for exam-
ple, one of the most important types of products—toilets—was already 
often the subject of private conformity assessment. Manufacturers were 
engaging third parties to certify that their products met certain operational 
standards set by the Canadian government or state and local governments 
in the United States. When WaterSense established its third-party program 
to assess conformity with water efficiency standards, the existing conformi-
ty assessment networks could be leveraged. Similar networks may already 
be present in the arena o� food safety due to the prevalence of private con-
formity assessment.619  
An agency should also consider the different benefits that derive from 
either directly verifying compliance or relying on third-party verification. 
The outputs of the two approaches differ in ways that may be important. 
For example, FDA staff does not view the compliance data acquired 
through the AP Inspection Program as equivalent to the compliance data 
acquired directly through an FDA inspection of a medical device facility. If 
the AP inspection suggests there may be violations, FDA must follow up 
with its own inspections to collect the evidence needed for a formal en-
forcement action.620 Similarly, in PMAP, FDA’s pilot program for medical 
device facility inspections established in coordination with Canada, FDA 
found that “the level of detail in the narrative needs to be greater in order 
for the regulators to have a more complete picture of the audit/inspection 
and the manufacturer’s organization and operation.”621 The narrative  
portion of the auditors’ reports under the PMAP varied in length from 
                                                                                                                      
processed only 1.6 percent of applications (218 applications), and TCBs processed the rest 
(13,427 applications). Id. 
 619. In terms o� food safety and possibly other areas of product safety, it is important 
to note that the private conformity assessment processes that exist are often not considered 
to be reliable. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. An agency that seeks to incorporate 
existing networks into its compliance assessment program would need to be particularly 
careful to set third-program rules that enhance the reliability of third-party determinations 
and otherwise instill public confidence.  
 620. Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347. 
 621. PMAP Report, supra note 344, at 3. 
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three to twenty pages, with large variability in the format and level of de-
tail.622 
Direct governmental verification may also enable more consistency in 
compliance data and quicker release of data to the public. Rather than adopt 
a third-party approach for greenhouse gas emission reporting, EPA decided 
to have facilities submit data electronically and to perform a series of auto-
mated data checks with follow-up questions to regulated entities and facility 
audits as necessary. EPA found that “the combination of comprehensive 
electronic review and a flexible and adaptive program of on-site auditing 
will enable us to effectively target verification resources while also provid-
ing the necessary consistency and quality in the data.”623 EPA also found 
that the direct verification approach would enable it to make data available 
to the public more quickly. With third-party verification, three to six 
months might be needed for third-party verifiers to perform their verifica-
tion role, and EPA “would still need to review [the data] and perform 
consistency checks after third-party verification was complete.”624 
Third-party verification programs generally have the drawback of add-
ing complexity and principal-agent problems to the regulatory process. 
With a third-party program, many decisions must be made about the roles 
and responsibilities of new actors, namely certification bodies, testing bod-
ies, and accreditation bodies. The regulatory agency must also assume a new 
role in overseeing these actors. The new roles seem likely to make the regu-
latory framework more complicated, thus potentially hindering public 
understanding and participation. Also, the introduction of new actors cre-
ates a “principal-agent problem.” A principal-agent problem arises when a 
principal (here, the regulatory agency) chooses an agent (the third party) to 
act on its behalf. Because the two parties have different interests and the 
agent has more information, the principal has difficulty ensuring that the 
agent is acting in the principal’s best interest.625 In third-party programs, 
such principal-agent problems are likely to be exacerbated by the fact that 
the third parties are not only agents of the regulatory agency but also paid 
agents of the regulated entities.626  
                                                                                                                      
 622. Id. 
 623. 74 Fed. Reg. 56,282 (Oct. 30, 2009). 
 624. Id. at 56,283. 
 625. See Paul M. Johnson, Agency Problem, in A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC 
TERMS, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/agency_problem (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 626. See Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and 
Clients’ Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2005) (arguing that the problem of 
auditing in the financial sector is that auditors have two masters and that the law needs to be 
written “so that auditors recognize proper incentives and serve only one master, a master 
whose own interests are aligned with those of the investing public”). 
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4. I� Third-Party Verification Would Be Optional, Evaluate the 
Incentives for its Use 
If a third-party program is being contemplated in which regulated enti-
ties would have the choice of contracting with third parties or being 
assessed directly by the agency, the agency should consider whether regulat-
ed entities are likely to use the program. The low level of participation in 
the AP Inspection Program exemplifies the problem. The FDA invested 
significant resources into its establishment, but it was seldom used by in-
dustry.627 While the program offered several incentives for participation, 
they were outweighed by a series of disincentives including the cost o� 
hiring the third party and the perceived risk that FDA would ultimately 
take a harder look at its facility.628  
Agencies should evaluate whether sufficient incentives can be created 
for the use of a voluntary third-party program in light of the costs and risks 
the program would impose. A program may attract more participation if the 
regulated entity is able to avoid paying an agency-assessed user fee if it 
contracts with a third party. Another incentive would be provided if the 
third-party conformity would satisfy the regulatory requirements of other 
jurisdictions in which a manufacturer operates or sells products. This would 
generally require a federal agency to coordinate with its counterparts in 
other countries to harmonize standards and assessments procedures. In this 
vein, the FDA is currently developing a Medical Device Single Audit Pro-
gram (MDSAP) in coordination with Canada, Brazil, and Australia.629 The 
goal of the program is to enable a single audit/inspection of a medical de-
vice manufacturer’s quality management system to satisfy the regulatory 
requirements of all the jurisdictions. 
B. Establishing a Third-Party Program 
1. Calibrate the Third-Party Program to the Level o� Risks 
Associated with Noncompliance 
An important principle of private third-party conformity assessment is 
that the design of the conformity assessment system should be driven by 
                                                                                                                      
 627. Cf. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, THIRD PARTIES AND 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF: MEDICAL DEVICE ISO 13485:2003 VOLUNTARY 
AUDIT REPORT SUBMISSION PILOT PROGRAM 5 (2012) (stating that “FDA has committed 
significant resources to creating the AP for Inspections program and continues to maintain 
it”). It is worth noting that this program was required by statute. 
 628. See generally supra notes 556–562 and accompanying text.  
 629. Telephone Interview with Kim Trautman, supra note 345.  
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the degree of assurance its user needs.630 In some cases, a user—such as a 
product purchaser—wants some independent assurance of conformity, but 
occasional instances of nonconformity will not cause major problems to the 
purchaser’s manufacturing process or business interests. The purchaser 
might be satisfied with occasional third-party testing of the product. In 
other cases, a purchaser may be at risk of incurring high costs due to non-
conformity in a purchased product. The purchaser might instead impose a 
variety of special requirements on the supplier and require third-party 
certification. 
The same principle applies in third-party verification programs. If the 
risks associated with noncompliance are very high, a third-party program 
should be designed to provide a maximal degree of reliability in the deter-
minations by third parties. This could be accomplished in a regulatory 
third-party program through accreditation rules that set high standards for 
third parties to be accredited, selection rules that carefully guard against 
conflicts of interest and the use of subcontractors, performance rules that 
require a rigorous and complete set of assessment activities, reporting rules 
that furnish ample information about the outcomes of the assessment, and a 
full array of governmental oversight and enforcement actions. Such rules 
can be expected to enhance the competence and independence of third-
party activities and thus the reliability of their determinations.  
Yet, such rules are also likely to entail high costs for both the regulatory 
agency and regulated entities. Such rules may, in some cases, represent an 
instance of “over-design” that adds costs to the system and potentially to 
the products or processes assessed, without compensating benefits.631 In 
some cases, the regulatory objective can be achieved with less intensive 
conformity assessment activities and with third parties who are not trained 
as thoroughly as they could be or who are not completely independent.  
For example, in several programs detailed above, the agency does not 
require that the laboratory that tests products be completely independent of 
the manufacturer. Under the CPSC’s rules, manufacturers’ laboratories can 
test products if they meet certain “firewalled” criteria. For Energy Star and 
WaterSense, products can be tested in a manufacturer’s lab under certain 
circumstances. More generally, the programs vary quite a bit in the extent 
they have adopted rigorous accreditation, selection, performance, and re-
porting rules. In some programs, governmental oversight has been sporadic 
and little evidence exists of active enforcement of third-party program 
rules.  
                                                                                                                      
 630. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 631. Gillerman, supra note 605. 
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It bears emphasis, however, that many types of regulations for which 
third-party programs are considered may be in the high-risk category, 
where noncompliance implies risks to health, safety, and other valued regu-
latory goals. For such regulatory purposes, a relatively complete third-party 
conformity assessment may indeed be appropriate despite its costs.  
2. Incorporate Existing Conformity Assessment Standards and 
Activities When Possible 
Agencies should strongly consider relying on existing conformity as-
sessment standards and related activities when they establish third-party 
programs.632 Doing so can reduce the costs of the program for both the 
regulatory agency and regulated entities. Relevant conformity assessment 
standards and activities may be occurring through other governmental 
agencies or in the private sector.  
Sometimes a new third-party program may be able to rely on another 
governmental agency’s conformity assessment activities. During develop-
ment of the WaterSense program, for example, companies were concerned 
that participation in WaterSense would require them to duplicate testing 
and reporting required for DOE plumbing standards and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) appliance labeling standards.633 In response, the 
WaterSense program made its reporting requirements similar or identical to 
what manufacturers already had done for DOE and FTC.  
Extensive private sector conformity assessment standards and activities 
are also available to be incorporated into regulatory third-party pro-
grams.634 Most significantly, as described above, ISO/IEC have developed a 
set of international conformity assessment standards, and an international 
                                                                                                                      
 632. Cf. NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.4(c) (advising agencies to “[u]se the 
results of other governmental agency and private sector organization conformity assessment 
activities to enhance the safety and efficacy of proposed new conformity assessment re-
quirements and measures”); id. at § 287.4(�) (advising agencies to “[c]onsider using the 
results of other agencies’ conformity assessment procedures”). 
 633. WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMENTS ON THE MAY 2007 
DRAFT WATERSENSE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 14 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
WaterSense/docs/cert_scheme_comments508.pdf; cf. EnergyGuide Labeling: FAQs for Appli-
ance Manufacturers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents 
/bus-82-energyguide-labels-faqs (last visited Feb. 11, 2014); Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy, Building Technologies Program, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://www1.eere.energy. 
gov/buildings/appliance_standards/residential/plumbing_products.html (last visited Feb. 11, 
2014). 
 634. See NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.4(e) (directing agencies to “[i]dentify 
appropriate private sector conformity assessment practices and programs and consider the 
results of such practices and/or programs as appropriate in existing regulatory and procure-
ment actions”).  
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conformity assessment industry has emerged to conduct related activities.635 
These standards set forth how testing bodies, certification bodies, and ac-
creditation bodies should function.  
Regulated entities have expressed a preference for agencies to incorpo-
rate private conformity standards and activities rather than creating 
“government-unique” conformity assessment.636 Regulated entities fear that 
government-unique standards would be duplicative of private sector con-
formity assessment activities that they already undertake for business 
reasons. They also opine that government-unique conformity assessment 
standards “may be expensive to develop and maintain, may impose addi-
tional costs on the private sector, and may not be recognized beyond 
national boundaries.”637 
Using international standards of conformity assessment enhances the 
possibility that the same conformity assessment might serve regulatory 
needs in other countries. For example, a federal agency may require that a 
certain product be tested by a lab accredited to ISO 17025 for conformity 
with a particular safety standard. If another country has the same safety 
standard or otherwise considers the U.S. standard equivalent and it respects 
the international accreditation of the lab, then the manufacturer may not 
need to undertake any further action to legally market its product in that 
other country.  
A significant way in which an agency can rely on existing conformity 
assessment standards and activities is by recognizing private sector accredi-
tation bodies to accredit certification and testing bodies rather than 
accrediting them directly. As in some existing programs, an agency may 
require that the private accreditation body operate in accordance with 
ISO/IEC 17011 and be a member of an international organization like IAF 
or ILAC that coordinates a peer-review process to evaluate accreditation 
                                                                                                                      
 635. NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.4(d) (directing agencies to “[u]se relevant 
guides or standards for conformity assessment practices published by domestic and interna-
tional standardizing bodies as appropriate in meeting regulatory and procurement 
objectives”).  
 636. See, e.g., Comments of Air-Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. on 
Federal Participation in the Development and Use o� Voluntary Consensus Standards and in 
Conformity Assessment Activities, (April 26, 2012), at 1, available at https://law.resource. 
org/pub/us/cfr/regulations.gov.docket.02/0900006480ffd5af.pdf. 
 637. See id. at 3; see also Comments of Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. on Federal Participa-
tion in the Development and Use o� Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity 
Assessment Activities, (June 1, 2012), at 4, (advocating solutions based on voluntary consen-
sus standards to reduce the costs of compliance for industry) available at http://publica 
a.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/Critical%20Issues/FederalRegister_
OMBA119/ANSI%20Response%20OMB-A119_FINAL.pdf. 
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bodies for membership.638 When an agency relies on the ISO/IEC stand-
ards for recognition, it avoids having to set all such standards itself. Also, if 
the agency requires that the accreditation be a member o� IAF or ILAC, 
those organizations conduct periodic assessments of the accreditation body. 
If an agency decides to accredit certification bodies directly, it may still 
find ISO/IEC 17011 to be useful as a guide for its own accreditation activi-
ties. The NOP regulations initially required that the NOP assemble a peer 
review panel pursuant to Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to 
evaluate its accreditation procedures.639 In its 2010 review of the program, 
USDA OIG found that the NOP had never established the panel, reported-
ly due to budget constraints. In response to the OIG report, the NOP 
proposed an alternative, namely that it would amend its regulations and 
instead develop “a quality management system that complies with the crite-
ria set forth in NIST’s National Voluntary Conformity Assessment 
Evaluation program (NVCASE) as well as the requirements o� ISO/IEC 
17011:2004.”640  
The FDA’s aquaculture pilot illustrated some of the challenges faced by 
agencies that directly accredit certification bodies, particularly in an inter-
national context.641 FDA reports that after it announced the pilot, it 
received applications from candidate certification bodies. It found, however, 
that the candidate CBs did not reliably submit supporting documentation 
in their applications and determining whether CBs were qualified required 
a greater investment of resources than it had anticipated. FDA recommend-
ed that “in any future program, FDA should be clearer in its expectations 
for the amount and type of information needed to adequately evaluate a 
firm’s application.”642  
Notably, programs that anticipate reliance on certification bodies in 
other countries may be particularly well served by relying on private ac-
creditation bodies. Such accreditation bodies may have more institutional 
competence than the agency in dealing with foreign companies and may 
even be located in that country or the same region of the world. Of course, 
the issue then arises o� how the agency will oversee the foreign activities of 
private accreditation bodies and the foreign certification bodies they accred-
it.  
                                                                                                                      
 638. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
 639. USDA OIG, supra note 531, at 3.  
 640. Id. at 19; cf. GRADING & VERIFICATION DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., QUALITY 
MANUAL FOR ACCREDITING CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES (2001), available at 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5073714. 
 641.  CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479. 
 642.  Id. at 7.  
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Importantly, when an agency incorporates international standards into 
its requirements for certification, testing, or accreditation bodies, it can 
supplement those standards in various ways. An agency, for example, may 
require that a certification body be accredited by a private accreditation 
body to ISO/IEC 17065 and also meet a certain set of requirements specific 
to a third-party program. The accreditation body might be given responsi-
bility for assessing conformity with the program-specific requirements, or 
the agency might do its own assessment as part of “recognizing” an accred-
ited certification body for participation in the program. 
Through these program-specific requirements, the agency can put flesh 
on the sometimes bare-bones requirements of the international standard. 
For example, ISO/IEC 17065 contains a basic requirement that certification 
bodies conduct surveillance of certified companies or products. Through 
program-specific requirements for accreditation of the certification body, 
the agency could require it to undertake particular types of surveillance 
activities at particular times. Similarly, an agency might specify particular 
conflict-of-interest rules that supplement ISO/IEC 17065’s general re-
quirement that certification bodies be independent and impartial.  
3. Ensure that the Agency and the Public Have Appropriate Access 
to Information 
Private third-party conformity assessment systems differ from regula-
tory third-party verification programs in a key respect. In the latter, the 
user of the system is ultimately the public, and the regulatory agencies that 
establish third-party programs are accountable to the public for their out-
comes. As a result, the responsible agency and the public should have access 
to a variety of types of information about the operation of the third-party 
program.  
The public should have access to and input into the procedures by 
which a regulatory third-party program is run. The development of pro-
gram rules and guidance should include public notice and participation. 
When agencies incorporate international conformity assessment standards 
into their regulatory processes, important concerns arise about the public 
availability of those standards.643 Because ISO/IEC standards are copyright 
protected, they are not easily accessible to interested members of the pub-
lic. ACUS has recommended that when an agency considers “incorporating 
copyrighted material by reference, the agency should work with the copy-
right owner to ensure the material will be reasonably available to regulated 
                                                                                                                      
 643. See especially ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE, supra note 604, at 2, 5–6. 
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and other interested parties both during rulemaking and following promul-
gation.”644 
The public should also have access to certain types of information 
about the compliance of regulated entities. If a third-party program replaces 
a regulatory compliance program, the same types of information that were 
accessible to the public before the implementation of the third-party pro-
gram should remain accessible after. In some cases, however, it may be 
appropriate and desirable to provide additional compliance information to 
the public that was not systematically available before the third-party pro-
gram came into effect.  
The public should have access to certain types of information about the 
third parties that participate in the regulatory program. The agency should 
make clear the roles and identities of the various third-party actors. In 
several programs discussed above, Congress has required that agencies 
maintain a public list of the private bodies associated with the program. 
Other information about the characteristics and activities of the private 
bodies may also be important to create public confidence in the integrity of 
the third-party program.  
For effective oversight, the government agency will also need certain 
types of information from accreditation, certification, and testing bodies. 
For example, testing and certification bodies might be required to report 
potential conflicts of interest before performing the conformity assessment. 
They might also be required to report the dates of their conformity assess-
ment activities so that agency officials can conduct a site visit for oversight 
purposes. In addition to the positive or adverse determination that is the 
ultimate outcome of the conformity assessment process, bodies can be re-
quired to submit documents gathered or generated during the process that 
explain and support the determination. To the extent that information 
required of third parties constitutes confidential business information, it 
can be held back from the public in accordance with the Freedom o� Infor-
mation Act and other applicable laws.  
Information disclosure requirements may have the effect of enhancing 
the degree to which third-parties answer directly to the agency rather than 
just the regulated entity that has contracted it. For example, FSMA re-
quires that accredited labs send their test results directly to the FDA.645 
One commentator has called this “a game-changing requirement” that “al-
ters the whole dynamic between labs and their clients,” making them 
                                                                                                                      
 644. Id. at 5. 
 645. 21 U.S.C. § 350k(b)(2) (2012).  
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“directly responsible to the public (i.e., the government) to ensure that 
information is disclosed about their client.”646  
Importantly, international conformity assessment standards include 
confidentiality provisions that may prevent the flow of information in a 
regulatory third-party program. When EPA requested comments on a draft 
of its rules for the recognition of accreditation bodies that would accredit 
laboratories, it received comments to the effect that several types of infor-
mation that it initially wanted from the accreditation bodies were contrary 
to the confidentiality provisions o� ISO 17011.647 For example, EPA initially 
wanted to be informed of the results o� ILAC’s peer evaluation. After being 
informed that such information was against ISO 17011’s confidentiality 
rules, EPA struck the requirement.648  
On the same basis, a commenter also objected to EPA’s requirement 
that recognized accreditation bodies provide EPA with copies o� laboratory 
assessment documentation including corrective action plans and documen-
tation about the resolution of deficiencies.649 In this case, however, EPA 
responded that the release of this information by the AB is an “integral 
aspect o� EPA’s recognition of the laboratory” and suggested that the AB 
should seek the laboratory’s written consent to share this information with 
EPA.650 EPA’s response also indicates how an agency can use program-
specific rules to essentially modify the default confidentiality rules con-
tained in the international standards. 
While confidentiality provisions should not hinder the flow of infor-
mation that is necessary for adequate regulatory oversight and public 
accountability, some would argue that certain confidentiality assurances 
ultimately serve regulatory goals. For example, the FDA has provoked a 
negative reaction from industry by interpreting FSMA to require that an 
accredited auditor must immediately notify the FDA if it “discovers a con-
dition that could cause or contribute to a serious risk to the public health” 
                                                                                                                      
 646. Daniel R. Dwyer, Third-Party Accreditation under the FDA Food Safety Moderniza-
tion Act, KKBLOG (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.kkblaw.com/?p=206& 
option=com_wordpress&Itemid=5. 
 647. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR COMMENTS MATRIX 2, http://w 
ww.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/mou/AB_Comment_Matrix.pdf (last visited Feb. 
12, 2014) (providing matrix that summarizes comments on the condition and criteria for 
recognition of accreditation bodies for Energy Star laboratory recognition); see also Stake-
holder Comments on the Enhanced Program Plan for ENERGY STAR Products, ENERGY STAR, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.intro_conf_calls#accred (last visited Feb. 
12, 2014) (listing of stakeholder comments on draft accreditation body requirements). 
 648. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR COMMENTS MATRIX, supra note 647, 
at 2. 
 649. Id. at 3. 
 650. Id. 
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during either a regulatory or a consultative audit.651 As stated by one indus-
try commenter, “[w]e disagree with this interpretation of the FSMA and 
maintain that such a position could undermine the purpose of the law, 
ultimately dissuading manufacturers from using third party auditors—a 
move that could negatively impact food safety and hinder FDA’s efforts to 
efficiently use its own resources.”652 Agencies should consider pros and cons 
o� limiting the types of confidentiality that regulated entities expect when 
they contract privately with third parties.  
IT can play an important role in enabling the flow of information in a 
third-party program. Regulated entities, third-party conformity assessment 
bodies, and accreditation bodies can be required to e-report certain types of 
information. Also, with well-administered IT systems, information that 
should be public can be more promptly made public. In its shrimp aquacul-
ture pilot, the FDA made a special note of the need for new “IT data  
systems to capture and report on results of assessments and audits.”653 
In sum, a change in the “communicative energy” of third-party con-
formity assessment is required in a regulatory context.654 The default in the 
private sector is for the third party to disclose his audit report exclusively to 
his client.655 If interested parties external to the contractual relationship are 
privy to the audit’s results at all, they are likely to be told little more than 
whether the subject of the audit conformed or not.656 For an assessment to 
serve public regulatory purposes, much richer information about its process 
and outcomes is necessary.657 
4. Commit to Undertaking Appropriate Oversight Activities  
When an agency establishes a regulatory third-party program, its role 
often changes from being the inspector to overseeing the inspectors.658 
Governmental oversight of third-party programs is essential to ensure that 
                                                                                                                      
 651. 21 U.S.C. § 384d(c)(4)(A) (2012); see also Imports, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm257980.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 
2013) (answering in the affirmative the question, “I.4.2 Is the accredited auditor required to 
notify the FDA if a condition of concern is found during a consultative audit?”). 
 652. Comments o� Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n on U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Food Safety 
Modernization Act Import Provisions Rulemaking, Docket Nos. FDA-2011-N-0143 to -45, 
(Apr. 28, 2011), at 3, available at http://www.idfa.org/files/IDFA_FSMA_Import_Com 
ments_042811.pdf.  
 653. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 26. 
 654. Christine Parker, Regulator-Required Corporate Compliance Program Audits, 25 LAW 
& POL’Y 221, 235–36 (2003). 
 655. See id. at 235. 
 656. See id. 
 657. Id. at 236. 
 658. Martin Shapiro, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? (1988). 
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they are fulfilling their regulatory purposes. In addition to exercising direct 
oversight, an agency can also require third parties to conduct and report 
surveillance activities that provide additional information to the agency 
about program operation.  
For a successful third-party program, a regulatory agency must imple-
ment and enforce the rules it establishes for associated accreditation and 
conformity assessment bodies. In principal, many of the same enforcement 
strategies and tools would apply in enforcing third-party program rules as 
apply in enforcing other regulatory rules. The agency can require certain 
types of reporting, conduct inspections to verify compliance, and impose 
sanctions for noncompliance. One important sanction would be the removal 
of a noncompliant accreditation or conformity assessment from the pro-
gram.  
An agency should determine in advance how it intends to conduct over-
sight. The agency may decide, for example, that it will assess the 
performance of accreditation bodies every few years, that it will conduct a 
certain number of audits of accreditations or certifications, or that it will 
carry out a market surveillance program that will test a certain number of 
products off the shelf each year. Special program rules may be necessary to 
ensure an oversight activity. In the shrimp aquaculture pilot, for example, 
FDA found that entities subject to certification were not always willing to 
allow an FDA official to accompany the certification body on a site visit. 
FDA concluded that it should “[c]onsider requiring, as a condition for 
accreditation, that CBs maintain agreements with establishments they 
certify to allow FDA to monitor or otherwise participate in certification 
audits as necessary.”659  
The agency should also retain direct enforcement authority over regu-
lated entities, which could be used when the agency discovers through the 
third-party program or otherwise that a regulated entity is out of compli-
ance. In the NOP program, for example, AMS uses its traditional 
enforcement powers to respond to situations where organic operations 
knowingly market nonorganic food as organic.660 Its enforcement actions 
play “a central role in maintaining the validity of the program and ensuring 
public trust” in the label.661  
As in traditional regulatory programs, agencies should be equipped to 
receive and respond to information about potential noncompliance from the 
public. In an investigation of the NOP program, the USDA OIG found 
that “NOP officials did not have adequate procedures or a system for track-
                                                                                                                      
 659. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 21. 
 660. USDA OIG, supra note 531, at 8. 
 661. Id. at 8. 
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ing the receipt, review, and disposition of complaints and any subsequent 
enforcement actions.”662 When third parties have played a role in assessing 
compliance, the agency might be able to direct a public complaint to the 
relevant third-party body for an initial investigation. The agency, however, 
would remain ultimately responsible for ensuring that the complaint was 
resolved. The agency could also require that employees of accreditation 
bodies and conformity assessment bodies be given information about how 
to anonymously contact an official within the regulatory agency to report 
any potential problems. 
The agency may require accreditation bodies and conformity assess-
ment bodies to undertake certain activities that provide information for 
oversight purposes. For example, accreditation bodies may be required to 
conduct periodic audits of the certification bodies they accredit. Certifica-
tion bodies may be required to conduct surveillance audits of the entities 
and products they certify.663 In either, the agency might also require that 
some or all of the audits be unannounced rather than announced.664 In its 
investigation of the NOP’s organic milk program, the OIG found that 
certifying agents were not performing unannounced inspections of organic 
dairy operations.665 While unannounced inspections are not required by 
NOP regulations, OIG and other stakeholders consider them to play a 
“critical role” in ensuring compliance.666 Notably, if the rules of a third-
party program do not require unannounced audits, accreditation and certifi-
cation bodies will have little incentive to do them for fear of offending 
clients. Unannounced audits o� facilities can be facilitated by requiring 
regulated entities to agree to them as a condition of certification.  
                                                                                                                      
 662. Id. at 1. 
 663. Energy Star requires CBs to operate a partner-funded verification testing pro-
gram to ensure products meet Energy Star standards. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY STAR 
APPLIANCE VERIFICATION TESTING – PILOT PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 22 (2012), 
available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/pdfs/energystar_ 
pilotprogram_report_02_03_12.pdf. 
 664. See Albersmeier et al., supra note 102, at 933 tbl.5 (showing that a superior risk-
oriented approach includes “[r]andomly chosen audits without announcement” rather than 
“regular audits with announcements”). 
 665. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL 
MARKETING SERVICE: NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM—ORGANIC MILK 16-17 (2012), 
available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/01601-0001-Te.pdf?utm_source=Organic+Mil 
k+Audit+Report+Published&utm_campaign=Organic+milk+audit+report&utm_medium=em
ail.  
 666. Id. at 17. 
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CONCLUSION  
Private regulation is pervasive. In a variety of contexts, private actors 
create, implement, and enforce rules that serve the traditional social goals 
of public regulation. This Article examines how these private actors and 
their work might be harnessed to build more effective regulatory regimes. 
After providing an overview o� how private regulators perform the classic 
functions of regulation—standard setting, implementation, and enforce-
ment—the first part of the Article focused on several forms o� harnessing 
private regulation, namely the incorporation of private standards, the public 
endorsement of self-regulation, and third-party verification.  
Having situated third-party verification in this broad context, the Arti-
cle proceeded to describe and analyze the use of third-party verification by 
a diverse set o� federal agencies responsible for health, safety, and environ-
mental protection. Eight third-party programs established by six federal 
agencies are described with attention to the goals of the regulatory pro-
gram, the authorizing laws and regulations, the roles and responsibilities of 
the third parties, and provisions for agency oversight. In doing so, the Arti-
cle shows how the exercise of public and private authority is interwoven 
when federal agencies develop programs that enable private third-parties to 
assume primary responsibility for compliance monitoring and assessment.  
The rich empirical information provided in the second part of the Arti-
cle allows for the construction of a set of metrics of success in the third part 
and recommendations in the fourth part. As two scholars of private regula-
tion recently explained, while there are many political forces pushing 
policymakers to prefer private regulation, there is “little or no guidance 
being given to policymakers about when, and under what circumstances 
[private regulatory schemes] can prove viable from a public policy perspec-
tive.”667 They further observed that “public bodies seem to have developed 
no means to design collaborative forms [to] control the evolution of pub-
lic/private governance.”668 The metrics and recommendations for third-
party verification answer this call for policy analysis and advice, enabling a 
much greater understanding of when and how third-party conformity as-
sessment can be used for public regulatory purposes.  
Private regulation and attempts to harness it are likely to grow as gov-
ernment resources continue to fall short in fulfilling regulatory needs. This 
Article suggests that there is both promise and peril in harnessing private 
regulation. Third-party verification, in particular, seems likely to increase 
the comprehensiveness and reliability of safety testing in various regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
 667. Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 144, at abstract.  
 668. Id. at 3. 
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contexts, particularly when regulated products are produced in international 
commodity chains. It also seems much more reliable than self-declaration to 
create trustworthy governmental labels for consumer products.  
Yet Congress and agencies should tread carefully. They need to identify 
the contexts that are amenable to harnessing and establish third-party pro-
grams that keep “non-governmental regulators committed to public 
purpose.”669 As shown in this Article, not all programs have been successful, 
and public regulators will benefit greatly by understanding what has worked 
well and what has not. Perhaps most importantly, public regulators must 
have the resources and will to exercise serious and consistent oversight once 
a program is in place.670 Ensuring that public regulatory objectives are met 
remains their responsibility. 
                                                                                                                      
 669. Balleisen, supra note 134, at 481. 
 670. Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 34, at 147. 
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APPENDIX 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 2012-7 
Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance 
Adopted December 6, 2012 
Federal agencies in diverse areas have developed third-party programs 
to assess whether regulated entities are in compliance with regulatory 
standards and other requirements. Through these programs, third parties 
assess the safety of imported food, children’s products, medical devices, cell 
phones and other telecommunications equipment, and electrical equipment 
used in workplaces. Third parties also ensure that products labeled as or-
ganic, energy-efficient, and water-efficient meet applicable federal 
standards. In these regulatory third-party programs, regulated entities 
generally contract with and pay third parties to carry out product testing, 
facility inspections, and other regulatory compliance assessment activities in 
the place of regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies then adopt new roles 
in coordinating and overseeing these third-parties.1 
In some areas of regulation, Congress has directed federal agencies to 
develop a third-party program; in others, regulatory agencies have devel-
oped programs under existing statutory authority.  A third-party program is 
just one of many regulatory approaches that Congress and agencies may 
adopt.2 Regulatory objectives may, for example, be adequately met by re-
quiring regulated entities to self-assess and report their compliance 
(sometimes referred to as “first-party certification”). Also, statutory re-
strictions on information disclosure or other legal restrictions may preclude 
an agency from using third parties to conduct inspections and other compli-
ance assessment activities. Some compliance assessment activities may be 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Agencies may use third parties in connection with regulatory, procurement, and 
federal assistance programs. This recommendation addresses use of third parties in regulato-
ry programs. 
 2. The Administrative Conference has addressed various approaches in prior rec-
ommendations. See, e.g., Recommendation 94-1, The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a 
Regulatory Technique, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701 (Aug. 30, 1994); Recommendation 89-1, Peer 
Review and Sanctions in the Medicare Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,965 (Jul. 10, 1989); Rec-
ommendation 78-4, Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 44 Fed. Reg. 1357 (Jan. 5, 1979). 
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inherently governmental, and thus require performance by government 
personnel.3 
Several broad reasons support the growing use of third-party programs 
in federal regulation. In many areas, federal regulatory agencies are faced 
with assuring the compliance of an increasing number of entities and prod-
ucts without a corresponding growth in agency resources. Third-party 
programs may leverage private resources and expertise in ways that make 
regulation more effective and less costly. In comparison with other regula-
tory approaches, third-party programs may also enable more frequent 
compliance assessment and more complete and reliable compliance data. 
Because agencies can authorize third parties located in other countries to 
undertake assessment activities, third-party programs may be particularly 
effective when regulated products or processes are international in scope.   
Regulatory third-party programs raise a host of important questions. 
Because third-party programs represent a partial privatization of the public 
function of implementing and enforcing regulatory law, they are a form of 
“public-private governance,” in which private actors play roles that are 
traditionally viewed as governmental in nature.4 While third-party pro-
grams may increase regulatory compliance or otherwise improve the 
performance of regulated entities and products, these programs also pose 
risks.5 If they are not well-conceived and well-operated, they may both 
undermine the achievement of regulatory goals and impose unnecessary 
costs on agencies and regulated entities.   
Frequently, regulatory third-party programs use the practices and ter-
minology of a conformity assessment framework that has been developed 
by international private-sector standards organizations. “Conformity as-
sessment” is defined in international standards as the “demonstration that 
specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person, or 
body are fulfilled.” 6 International standards also set forth how the organiza-
                                                                                                                      
 3. Office o� Mgmt. & Budget, OMB Circular No. A-76 (Revised May 29, 2003). 
 4. See William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Freeman and 
Minow, eds., Harvard University Press, 2009); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partner-
ships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2002-2003); Jody 
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.  1285, 1286-87 
(2002-2003); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 
in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331 (David Dyzenhaus 
ed., Hart, 1999). 
 5. See Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1 
(2012). 
 6. American National Standards Institute (ANSI), National Conformity Assessment 
Principles for the United States, 3, available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents 
/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/NCAP%20second%20edition.pdf. 
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tions that conduct conformity assessment – “conformity assessment bodies,” 
which are usually private organizations – should operate. International 
standards have been developed for various types of conformity assessment 
bodies, including testing bodies, certification bodies, and inspection bodies.     
Recognizing the assessment of regulatory compliance as a form of con-
formity assessment, many federal agencies that have established third-party 
programs have relied on conformity assessment standards and bodies. 
Agencies may require, for example, that third parties that certify conformi-
ty with regulatory requirements operate in accordance with the 
international standards for certification bodies. Federal agencies may also 
require that the third parties be accredited by accreditation bodies that 
operate in accordance with international accreditation standards. Accredita-
tion bodies are established in many countries, and they may be either 
private or governmental.  
Agencies that establish third-party programs generally cannot or do not 
delegate their regulatory authority to conformity assessment bodies. Rather, 
agencies authorize conformity assessment bodies to perform certain tech-
nical tasks to assess conformity, and regulatory agencies rely on these 
assessments in their own enforcement of regulatory requirements. The goal 
is to leverage private expertise and resources to serve regulatory objectives. 
Because the regulatory agency must remain ultimately responsible for 
achieving regulatory objectives, it is vital to provide public oversight of 
third-party assessment activities. 
A key resource for agencies considering a regulatory third-party pro-
gram is the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which 
has the responsibility under the National Technology Transfer and Ad-
vancement Act of 1995 to coordinate government conformity assessment 
activities with similar activities of private-sector entities, with the goal of 
avoiding unnecessary duplication and complexity. Following Office o� 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, NIST published guidance 
in 2000 for federal agencies on conformity assessment activities.7 NIST: (1) 
provides advice, solutions, and program support for development of tech-
nical standards and conformity assessment programs to support agency 
missions; and (2) develops and conducts customized standards-related 
workshops and educational events for government.  
Recognizing the growing use of third parties and the issues it raises, the 
Administrative Conference makes this recommendation to assist federal 
agencies in determining whether and how to establish third-party programs 
to assess regulatory compliance. The recommendation first suggests that, 
                                                                                                                      
 7. OMB Circular A-119 Revised §§ 8, 13(e) (Feb. 10, 1998); NIST, Guidance on 
Federal Conformity Assessment Activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,894 (Aug. 10, 2000). 
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when considering a third-party program, agencies should consult relevant 
governmental and nongovernmental resources. Next, agencies should com-
pare the advantages and disadvantages of a third-party approach to a more 
traditional approach of direct governmental compliance assessment. Also, if 
an agency is considering a program in which regulated entities could choose 
whether to contract with a third party for regulatory compliance assess-
ment, it should first determine that regulated entities will have sufficient 
incentives to choose to contract with a third party.   
The recommendation then sets forth considerations for agencies after 
they have decided to establish a third-party program. An agency should 
design conformity assessment programs to be proportional to the risks 
associated with regulatory noncompliance. When regulatory noncompliance 
implies serious risk to public health, safety, or other important values, 
third-party program rules should guarantee a high degree of rigor and 
independence. When possible, the agency should incorporate existing con-
formity assessment standards, which may avoid unnecessary duplication and 
create efficiencies for both agencies and regulated entities.  The agency 
should also ensure appropriate government and public access to information 
about program operation.  Finally, the agency should undertake appropriate 
oversight activities to ensure that the third-party program fulfills its regula-
tory purpose. 
RECOMMENDATION 
A. Considerations for a Federal Agency When Deciding Whether to Devel-
op a Third-Party Program to Assess Regulatory Compliance 
 
1.  Resources.  When considering whether to develop a third-party pro-
gram to assess regulatory compliance, the agency should consult 
governmental and non-governmental resources relating to third-party con-
formity assessment, as appropriate.  These include, but are not limited to, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); private con-
formity assessment standards, particularly the standards of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO); and conformity assessment bodies, 
for practical input on feasibility and the impacts on the regulated entities. 
 
2.  Compare Regulatory Approaches.  The agency should compare a third-
party approach with direct governmental assessment of compliance.  In 
choosing between them, the agency should evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of these approaches, with consideration of: 
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(a)  whether third-party conformity assessment is likely to be effective 
in practice and as a technical matter for the applicable regulatory standards 
and context;   
(b)  the costs and potential delay that may result from developing and 
establishing a third-party program; 
(c)  the capacity of the agency to perform effective oversight and its re-
lated costs; 
(d)  the potential for the agency to achieve efficiencies through reduc-
ing its direct compliance assessment costs and resource needs; 
(e)  the costs to regulated entities of paying third parties to perform 
conformity assessment activities, which are likely to be of particular concern 
to small businesses;  
(�)  the potential for development of a well-functioning market in 
third-party conformity assessment services; and 
(g)  the benefits that may accrue to regulated entities by, for example, 
receiving regulatory approval to market their products more quickly or 
simultaneously satisfying the regulatory requirements of other agencies to 
which they are subject, including state agencies or agencies in other coun-
tries. (See Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 2257, 2259 (Jan. 17, 2012); Exec. Order 13,609 (May 1, 2012); Exec. 
Order 13,563 (Jan. 18, 2011)). 
 
3.  Evaluate Incentives.  If an agency is contemplating a third-party pro-
gram in which regulated entities would have the choice of either contracting 
with third parties or being assessed directly by the agency, the agency 
should evaluate whether sufficient incentives exist or can be created to 
attract the participation of regulated entities in the third-party program.  
Incentives for regulated entities to utilize third parties may include:  
(a)  exemption from a governmental fee that would otherwise be appli-
cable; or  
(b)  the ability to satisfy the regulatory requirements of multiple juris-
dictions through a single third-party conformity assessment engagement.   
 
B. Considerations for a Federal Agency When Establishing a Third-Party 
Program to Assess Regulatory Compliance 
 
4.  Proportionality to the Risk.  An agency that has decided to establish a 
third-party program to assess regulatory compliance, or is directed by stat-
ute or other provision o� law to do so, should design its conformity 
assessment program to be proportional to the risks associated with regulato-
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ry noncompliance.  When the risks are high, a conformity assessment pro-
gram should be characterized by high degrees of rigor and independence.  
When the risks associated with noncompliance are lower, the regulatory 
objective may be achievable with less rigor and independence.  Types of 
rules that may be established by the agency to help ensure rigor and inde-
pendence include: 
(a)  accreditation rules that set high standards of competence for the 
accreditation of third parties; 
(b)  selection rules that pertain to how regulated entities select third 
parties, requiring, for example, that third parties disclose conflicts of inter-
ests or that regulated entities contract with a different third party after a 
specified number of assessments;  
(c)  performance rules that require third parties to perform a rigorous 
set of assessment activities; and 
(d)  reporting rules that require third parties to provide sufficient in-
formation to the agency and the public about the process and outcomes of 
assessment activities. 
 
5.  Use of Existing Conformity Assessment Standards.  The agency should 
consider relying on existing conformity assessment standards, particularly 
international standards that set forth requirements for conformity assess-
ment and accreditation bodies.  Incorporating existing standards may 
reduce costs for the agency and for the regulated entities.  To evaluate the 
suitability of using existing standards, the agency should take into account 
the following considerations:  
(a)  When an agency incorporates existing conformity assessment 
standards into its program requirements, important concerns may arise 
about the public availability of those standards due to the costs of obtaining 
copyrighted materials.  When an agency considers incorporating copyright-
ed material by reference, the agency should be cognizant of issues relating 
to incorporation by reference.  (See Administrative Conference of the Unit-
ed States, Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012));  
(b)  An agency that anticipates the use of conformity assessment bodies 
in other countries may particularly benefit by recognizing accreditation 
bodies that operate in accordance with international standards rather than 
the agency itself accrediting conformity assessment bodies;   
(c)  When an agency incorporates existing standards into its require-
ments for third parties, it can supplement those standards with program-
specific rules.   An agency may require, for example, that in addition to 
being accredited to an international standard, a conformity assessment body 
must satisfy accreditation rules specific to the third-party program; and 
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(d)  Agencies should also be aware that existing conformity assessment 
standards may include confidentiality provisions that apply to information 
collected during the assessment.  Agencies should consider when disclosure 
to agencies and/or the public is necessary and when confidentiality may be 
justified.  Program-specific reporting rules, as discussed in section 6 below,  
may be necessary to enable appropriate governmental or public access to 
such information. 
 
6.  Access to Information.  The agency should ensure that both the gov-
ernment and the public will have appropriate access to information about 
program operations.   An agency’s development of third-party program 
rules and guidance should include notice and an opportunity for public 
participation.   Also, the agency should provide information to the public 
about the roles and identities of the third parties associated with a regulato-
ry program.  Finally, the agency should establish reporting rules that 
require third parties to provide information to the agency based on the 
following considerations: 
(a)  The reporting rules should facilitate transparency.  Information 
about the compliance of regulated entities should be available from the 
agency to the public, comparable to what would be available in the absence 
of a third-party program.  Agencies may also be able to provide additional 
compliance information to the public that was not available before the 
third-party program;  
(b)  The reporting rules should facilitate appropriate agency oversight.  
For example, conformity assessment bodies can be required to report to the 
agency potential conflicts of interest before performing a conformity as-
sessment, or provide the dates of their assessment activities so that the 
agency can conduct site visits; 
(c)  In certain circumstances, the agency might have reporting rules 
that require conformity assessment bodies to send assessment results direct-
ly to the agency; and 
(d)  The agency might require conformity assessment bodies and/or 
regulated entities to report electronically, which may facilitate the provision 
of information to the public. 
 
7.  Agency Oversight.  The agency has a duty to exercise oversight to en-
sure that the third-party program is fulfilling its regulatory purpose.  An 
agency should generally set forth how it intends to conduct such oversight.  
For example, it may annually audit a certain number of accreditations or 
conformity assessments, or carry out a market surveillance program to test 
regulated products off-the-shelf.  In exercising oversight, the agency should 
also take into account the following considerations: 
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(a)  Beyond conducting direct oversight, an agency can require third 
parties to conduct additional assessment activities that provide further 
information to the agency about program operation.  For example, an agen-
cy may require accreditation bodies annually to audit a certain number of 
conformity assessments, or it may require conformity assessment bodies to 
conduct particular types of surveillance on products they assess; 
(b)  The agency should establish procedures for receiving and respond-
ing to public complaints regarding potential noncompliance or other aspects 
of program operation.  The agency could, for example, require a third party 
that has assessed the conformity of a regulated product or entity to investi-
gate a complaint of noncompliance.  In any event, the agency should ensure 
that complaints are resolved in an appropriate and timely manner; and   
(c)  The agency should make clear the possible adverse actions that it 
may take against third parties that do not comply with program rules.  A 
key adverse action is removing third parties from the program. Third par-
ties may be removed temporarily through a suspension of accreditation, or 
permanently through a withdrawal of accreditation. 
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